FIVE BOOKES,

OF

PHILOSOPHICALL COMFORT, FVLL

Of Christian consolation, written a 1000. yeeres since.

Hhh. 205

L.24.4

By *Anitius, Manlius, Torquatus, Seuerinus,* BOETIVS; a Christian Consul of ROME.

Newly Translated out of Latine, together with Marginall Notes, explaining the obscurest places.

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TO THE MOST Vertuous LADY, the *Counteſſe of* DORSET DOVVAGER.

THis excellent Booke, prouing tho ſhortly, yet ſurely, the vanitie of all other goods; the veritie of mans onely good to conſiſt in ſolely ſetling his ſoule on God the ſoueraigne, yea ſole Good; hauing proued profitable to all almoſt neighbour Nations, as turned into their tongues; I preſume to preſent vnto our Countrie alſo for our common good. Now for that it is a common vſe, in communicating to all a priuate Inuention or Tranſlation, to appro-

priate the protection thereof to some one particular Person: in the designing of that Person, vnto me none occurs more proper then your vertuous selfe, not so much for my priuate obligations vnto you (which yet be manifold, I must needes publikely acknowledge) as for a peculiar interest (as I may say) it seems you haue vnto this booke. This Booke (I say) so much esteemed by your late most worthy Lord and Husband, as had his leisure beene answerable to his learning and will, it had beene enobled by a more noble Translatour. This Booke (I say) which though perhaps as Philosophicall for the speculatiue points, may be aboue your vnderstanding, yet as truely Theological for the practicall partes, the principall ende of such speculations, it is I am perswaded according, and vnder your will. And yet also (Madame, for I had rather you should wisely feare, then I foolishly flatter) looke into it as a glasse, not so much to see if most parts be much, as if any bee lesse beautifull. Weigh if in all things and at all times, you haue truely preferred the veritie of goodnesse of God, afore the vanitie of vice of the world: if you haue, continue therein, so much

much more carefully, as remaines for you a leſſe time of this comberſome carefulneſſe. If you haue not, bee carefull now in your laſt times at the leaſt in the principall points to begin your iourney with ſuch alacritie, as with much ſpeed to make perhaps a long way in a ſhort time. This is the greateſt good I your poore Client can wiſh you, this is the powerfulleſt patronage and higheſt commendation you can procure to this Booke; that your ſelfe doe vertuouſly no leſſe effect in will and worke, then your late loued Lord did affect it in word and vnderſtanding. With the which wiſh to the richeſt ſeruice my pouertie can reach vnto,

I remaine.

Your moſt meane but not leaſt
deuoted ſeruant

I. T.

To the Reader.

IT *is an old ſaying, and not ſo old as true, that* vino vendibili non eſt opus hædera: *I would it were as true, that the beſt thinges are alway moſt eſteemed, then I would not doubt but that this golden booke of* Boethius *would be in great requeſt; for I cannot imagine, what fault any man can find with it, that is delighted with Vertue. The ſubiect of this Diſcourſe is true Felicitie, the way to it, and the remouing of all impediments. All this is explaned*

ned by Rhetoricall & Philoſophicall diſcourſes. And leaſt any thing ſhould bee wanting, the Poetical Muſes are not excluded; Thus are all diſpoſitions ſatisfied, and profite ioyned with delight. Wherefore well we may ſay of this worthy Authour: Omne tulit punctum, q'ui miſcuit vtile dulci. *And yet this I will adde more; that the noble, learned and pyous wits and minds, will take moſt benefite and pleaſure in* Boethius. *The reaſon is, for that* ſimilis ſimili gaudet; *Who more noble then* Anitius Manlius Torquatus Seuerinus; *ſince fewe of that family deſerued not to be Conſuls. And they were worthy of the golden chayne, ſince their Champion wonne it in the field.* Titus Manlius *I meane, who tooke it from his French Challengers necke, and put it about his owne, whereby he purchaſed to himſelfe and his poſteritie, the ſyrname of* Torquatus.

quatus. *And by another no leſſe admirable act of iuſtice, came to bee called* Seuerinus, *not ſparing his owne conquering ſonne, becauſe he gaue the battell againſt his fathers commaund. What ſhould I ſpeake of our* Boethius *his learning? Let theſe his fiue Bookes giue ſufficient teſtimonie thereof. Or if this will not ſuffice, peruſe who liſt his other monuments, fraught with varietie of all Sciences, both humane and diuine. His pietie appeareth in his whole life, but moſt of all at his death; hee both wrote and dyed for defence of Chriſt and his faith againſt the* Arians *and other hereticks. Finally he was truely* Boethius, *that is, an helper and relieuer of all innocent and diſtreſſed people. And leaſt his Benefite ſhould liue no longer then himſelfe, he committed it to writing, and ſendeth it to thee, in this his noble, learned, and pyous worke. Which that our*

Coun-

Countrey may the better enioy, is now, (as thou seest) both in English verse and prose. Which how hard it was to effect, thou mayest guesse in part: since our prince of Poets, Chaucer *turned it only into prose. Which will be a sufficient motiue to take this labour in good part; and to beare with such faults as cannot easily be amended. Though thus much also I doe assure thee, that it will be more pleasing to the Translatour, to see his labour rather amended then commended. As likewise hee will take it more in patience, to haue it carped at, then corrupted.*

Vale & fruere.

(. . .)

TO

TO THE YONG Gentlemen Readers, concerning the Title of this Booke of Philosophicall Comfort.

WHo tasts those ioyes which fading pleasure yeelds,
His age will rue the follies of his youth:
But if you trauell in the spatious fields
Of learned Arts, there seeking precious truth,
The sacred Treasure, which you thence haue gained,
In wants and troubles shall your succour proue;
And though your bodies be in dungeons chained,
By wisedomes ayd your minds shall be aboue.
Then since you may be wretched, poore and old,
Let not such infants starue for lacke of care,
Who shall like thankefull children you vphold,
When they more strong, when you more feeble are.
Whereof you by this worke the proofe may see
In him, whose comforts your instructions bee.

Another

Another of the Authour.

IN thee (Boetius) *that true rule appeares,*
That wise men gaine most fame by suffering paines.
Of all the actions of thy prosperous yeeres
To after-times small memorie remaines:
But when the cloudes of sorrow stroue t'obscure
Thy vertues light, then it did clearer shine.
Calamity makes studious minds more pure,
Their glorie groweth, as their states decline.
Thou couldst not in thy ioyes haue pleas'd vs so,
As with this worke, which to thy griefe we owe.

To

To the friendly Reader.

Sonnet.

VVHat need my lines to recommend these leaues,
So frequently by learned hands perus'd,
As that I feare they'll seeme to be abus'd,
Since customarie praise suspition weaues.

For I mistrust a gorgeous Frontispice,
Of mercenary penns. If thou doest so,
And art vnlearn'd, to better counsell goe.
I, thou, nor any can thinke that amisse.

And lettered th ugh thou bee'st, here mayst thou find,
What other volumes haue not, for thy good:
Some passages explained of that kind
As are, at first, not easily vnderstood.

Friend, let with thankes our Author be rewarded,
Who gaines, nor fame, but thy good hath regarded.

G. G.

THE FIRST BOOKE OF BOETIVS.

Containing his Complaint *and Miſeries.*

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THE I. VERSE.

Wherein Boetius bewaileth his eſtate.

I That with youthfull heate did verſes write,
Muſt now my woes in dolefull tunes endite,
My worke is fram'd by Muſes torne and rude,
And my ſad cheeks are with true teares bedew'd
For theſe alone no terrour could affray,
From being partners of my weary way,

My happy and delightfull ages glory,
Is my sole comfort, being old and sory.
Old age through griefe makes vnexpected hast,
And sorrow in my yeares her signes hath plac't,
Vntimely hoary haires cour my head,
And my loose skin quakes on my flesh halfe dead,
O happy death that spareth sweetest yeares,
And comes in sorrow often call'd with teares.
Alas how deafe is he to wretches cries,
And loth he is to close vp weeping eyes,
While trusted chance me with vain fauour crowned,
That saddest houre my life had almost drowned:
Now she hath clouded her deceitfull face,
My pitefull daies prolong their weary race,
My friends, why did you count me fortunate?
He that is fall'n, ne're stood in setled state.

THE I. PROSE.

Containing the description of Philosophy.

WHile I ruminated these things with my selfe, and determined to set forth my woful complaint in writing; me thought

thought I sawe [a] a woman stand [b] higher then my head, hauing a [c] graue countenance, [d] glistering cleare eyes, and of quicker sight, then commonly Nature doth afford; her [e] colour fresh and cheerefull, and yet discouering so many years, that she cou d not be thoght to haue liued in our times; her [f] stature vncertaine and doubtfull, for sometime she exceeded not the common height of men, and somtime she seemed to touch the heauens with her head, and if she lifted it vp to the highest, she pearced the very heauens, so that she could not bee seene by the beholders; her [g] garments were made of mo't [h] fine threads, with [i] cunning workman-

a Because in Latine and Greeke Philosophy is the feminine gender.
b Philosophy is Gods gift.
c Because she maket her possessors reuerend and graue.
d Piercing and speculating the hidden nature of things.
e The beauty of Philosophy is neither encreased nor diminished with years.
f Naturall and Moral Philosophy are not aboue mans common capacity: Astronomy toucheth the heauens, Metaphysicke or the knowledge of God and Angels, &c. cannot bee exactly comprehended. g Her disputations or discourses. h Learned Propositions. i Logicke.

ship, and of an [k] euer during ſtuffe, which (as I knew afterward by her owne report) ſhe had wouen with her [l] own hands. A certaine [m] duſkiſhneſſe cauſed by negligence and time, had darkened their colour, as it is wont to happen, when Images ſtand in a ſmokie roome. In the lower part of them was placed the letter [n] π, and in the vpper [o] θ, and betwixt the two letters, in the maner of ſtayers, there were certaine [p] degrees made, by which there was a paſſage from the lower to the higher letter: this her garment had been cut by the violence of ſome, who had taken away ſuch [q] peeces as they could get. In her [r] right hand ſhe had certaine books, and in her [s] left hand ſhe held a ſcepter. This woman ſeeing the [t] Poeticall

k Euerlaſting truth.
l Becauſe none without Philoſophy can weaue theſe diſcourſes.
m Learning neglected in the time of Boetius, and written obſcurely by ancient Philoſophers.
n Practica.
o Theorica.
p All ſciences are to be obtayned with Method.
q Some ſentences ill applyed to the defence of falſe opinions; See the third Proſe.
r She chiefly delighted in ſtudy and contemplation.
s Next ſhe was occupied in gouerning the Common wealth.
t Poetry is to be eſteemed of, according to the matter it handleth.

Muses standing about my bed, and suggesting wordes to my teares, being moued for a little space, and inflamed with angry lookes; who (sayth shee) hath permitted these Tragical harlots to haue aceesse to this sicke man? which will not onely not comfort his griefes with wholesome remedies, but also nourish them with sugred poyson; for these be they, which with the fruitlesse thornes of [u] affections doe kill the fruitful crop of reason, and doe accustome mens minds to sickneſſe, and not free them. But if your flattery did depriue vs of some prophane fellow, as commonly it happeneth, I should thinke, that it were not so grieuously to be taken, for in him our labors should receiue no harme. But now you haue laid hand of him, who

[u] This is the common fault of Poets, to feede and nourish pasion against reason.

hath beene brought vp in [x] Peripatetticall, and Academicall ſtudies: but rather get you gone, you Syrens pleaſant euen to deſtruction, and leaue him to my Muſes to be cured and healed. That [y] company being thus checked, ouercome with griefe, caſting their eyes vpon the ground, and bewraying their baſhfulneſſe with bluſhing, went ſadly away. And I, whoſe [z] ſight was dimmed with teares, ſo that I could not diſcerne what this woman might be, ſo imperious, and of ſuch authority, was aſtoniſhed, and fixing my countenance vpon the earth, began to expect with [a] ſilence what ſhee would doe afterward. Then ſhe comming nigher, ſate downe at my beds feet, and beholding my countenance ſad with mourning, and caſt vpon the ground

[x] Eleaticis of Elea, the City where *Ariſtotle* ſtudied.

[y] Note the force of a graue reprehenſion

[z] Griefe for temporall loſſes darkneth and dulleth the vnderſtanding.

[a] The way to be comforted is to giue care to good counſell.

ground with griefe, complained of the perturbation of my mind with these verses.

The II. Verse.

Phylosophy bewayleth the perturbation of Boetius his mind.

Alas, how thy dull mind is headlong cast
In depthes of woe, where all her light once lost,
She doth to walke in vtter darkenes hast,
While cares grow great with earthly tempests tost.
He, that through th'opned heau'ns did freely runne,
And vs'd to trauaile the celestiall wayes,
Marking the rosie splendor of the sunne,
And noting Cynthiaes cold and watry rayes.
He that did bravely comprehend in verse,
The different spheres, and wandring course of stars,
He that was wont the causes to rehearse,
Why sounding winds doe with the seas make wars,
What spirit moues the worlds well setled frame,
And why the Sunne, whome forth the East doth bring
In westerne waues doth hide his falling flame,
Searching what power tempers the pleasing spring,
Which makes the earth her rosie flowers to beare.
Whose gift it is, that Autumnes fruitfull season,

Should with full grapes flow in a plenteous yeare,
Telling of secret Nature euery reason,
Now hauing lost the [a] *beauty of his mind.*
Lies with his necke compast in pond'rous [b] *chaines,*
His countenance with heauy waight declin'd,
Him to [c] *behold the sullen earth constraines.*

[a] The foresaid speculation.
[b] Affection to earthly things and the passions which ensue thereof.
[c] To thinke vpon earthly things.

THE II. PROSE.

Philosophy enquireth of Boetius his disease.

BVt it is rather time (saith she) to apply remedies, then to make complaintes: And then looking wishly vpon me; Art thou he (saith she) which being long since nursed with our milke, and brought vp with our nourishments, wert come to mans estate? but we had giuen thee such [a] weapons, as if thou haddest not cast them away, would

[a] The intellectual and Cardinall, or morall vertues.

would haue made thee inuincible: Doest thou not know me? why doest thou not speake? Is it [b] shamefastnesse or vnsensiblenesse that makes thee silent? I had rather it were shamefastnesse, but I perceiue thou art become vnsensible. And seeing me not onely silent, but altogether mute and dumbe; fayre and easily she laid her hand vpon my breasts saying, [c] there is no danger, he is in a [d] Lethargie, the common disease of deceiued minds: he hath a little forgot himselfe, but he will easily remember himselfe againe, if he be brought to know vs first. To which end, let vs a little wipe his eyes, dimmed with the cloud of mortall things. And hauing said thus, with a [e] corner of her garment shee dried my eyes which were wet with teares.

[b] Shamefastnesse causeth only silence, vnsensiblenesse taketh away both speech and memory.

[c] He is an ill Physition who despayreth of his cure. *Sen l. de Clem.*

[d] Forgetfulnesse.

[e] Some vulgar sentence which he could not altogether forget.

THE

THE III. VERSE.

How Boetius began to recouer his knowledge and memory.

THen fled the night and darkenes did me leaue,
Mine eyes their wonted ſtrength receiue:
As when the ſtarres withdraw their haſty band,
If heau'n ore-caſt with cloudes doe ſtand,
The Sunne doth lurke, the earth receiueth night,
Before the time of ſtarrylight.
But if fierce Boreas ſent from Thrace make way
For the reſtoring of the day,
Phœbus with freſh and ſodaine beames doth riſe,
Striking with light our wondring eyes.

THE III. PROSE.

How the perſecution of Wiſemen is no new or ſtrange thing.

IN like manner the miſts of ſadneſſe diſſolued I came to my ſelfe, and recouered my iudgement, ſo that

that I knew my Physitions face: wherefore casting mine eyes vpon her somewhat stedfastly, I beheld my nurse *Philosophy*, in whose house I had remained from my youth, and I said: O Mistresse of all vertues, for what cause art thou come from [a] heauen into this our solitary banishment? art thou come to beare me company in being falsly accused? Should I (saith she) forsake thee my Disciple, and not deuide the burthen, which thou beares't for enuy to my name, by partaking of thy labour? But *Philosophy* thought it not lawfull to forsake the innocent in his trouble. Should I feare any accusation? as though this were any new matter? for doest thou thinke, that this is the first time, that Wisedome hath been exposed to danger by wicked men?

[a] Philosophy the gift of God

men? Haue we not in ancient times before our *Platoes* age, had often-times great conflicts with the rashnesse of folly? and while he liued, had not his Master [b] *Socrates* the victory of an vniust death in my presence, whose inheritance, when afterward the *Epicures*, *Stoikes*, and others, (euery one for his own sect) endeuoured to vsurpe, and as it were in part of their pray, sought to draw me to them, exclaiming and striuing against them; they tore the garment which I had wouen with my owne hands, and hauing gotten some little peeces of it, thinking me to be wholy in their possession, departed. Amongst whom, because [c] certaine signes of my apparell appeared, indiscretion supposing that they were my familiar friendes, hath peruerted and drawn many

[b] He was put to death at Athens by *Anitus*, for acknowledging one God and the immortality of the soule.

[c] False opinions alledge some sentences of Philosophie in a wrong sense.

many into the errors of those prophane multitudes. But if thou hast not heard of the flight of [d] *Anaxagoras*, the poyson of *Socrates*, nor the torments of [e] *Zeno*, because they are forraine examples; yet thou maiest haue heard of *Cannius* of *Seneca*, of [h] *Soranus*, whose memory is both fresh and famous, whome nothing else brought to their ouerthrow, but that they had been instructed in our schoole, and were altogether disliking to the humors of wicked men; wherefore thou hast no cause to maruaile, if in the sea of this life we be tossed with boysterous stormes, whose [i] chiefest purpose is to displease the wicked: Of which though there be an huge armie, yet it is to be despised, because it is not gouerned by any [k] Captaine, but is carried vp and downe

[d] He was constrayne to flie for denying th some to b God.
[e] He was pounded i a morter b atyrant whome h impugned.
[f] A Poet put to dea by *Caius* the Emperour.
[g] *Neroes* Schoolemaster, who caused him to bleed t death.
[h] A famous Poet acknowledging God, was crucified by some wicked men.
[i] The displeasure of the wicked is rather to be desired then feared.
[k] Because they follow not reason.

downe by phantasticall Errour without any order at all. And if at any time they assaile vs with greater force, [l] our Captaine retireth [m] her bands into [n] a Castle, leauing them occupied in sacking [o] vnprofitable baggage. And from aboue we laugh them to scorn for seeking so greedily after most vile things being safe from all their furious assault, and fortified with that defence, which aspiring Folly cannot preuaile against.

l Right reason.
m The other powers of the Soule.
n Of Vertue and contemplation.
o Temporall things.

THE IIII. VERSE.

How we may resist the persecution of the wicked.

WHo mildly can his age dispose,
And at his feet proud destiny throwes:
Who stoutly doth each chance behold,
Keeping his countenance vncontrold:
Not him the Oceans rage, and threat,

Stirring

Stirring the waues with angry heate,
Nor hoate [a] *Vesevus when he casts*
From broken hilles enflamed blasts;
Nor fiery thunder can dismay,
Which takes the tops of towers away.
Why doe fierce tyrants vs affright,
Whose rage is farre beyond their might?
For nothing hope, nor feare thou harme,
So their weake wrath thou shalt disarme:
But he whome hope or terror takes;
Being a slaue his shield forsakes,
And leaues his place, and doth prouide
A chaine, wherewith his hands are ti'de.

[a] A mountaine by Naples.

THE IIII. PROSE.

Boetius discouereth the causes of his griefe.

VNderstandest thou these things (saith she) and doe they make impression in thy mind? Art thou ὄνος πρὸς λύραν? why weepest thou? why sheddest thou so many teares? ἐξαύδα μὴ κεύθε νόῳ: If thou expectest to be cured, thou must

Asinus ad Lyram.

Eloquere, ne occultes intellectus.

muſt diſcouer thy wound. Then I collecting the forces of my mind together, made her anſwere in theſe words. Doth the cruelty of fortunes rage neede further declaration, or doth it not ſufficiently appeare of it ſelfe? doth not the very countenance of this place moue thee? Is this the Library, which thou thy ſelfe hadſt choſen to ſit in at my houſe? in which thou haſt oftentimes diſcourſed with me of the knowledge of diuine and humaine things? Had I this attire or countenance, when I ſearched the ſecrets of Nature with thee, when thou deſcribedſt vnto me the courſe of the ſtarres with thy Geometricall rod, when thou diddeſt frame my conuerſation, and the maner of my whole life according to the patterne of the celeſtiall order.

a The firſt cauſe of *Boetius* his griefe was his baniſhment and miſery.

der. Are these the [b] rewardes, which thy obedient seruants haue? But thou diddest decree that sentence by the mouth of *Plato*; that common wealthes should be happy, if either the Students of wisedom did gouerne them, or those which were appointed to gouerne them, would giue themselues to the study of wisedome. Thou by the same Philosopher diddest admonish vs, that it is a sufficient cause for wisemen to take vpon themselues the gouernement of the commonwealth, lest if the rule of Cities were left in the hands of lewd and wicked Citizens, they should work the subuersion and ouerthrow of the good. Wherfore following this authority, I desired to practise that by publike administration which I had learned of thee in priuate con-

[b] the second cause, because he had not deserued them, hauing a good intention in admitting promotion

ference. Thou and God himselfe who hath inserted thee in the minds of the wise, are my witnesses, that nothing but the common desire of all good men, brought me to be a Magistrate. This hath beene the [c] cause of my grieuous and irreconcileable disagreements with wicked men, and that which freedom of conscience carrieth with it, of contemning the indignation of Potentates for the defence of iustice. How often haue I encountered with [d] *Conigastus*, violently possessing himselfe with poore mens goods? How often haue I put backe [e] *Triguilla* Prouost of the Kings house from iniuries which he had begunne, yea and finished also? How often haue I protected by putting my authority in danger, such poore wretches, as the vnpu-

[c] Thirdly, he deserued the contrary.

[d] One of king Theodoricus his chiefest fauorites;

[e] Another

vnpunished couetousnesse of the [f] barbarous did vexe with infinite reproches? Neuer did any man draw me from right to wrong. It grieued me no lesse then them which suffered it, to see the wealth of our Subiects wasted, partly with priuate pillage, and partly by publike tributes. When in the time of a great dearth things were set at so excessiue and vnreasonable a rate, that the Prouince of *Campania* was like to bee altogether impouerished for the common good, I stucke not to contend with the chiefe Prætor himselfe, and the matter was discussed before the king, and I preuailed so farre, that it went not forward. I drew *Paulinus*, who had been Consull, out of the very mouth of the gaping Courtiers, who like rauenous curs,

[f] The Gothes.

had already in hope and ambition deuoured his riches. That *Albinus* who had likewiſe beene Conſul, might not be puniſhed vpon preſumptions and falſe accuſation, I expoſed my ſelfe to the hatred of *Cyprian* his accuſer. May I ſeeme to haue prouoked enmity enough againſt my ſelfe? But others ſhould ſo much the more haue procured my ſafety, ſince that for the loue I bare to Iuſtice, I left my ſelfe no way by the meanes of Courtiers to be ſafe. § But by whoſe accuſations did I receiue this blow? by theirs, who, long ſince hauing put *Baſil* out of the kings ſeruice, compelled him now to accuſe me, by the neceſsity which he was driuen to by debt. *Opilio* likewiſe and *Gaudentius* being baniſhed by the kings decree, for the iniuries and manifold deceites,

§ The fourth cauſe of his griefe, the baſenes of his accuſers and the open iniuſtice of his accuſation.

deceites, which they had committed, because they would not obey, defended themselues by taking Sanctuary, of which the king hearing, gaue sentence, that vnlesse they departed out of the City of *Rauenna* within certaine daies, they should be branded in the foreheads, and put out by force. What could be added to this seuerity? And yet that very day, their accusation against me went for currant. What might be the reason of this? did my dealing deserue it? or did their condemnation which went before, make them iust accusers? was not fortune ashamed? if not that innocency was accused, yet at least, that it had so vile and base accusers? But [h] what crime was laid to my charge? wilt thou haue it in one word? I am said to haue desi-

[h] Fiftly. His chiefe offence was vertue.

red the Senates safety. Wilt thou know the maner how? I am blamed for hauing hindred their accuser to bring forth euidence, by which he should proue the Senate guilty of treason. What thinkest thou O Mistresse? Shall I deny this fault, that I may not shame thee? But it is true, I desired it, neither will I euer cease from hauing that desire. Shall I confesse it? but then I must leaue hindering their accuser. Shall I call it an offence to haue wished the safety of that order? Indeed the Senate with their decrees concerning me, had made it an offence. But Folly alway deceiuing her selfe, cannot change the deserts of things, neither doe I thinke it lawfull for me by the decree of *Socrates*, either to haue concealed the truth, or granted a lie. But how

how this may be, I leaue to thine, and wisemens censure. And that the posterity may not be ignorant of the course and truth of the matter, I haue put it downe in writing: for what should I speake of those fained [i] letters, in which I am charged to haue hoped for the Romane liberty? The deceit of which would manifestly haue appeared, if it might haue been lawfull for me to haue vsed the confession of my very accusers, which in all busines is of greatest force: for what liberty remaineth there to be hoped for? I would to God there were any? I would haue answered as *Canius* did, who being charged by *Caius Cæsar*, sonne to *Germanicus*, that he was priuy to the conspiracy made against him, answered: If I had been made acquainted with it, thou

[i] Sixtly He was falsely accused & not permitted to vse the testimony of his very accusers.

shouldest neuer haue known of it. Neither hath sorrow so dulled my wits, that I complaine of the wicked endeuours of sinnefull men against vertue, but I exceedingly maruaile at those things, which they hoped to bring to passe: for the desire of doing euill may be attributed to our weakenesse, but that in the sight of [k] God, the wicked should be able to compasse whatsoeuer they contriue against the innocent, is altogether monstrous; vpon which occasion not without cause, one of thy familiar friends demanded, (if faith he) there be a God, from whence proceed so many euils? and if there be no God, from whence commeth any good? But let that passe, that wicked men, which seeke the bloud of all good men, and of the whole

[k] Seuenthly He grieueth that wicked men are able to preuaile against the good.

whole Senate, would also haue ouerthrowne me, whome they saw to stand in defence of good men, and of the Senate: [1] But did I deserue the same of the Senators themselues? I suppose thou remembrest, how thou being present, diddest alway direct me, when I went about to say or doe any thing. Thou remembrest I say, when at *Verona*, the king being desirous of a common ouerthrow, endeauoured to lay the treason, whereof onely *Albinus* was accused, vpon the whole order of the Senate, with how great securitie of my owne danger, I defended the innocency of the whole Senate. Thou knowest that these thinges which I say are true, and that I was neuer delighted in my own praise, for the secret of a good conscience

[1] Rightly, The Senators themselues of whome hee had deserued so well, were his enemies.

science is in some sort diminished, when by declaring what he hath done, a man receiueth the reward of fame. But thou seest to what passe my innocency is come: in stead of the rewards of true vertue, I vndergo the punishment of wickednesse, wherewith I am falsly charged. [m] Was it euer yet seene, that the manifest confession of any crime, made the Iudges so to conforme themselues to seuerity, that either the errour of mans iudgement, or the condition of Fortune, which is certaine to none, did not incline some of them to fauour? If I had beene accused, that I would haue burnt the Churches, or wickedly haue killed the Priestes, or haue sought the death of all good men, yet sentence should haue been pronounced against me present, hauing

[m] Ninthly, all conspired against him, no man had compassion of him.

uing confessed, and being conuicted. [n] Now being conuaied fiue hundred miles of, not suffered to make any defence, I am condemned to death and proscription, for bearing the Senate too much good will. O Senate, which deserues that neuer any may be conuicted of the like crime. The dignity of which guilt, euen the very accusers themselues saw, which that they might obscure by adding some kind of fault, they belyed me, that I had defiled my conscience with [o] sacriledge, for an ambitious desire of preferment. But thou, which haddest seated thy selfe in me, diddest repell from the seat of my mind all desire of mortall things, and within thy sight there was no place for sacriledge to harbour; for thou diddest instill into my eares and thoughts

[n] 10. He was condemned being absent.

[o] 11. He was falsly accused of sorcery.

thoughts dayly that saying of *Pythagoras*; ἕπου θεῷ: Neither was it fitting for me, to vse the aide of most vile spirites, whome thou haddest framed to that excellency, that I might become like to God. Besides the innocency which appeared in the most retired roomes of my house, the assembly of my most honourable friends, my holy and worthily renowmed father in Law *Symmachus*, doe cleare mee from all suspition of this crime. But O detestable wickednesse. They the rather giue credite to so great a crime, and thinke me the nigher to such mischieuous dealing, because I am endewed with thy knowledge, and adorned with thy vertues, so that it is not inough that I reape no commodity for thy respect, vnlesse P thou beest also dis-

honoured

Sequere Deum.

P 12 Philosophy and Learning dishonoured for his respect.

honoured for the hatred conceiued againſt me. And that my miſeries may increaſe the more, the greateſt part doe not ſo much reſpect the value of things, as the euent of fortune, and they eſteeme onely that to be prouidently done, which the happy ſucceſſe commends. By which means it commeth to paſſe, that the firſt loſſe which miſerable men haue is their [q] eſtimation, and the good opinion which was had of them. What rumors goe now among the people, what diſſonant & diuers opinions? I cannot abide to thinke of them: onely this I will ſay, the laſt burthen of aduerſity is, that when they which are in miſery, are accuſed of any crime, they are thought to deſerue whatſoeuer they ſuffer. And I ſpoiled of all my goodes, bereaued of my dig-

q is. The loſſe of eſtimation with the greateſt part.

dignities, blemiſhed in my good name, for benefites receiue puniſhments. And me thinks I ſee the r curſed crues of the wicked abounding with ioy and gladneſſe, and euery loſt companion deuiſing with himſelfe, how to accuſe others falſly, good men lie proſtrate with the terror of my danger, and euery lewd fellow is prouoked by impunity to attempt any wickedneſſe, and by rewards to bring it to effect; but the innocent are not onely depriued of all ſecurity, but alſo of any maner of defence. Wherefore I may well exclaime.

r 14. The wicked encouraged and the good diſmayed by his fall.

THE

The V. Verse.

Boetius complaineth, that all things are gouerned by Gods prouidence, beside the actions and affayres of men.

CReator of the skie,
Who sitst on thine æternall throne on hie,
Who doest quicke motion cause,
In all the heau'ns, and giu'st the starres their lawes.
That the pale Queene of night,
Sometimes receiuing all her brothers light,
Should shine in her full pride,
And with her beames the lesser stars should hide;
Sometimes she wants her grace,
When the sunnes rayes are in lesse distant place.
And [a] *Hesperus that flies*
As Messenger before the night doth rise,
And oft with sodaine change
Before the Sunne, as [a] *Lucifer doth range.*
Thou short the dayes doest make,
When Winter from the trees the leaues doth take:
Thou when the fiery Sunne,
Doth summer cause, mak'st the nights swiftly run.
Thy might doth rule the yeare,
As Northerne winds the leaues away doe beare,
So Zephyrus from West,
The plants in all their glory doth reuest;
And [b] *Syrius burnes that corne,*

[a] The same starre hath two contrary names, because it appeares both in the euening and morning.

With

With which [b] Arcturus did the earth adorne.
None from thy lawes are free,
Nor can forsake their place ordain'd by thee.
Thou that to certaine end
Gouern'st all things; deny'st thou to intend
The Acts of men alone,
Directing them in measure from thy throne?
For why should slipp'ry chance
Rule all things with such doubtfull gouernance?
Or why should punishments,
Due to the guilty light on innocents?
But now the highest place,
Giueth to naughty manners greatest grace,
And wicked people vexe
Good men, and tread vainstly on their necks,
Vertue in darkenesse lurkes,
And righteous soules are charg'd with impious workes.
Deceites nor Periuries,
Disgrace not those, who colour them with lies,
For, when it doth them please.
To shew their force, they to their will with ease,
The hearts of kings can stare,
To whome so many crouch with trembling feare,
O thou that ioyn'st with loue
All worldly things, looke from thy seat aboue
On the earthes wretched state,
We men, not the least worke thou didst create,
With fortunes blasts doe shake,
Thou carefull ruler, these fierce tempests slake,
And for the earth prouide,
Those laxes by which thou heau'n in peace dost guide.

[b] Diuerse starres which appeare by the sunne in diuers seasons.

THE

THE V. PROSE.

Philosophy sheweth that Boetius is the cause of his owne misery.

WHen I had vttered these speeches with continued griefe, shee with an amiable countenance, and nothing moued with my complaints, said; when I first saw thee sad and weeping, I forthwith knew thee to be in misery and banishment. But I had not knowne how farre of, thou wert banished, if thy speech had not bewrayed it. O how farre art thou gone from thy [a] Country, not being driuen away, but wandring of thine owne accord. Or if thou haddest rather be thought to haue been driuen out, it hath been onely by thy selfe; for neuer could any other but thy selfe haue done it;

[a] Mans Country is wisedome, *Senec. de remed. Fortun. Si sapiens est non peregrinatur, si stultus est, exulat.*

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Sed Omnes Rex est Omnes Dominus.

it; for if thou remembrest, of what Country thou art, it is not gouerned as *Athens* was wont to be, by the multitude ἀλλὰ εἷς βασιλεὺς ἐστιν, εἷς ποιμήν, It is desirous to haue aboundance of Citizens, and not to haue them driuen away. To be gouerned by whose authority, and to be subiect to her lawes, is the greatest freedome that can be. Art thou ignorant of that most ancient law of thy City, bywhich it is decreed, that he may not be banished, that hath made choice of it for his dwelling place: for he that is within her fort or hold, needs not feare, lest he deserue to be banished. But whosoeuer ceaseth to desire to dwell in it, ceaseth likewise to deserue so great a benefite. Wherefore the countenance of this place moueth me not so much as thy counte-

nance

nance doth. Neither dol ſo much require thy Library adorned with yuory ſeelings, and chriſtall windowes, as the ſeat of thy mind, in which I haue not placed bookes, but that which makes bookes to be eſteemed of, I meane the ſentences of my books, which were written long ſince. And that which thou haſt ſaid of thy deſerts to the common good, is true indeed, but little in reſpect of the many things which thou haſt done. That which thou haſt reported, either of the honeſty, or of the falſeneſſe of thoſe things, which are obiected aga'nſt thee, is knowne to all men. Thou diddeſt well to touch but briefly the wickedneſſe and deceit of thy accuſers, for that the common people to whoſe notice they are come, doe more fitly and largely

ſpeake of them. Thou haſt alſo ſharply rebuked the vniuſt Senates deed. Thou haſt alſo grieued at our accuſation, and haſt bewailed the loſſe or diminiſhing of our good name: and laſtly, thy ſorrow raged againſt fortune, and thou complaynedſt, that deſerts were not equally rewarded. In the end of thy bitter verſe, thou deſiredſt, that the earth might be gouerned by that peace, which heauen enioyeth. But becauſe thou art turmoiled with the multitude of affections, griefe and anger drawing thee to diuerſe partes, in the plight thou art now, the more forcible remedies cannot be applyed vnto thee; wherefore, for a while, we will vſe the more eaſie, that thy affections, which are as it were hardened and ſwolne with per-

perturbations, may by gentle handling be mollified and disposed to receiue the force of sharper medicines.

THE VI. VERSE.

Philosophy proueth that order is necessary in all things.

VVHen hoat with Phœbus beams,
The Crab casts fiery gleames,
He, that doth then with seede,
The fruitlesse furrowes feede,
Deceiued of his bread,
Must be with akornes fed.
Seeke not the flowry woods,
For Violets sweet buddes,
When fields are ouercast
With the fierce Northerne blast,
Nor hope then home to bring,
The branches of the spring.

If thou in grapes delight,
In Autumne Bacchus *might*
With them doth decke our clime.
God eu'ry seu'rall time,
With proper grace hath crown'd,
Nor will those lawes confound,
Which he once setled hath.
He, that with headlong path
This certaine order leaues,
An hapleſſe end receaues.

THE VI. PROSE.

Philoſophy diſcouereth the inward cauſes of Boetius his griefe.

FIrſt therefore wilt thou let me touch and trie the ſtate of thy mind by asking thee a few queſtions, that I may vnderſtand how thou art to be cured. To which I anſwered, aske me what

what queſtions thou wilt, and I will anſwere thee. And then ſhee ſaid, Thinkeſt thou that this world is gouerned by happe hazard and chance? or rather doeſt thou belieue that it is ruled by reaſon? I can (quoth I) in no manner imagine, that ſuch certaine motions are cauſed by raſh chance. And I know that God the Creator doth gouern his worke, neither will I euer thinke otherwiſe. It is ſo, ſaith ſhee, for ſo thou ſaideſt in thy verſe a little before, and bewayledſt, that onely men were void of Gods care; for as for the reſt, thou diddeſt not doubt, but that they were gouerned by reaſon. And ſurely I cannot chuſe, but exceedingly admire, how thou canſt be ill affected, holding ſo wholeſome an opinion. But let vs ſearch further, I geſſe thou wan-

teſt ſomething, but I know not what. Tell mee, ſince thou doubteſt not, that the world is gouerned by God, canſt thou tell me alſo by what meanes it is gouerned? I doe ſcarſely (quoth I) vnderſtand what thou askeſt, and much leſſe am I able to make thee a ſufficient anſwere. Was I (quoth ſhee) deceiued in thinking that thou wantedſt ſomething, by which as by the breach of a fortreſſe, the ſickneſſe of perturbations hath entred into thy mind? But tell me, doeſt thou remember, what is the end of things? or to what the whole intention of nature tendeth? I haue heard it (quoth I) but griefe hath dulled my memory. But knoweſt thou from whence all things had their beginning? I know (quoth I) and anſwered, that from God.

And

And how can it be, that knowing the beginning, thou canſt be ignorant of the end? But this is the condition and force of perturbations, that they may alter a man, but wholy deſtroy, and as it were roote him out of himſelfe, they cannot. But I would haue thee anſwere me to this alſo; doeſt thou remember, that thou art a man? why ſhould I not remember it (quoth I?) Well then, canſt thou explicate what man is? Doeſt thou aske me, if I know that I am a reaſonable and mortall liuing creature? I knowe and confeſſe my ſelfe to bee ſo. To which ſhee replyed, doeſt thou not know thy ſelfe to bee any thing elſe? Not any thing. Now I know (quoth ſhee) another, and that perhaps the greateſt cauſe of thy ſickneſſe, thou haſt forgotten what

[a] The cause and remedy of excessiue griefe.

what thou art. Wherefore I haue fully found out, both the [a] maner of thy disease, and the meanes of thy recouery: for the confusion which thou art in, by the forgetfulnesse of thy selfe, is the cause, why thou art so much grieued at thy exile, and the losse of thy goods. And because, thou art ignorant, what is the end of things, thou thinkest, that lewd and wicked men be powerfull and happy; likewise, because thou hast forgotten, by what meanes the world is gouerned, thou imaginest, that these alterations of fortunes doe fall out without any guide. Sufficient causes not onely of sicknesse, but also of death it selfe. But thanks be to the author of thy health, that Nature hath not altogether forsaken thee.

We

We haue the greatest nourisher of thy health, the true opinion of the gouernement of the world, in that thou beleeuest that it is not subiect to the euents of chance, but to diuine reason: Wherefore feare nothing, out of this little sparkle will be inkindled thy vitall heat. But because it is not yet[b] time to vse more solide remedies; and it is manifest, that the nature of minds is such, that as often as they cast away true opinions, they are possessed with false, out of which the darkenesse of perturbations arising doth make them, that they cannot discerne things aright: I will endeuour to dissolue this cloude with gentle and moderate fomentations; that hauing remoued the obscurity of deceitfull affections, thou mayest behold the splendor of true light.

[b] Discretion to be vsed in comforting the afflicted.

THE

THE VII. VERSE.

Philosophy declareth how the perturbations of our mind doe hinder vs from the knowledge of truth.

WHen starres are shrowded
With duskie night,
They yeeld no light
Being so clowded.
When the wind moueth,
And waues doth reare,
The Sea late cleare,
Foule and darke proueth.
And riuers creeping
Downe a high hill,
Stand often still,
Rocks them backe keeping.
If thou wouldst brightly,
See truthes cleare rayes,
Or walke these wayes,
Which lead most rightly,
All ioy forsaking,
Feare thou must flie,
And hopes defie,
No sorrow taking.
For where these terrors
Raigne in the mind,
They it doe bind,
In cloudy errors.

THE

THE SECOND BOOKE OF BOETIVS.

In which Philosophy applyeth the more easie remedies to Boetius his griefe.

THE I. PROSE.

Of the deceites and inconstancy of Fortune.

AFter this shee remained silent for a while; and hauing by that her modesty made me attentiue, began in

in this wise: If I be rightly enformed of the causes and condition of thy disease, thou languishest with the affection and desire of thy former fortune, and the change of that alone, as thou imaginest, hath ouerthrowne the state of thy mind. I know the manifold [a] illusions of that monster, exercising most alluring familiarity with them, whome shee meaneth to deceiue, to the end shee may confound them with into'erable griefe, by forsaking them vpon the sodain, whose nature, customes and desert, if thou remembrest, thou shalt know, that thou neither diddest possesse, nor hast lost any thing of estimation in it; and as I hope, I shall not need to labour much to bring these things to thy remembrance, for thou wert wont, when thee

[a] The deceites of fortune.

shee was present, and flattered thee most, to assayle her with manfull words, and pursue her with sentences taken forth of our most hidden knowledge. But euery sodaine change of thinges happeneth not without a certaine wauering and disquietnesse of mind. And this is the cause, that thou also for a while hast lost thy former tranquility and peace. But it is time for thee to take and taste some gentle and pleasant thing, which being receiued may prepare thee for stronger potions; Wherefore let vs vse the sweetnesse of[b] Rhetoricall perswasions, which then onely is well imployed, when it forsaketh not our ordinances; and with this, let Musicke a little slaue belonging to our house, chaunt sometime lighter and sometime sadder notes. Wherefore O man, what

[b] The true vse of Rhetoricke and Poetry, or Musicke.

what is it, that hath caſt thee into ſorrow and griefe? If thou thinkeſt that fortune hath altered her maner of proceeding toward thee, thou art in an errour. This was alway her faſhion, this is her nature. Shee hath kept that [c] conſtancie in thy affaires, which is proper to her, in being mutable, ſuch was her condition when ſhe fawned vpon thee and allured thee with entiſements of fained happineſſe. Thou haſt diſcouered the doubtfull lookes of this blind Goddeſſe. Shee, which concealeth her ſelfe from others, is wholly knowen to thee. If thou likeſt her, frame thy ſelfe to her conditions, and make no complaint. If thou deteſteſt her treacherie, deſpiſe and caſt her off, with her pernicious flatterie. For that, which hath cauſed thee ſo much ſorow, ſhould haue brought

[c] Fortune onely conſtant in being mutable.

brought thee to great tranquilitie. For ſhee hath forſaken thee, of whom no man can be ſecure. Doeſt thou eſteeme that happineſſe precious, which thou art to looſe? And is the preſent fortune deare vnto thee, of whoſe ſtay thou art not ſure, and whoſe departure will breede thy griefe. And if ſhee can neither be kept at our will, and maketh them miſerable, whom ſhee leaueth, what elſe is fickle fortune, but a token of future calamitie? For it is not ſufficient to behold that, which wee haue before our eyes; wiſedome pondereth the euent of things, & this mutabilitie on both ſides maketh the threates of fortune not to be feared, nor her flatterings to be deſired. Finaly, thou muſt take in good part, whatſoeuer happeneth vnto thee within the reach of

fortune, when once thou haſt ſubmitted thy necke to her yoke. And if to her, whom of thine owne accord, thou haſt choſen for thy Miſtreſſe, thou wouldeſt preſcribe a Law, how long ſhee were to ſtay, and when to depart, ſhouldeſt thou not doe her mightie wrong, and with thy impatiencie make thy eſtate more intollerable, which thou canſt not better? If thou ſetteſt vp thy ſayles to the wind, thou ſhalt be caried not whether thy will deſireth, but whether the Gale drieth. If thou ſoweſt thy ſeed, thou conſidereſt, that there are as well barren, as fertile yeeres. Thou haſt yeelded thy ſelfe to fortunes ſway, thou muſt bee content with the conditions of thy miſtreſſe. Endeuoureſt thou to ſtay the force of the turning wheele? But thou fooliſh-

foolishest man, that euer was, if it beginneth to stay, it ceaseth to be fortune.

The I. Verse.

Phylosophy discribeth the conditions of fortune.

The pride of sickle fortune spareth none,
But like the flouds of swift [a] *Euripus borne,*
Oft casteth mighte Princes from their throne,
And oft the abiect Captiue doeth adorne.
Shee cares not for the wretches teares and mone,
And the sad grones, which she hath caus'd doth skorne
Thus doth shee play, to make her power more knowen,
Shewing great wonders, when mans sickle state
One houre, haplesse doeth see, and fortunate.

[a] An arme of the Sea betwixt Phocides in Bæotia, and the Ile Eubæa, which ebs and flowes so swiftly 7. times in a day, that it carieth ships against the wind, yea the very wind it selfe *Plin. lib. 2.*

The II. Prose.

Fortune sheweth, that shee hath taken nothing from Boetius, that was his.

BVt I would vrge thee a little with Fortunes owne speeches. Wherefore con-

ſider thou, if ſhee asketh not reaſon. For what cauſe, O man, chargeſt thou mee with daily complaints? What iniurie haue I done thee? What goods of thine haue I taken from thee? Contend with mee before any Iudge, about the poſſeſsion of riches and dignities: and if thou canſt ſhew, that the proprietie of any of theſe things belong tó any mortall wight, I will foorthwith willingly graunt, that thoſe things which thou demandeſt, were thine. When nature produced thee out of thy mothers wombe, I receiued thee naked and poore in all reſpects, cheeriſhed thee with my wealth, and (which maketh thee now to fall out with me) being forward to fauour thee, I had moſt tender care for thy education, and adorned thee with the aboundance & ſplendour of

of all things, which are in my power. Now it pleaseth mee to withdraw my hand, yeeld thankes, as one that hath had the vse, of that which was not his owne. Thou hast no iust cause to complaine, as though thou hadst lost that, which was fully thine owne. VVherefore lamentest thou? I haue offered thee no violence. Riches, honours, and the rest of that sort belong to mee. They acknowledge mee for their Mistresse, and themselues for my seruants, they come with me, and when I goe away, they likewise depart. I may boldly affirme, if those things which thou complainest to be taken from thee, had beene thine owne, thou shouldest neuer haue lost them. Must I onely be forbidden to vse my right? It is lawful for the heauen to bring foorth faire

dayes, and to hide them againe in darkeſome nights. It is lawfull for the yeere ſometime to compaſſe the face of the earth with flowers and fruites, and ſometime to couer it with clouds & cold. The Sea hath right ſometime to fawne with calmes, and ſometime to frowne with ſtormes and waues. And ſhal the vnſatiable deſire of men tie me to conſtancie, ſo contrarie to my cuſtome? This is my force, this is the ſport, which I continually vſe. I turn about my wheele with ſpeed, and take a pleaſure to turne things vpſide downe; Aſcend, if thou wilt, but with this condition, that thou thinkeſt it not an iniurie to deſcend, when the courſe of my ſport ſo requireth. Diddeſt thou not know my faſhion? VVert thou ignorant how *Cræſus* King of the *Lydians*, not

not long before a terrour to [a] *Cyrus*, within a while after came to such miserie, that hee should haue beene burnt, had hee not beene saued by a shower sent from heauen. Hast thou forgotten how [b] *Paul* pyously bewailed the calamities of King [c] *Persus* his prisoner? What other thing doeth the out-crie of Tragedies lament, but that fortune hauing no respect, ouerturneth happie states? Diddest thou not learne in thy youth, that there lay two [d] Barrels, th'one of good things, and the other of bad, at *Iupiters* threshold? But what if thou hast tasted more aboundantly of the good? What if I be not wholly gone from thee? What if this mutabilitie of mine be a iust cause for thee to hope for better? Notwithstanding loose not thy courage, and liuing in a

[a] King of Persia.

[b] *Paulus Aemilius*, Consul of Rome.

[c] Or *Perses* King of Macedonia.

[d] This is taken out of *Homer. Iliad. 6.*

kingdome which is common to all men, desire not to bee gouerned by peculiar Lawes, proper onely. to thy selfe.

THE II. VERSE.

Fortune complaineth of the vnsatiable desire of men.

IF plentie as much wealth should giue, we're holding back her hand,
As the fierce winds in troubled Seas doe tosse vp heapes of sand,
Or as the Starres, that Heauenly Orbes in light some nights doe grace:
Yet wretched men would still accuse their miserable case.
Should God so liberall of his gifts their greedinesses heare,
And with bright honours them adorne: yet all that nothing were,
Since rauenous minds deuouring all for more are ready still,
What bridle can containe in bounds this their contemptuous will?
When fild with riches they retaine the thirst of having more?
He is not rich, that feares, and grieues, and counts himselfe but poore.

THE III. PROSE.

Philosophy proueth, that fortune had beene more fauourable, then contrarie to Boetius.

WHerefore if fortune should plead with thee thus in her owne defence, doubtlesse thou wouldest not haue a word to answere

anſwere her. But if there bee any thing, which thou canſt alleadge in thy owne defence, thou muſt vtter it, wee will giue thee full liberrie to ſpeake. Then I ſaid, theſe things make a faire ſhew, and being ſet out with pleaſant Rhetoricke and Muſicke, delight onely ſo long as they are heard. But thoſe, which are miſerable haue a deeper feeling of their miſeries. Therfore, when the ſound of theſe things is paſt, hidden ſorrow oppreſſeth the mind. It is ſo indeed quoth ſhe, for theſe be not the remedies of thy diſeaſe, but certaine fomentations to aſſwage thy griefe, which as yet reſiſteth all cure. But when it ſhall bee time, I will apply that, which ſhall pierce to the quicke. And yet there is no cauſe, why thou ſhouldeſt thinke thy ſelfe miſerable; Haſt thou forgotten, how

how many wayes, and in what degree thou art happie? I passe ouer with silence, that hauing lost thy Father, thou wert prouided for by men of the best sort, and being chosen to haue affinitie with the chiefest of the Citie, thou beganneſt sooner to be deare vnto them, then to be akinne, which is the most excellent kind of kindred. Who esteemed thee not most happie, hauing so Noble a Father inlaw, so chaste a Wife, and so many Sonnes? I say nothing (for I will not speake of ordinarie matters) of the dignities denied to others in their age, and graunted to thee in thy youth. I desire to come to the top of thy felicitie. If any fruit of mortall things hath any weight of happinesse, can the remembrance of that light bee darkned with any cloud of miseries

that can ouercast thee? VVhen thou sawest thy two Sonnes being both Consuls together caried from their house, the Senatours accompaning them, & the people reioycing with them, when they sitting in the Senate in their Chaires of estate, thou making an Oration in the kings praise, deseruedst the glory of witte and eloquence. When in publike assembly thou hauing beene Consul thy selfe, standing betwixt thy two Sonnes, diddest satisfie with thy triumphant liberalitie, the expectation of the multitudes gathered together. I suppose thou flatteredst fortune, while shee fawned thus vpon thee, and vsed thee, as her deerest friend. Thou obtainedst more at her hands, then euer priuate man had before thee. VVilt thou reckon with fortune? This is the first

first time, that euer shee frowned vpon thee. If thou considerest the number and measure of thy ioyfull and sad accidents, thou canst not chuse but thinke thy selfe happie still. And if thou esteemest not thy selfe fortunate, because those things which seemed ioyfull are past, there is no cause, why thou shouldest thinke thy selfe miserable, since those things which thou takest to be sorrowfull, doe passe. Commest thou now first as a Pilgrime and stranger into the Theater of this life? Supposest thou to find any constancie in humane affaires? Since that man himselfe is soone gone: for although things subiect to fortune seldome keepe touch in staying, yet the end of life is a certaine death, euen of that fortune, which remaineth. Wherefore what matter

ter is it, whether thou by dying leaueſt it, or it forſaketh thee by flying?

THE III. VERSE:

Philoſophy declareth, how all worldly things decay and fade away.

WHen Phœbus with his Roſie teame
Sheweth his lightſome beame,
The dull and darkened Starres retire
Yeelding to greater fire.
When Zephyrus his warmth doth bring,
Sweete Roſes decke the ſpring
Let noyſome Auſter blow apace,
Plants ſoone will looſe their grace.
The Sea hath often quiet ſtood,
With an vnmoued flood;
And often is turmoyl'd with waues,
When boyſtrous Boreas raues.
If thus the world neuer long tarie
The ſame, but often varie:
On fading fortunes then relie,
Truſt to thoſe goods that flie.
An euerlaſting law is made,
That all things borne ſhall fade.

THE

THE IIII. PROSE.

Philoſophy proueth, that Boetius is ſtill fortunate, and that no man hath complete happineſſe in this life.

TO which I anſwered, the things, which thou reporteſt are true, O nurſe of all vertues, and I cannot denie the moſt ſpeedy courſe of my proſperitie, but this is that, which vexeth me moſt, when I remember it. For in all aduerſitie of fortune, it is the moſt vnhappie kind of misfortune, to haue beene happie. But, quoth ſhee, thou canſt not iuſtly impute to the things themſelues, that thou art puniſhed for thy falſe opinion. For if this vaine name of caſuall felicitie moueth thee, let vs make accompt with how many, and how great things thou aboundeſt. VVherefore

fore if that, which in all thy reuenewes of fortune, thou eſteemedſt moſt precious, doeth ſtill by Gods prouidence remaine ſafe and vntouched, canſt thou, retaining the beſt, iuſtly complaine of misfortune? But thy Father in-law *Symmachus* (that moſt excellent ornament of mankind) liueth in ſafetie, and for the obtaining of which thou wouldeſt willingly ſpend thy life, that man wholly framed to wiſedome and vertues, being ſecure of his owne, mourneth for thy iniuries. Thy wife liueth, modeſt in diſpoſition, eminent in chaſtitie, and to rehearſe briefely all her excellent gifts, like her Father. Shee liueth, I ſay, and wearie of her life, reſerueth her breath onely for thee. In which alone I muſt alſo graunt, that thy felicitie is diminiſhed, ſhe conſumeth her

her ſelfe with teares and griefe for thy ſake. VVhat ſhould I ſpeake of thy children, which haue beene Conſuls, in whome already, as in Children of that age, their Fathers, or Grand-fathers good diſpoſition appeareth? wherefore ſince the greateſt care, that mortall men haue, is to ſaue their liues, O happie man that thou art, if thou knoweſt thy owne wealth, who ſtill haſt remaining thoſe things, which no man doubteth to bee dearer then life it ſelfe? And therefore ceaſe weeping. Fortune hath not hitherto ſhewed her hatred againſt you all, neither art thou aſſailed with too boyſterous a ſtorme, ſince thoſe Ankers hold faſt, which permit neither the comfort of the time preſent, nor the hope of the time to come, to bee wanting. And I pray God (quoth I)

I) that they may hold fast, for so long as they remaine, howsoeuer the world goeth, wee shall escape drowning. But thou seest, how great a part of our ornaments is lost. Wee haue gotten a little ground, (quoth shee) if thy whole estate be not irkesome vnto thee. But I cannot suffer thy daintinesse, who with such lamentation & anxietie complainest, that something is wanting to thy happinesse: For who hath so [a] entire happinesse, that he is not in some part offended with the condition of his estate. The nature of humane felicitie is doubtfull and vncertaine, and is neither euer wholly obtained, or neuer lasteth alwayes. One man hath great reuenewes, but is contemned for his base linage. Anothers Nobilitie maketh him knowen, but oppressed with penu-

[a] No man hath entire happinesse.

rie, had rather be vnknowen. Some abounding with both, bewaile their vnfitneſſe for mariage. Some other well married, but wanting children, prouideth riches for ſtrangers to inherite. Others finally, hauing children, mournefully bewaile the vices, which their ſonnes or daughters are giuen to. So that ſcarce any man is pleaſed with the condition of his fortune. For there is ſomething in euery eſtate, which without experience is not knowen, and being experienced doth moleſt and trouble. Beſides that, thoſe, which are [b] moſt happie are moſt ſenſible, and vnleſſe all things fall out to their liking, vnpatient of all aduerſitie, euery little croſſe ouerthrowes them, ſo ſmall are the occaſions, which take from the moſt fortunate the height of their happineſſe.

[b] The moſt happie are moſt ſenſible of affliction.

How

How many are there thinkest thou, which would thinke themselues almost in heauen, if they had but the least part of the remnants of thy fortune? This very place, which thou callest banishment, is the Countrey of the inhabitants. So true it is, that nothing is miserable, but when it is thought so, and contrariwise, euery [c] estate is happie, if he that beares it, bee content. Who is there so happie, that if he yeeldeth to discontent, desireth not to change his estate? How much bitternesse is mingled with the sweetenesse of mans felicitie, which though it seemeth neuer so pleasant, while it is enioyed, yet can it not be retained from going away, when it will. And by this it appeareth how miserable the blessednesse of mortall things is, which neither endureth

[c] He that is best contented, is most happie.

alway with the contented, nor wholly delighteth the pensiue. Wherefore O mortall men, why seeke you for your felicitie abroad, which is placed within your selues? Errour and ignorance do confound you. I will briefely shew thee the [d] Center of thy chiefest happinesse. Is there any thing more precious to thee then thy selfe. I am sure thou wilt say nothing. Wherefore, if thou enioyest thy selfe, thou shalt possesse that, which neither thou wilt euer loose, nor fortune can take away; and that thou mayest acknowledge, that blessednesse cannot consist in these casuall things, gather it thus: If blessednesse be the chiefest good of nature endewed with reason, and that is not the chiefest good, which may by any meanes bee taken away, because that,

[d] The Center of happinesse.

that, which cannot bee taken away, is better; it is manifest, that the [e] instabilitie of fortune cannot aspire to the obtaining of blessednesse.

[e] Temporall things cannot make men happie.

Moreouer, hee that nowe enioyeth this brittle felicitie, either knoweth it to bee mutable, or no; if not, what estate can bee blessed by ignorant blindnesse? And if hee knoweth it, hee must needes feare, least hee loose that, which hee doubteth not, may bee lost, wherefore continuall feare permitteth him not to bee happie. Or doeth hee thinke, that it were to bee neglected, though hee should loose it? But so it were a very small good, which hee would bee content to loose. And because thou art one, whom I know to be fully perswaded, that the soules

of men are in no wise mortall; and since it is cleare, that casuall felicitie is ended by the bodies death, there is no doubt, if this can cause blessednesse, but that all mankind falleth into miserie by death. But if we know many who haue sought to reape the fruit of blessednesse, not onely by death, but also by afflictions and torments; how can this present life make men happie, the losse of which causeth not miserie?

THE IIII. VERSE.

Philosophy commendeth a meane estate.

WHo with an hee defull care
Will an eternall seate prepare,
Which cannot be downe cast
By any force of windie blast.
And will the floods despise,
When threatning billowes doe arise.
He not on hils must stand,

Nor

Nor on the dang'rous sinking sand.
For there the winds will threate,
And him with furious tempest beate,
And here the ground too weake
Will with the heaue burthen breake.
Flie then the dangerous case
Of an vntry'd delightfull place,
And thy poore house bestow
In stonie places firme and low.
For though the winds doe sound,
And waues of troubled Seas confound.
Yet thou to rest disposed
In thy safe lowly vale inclosed,
Mayst liue a quiet age,
Skorning the Ayres distemp'red rage.

THE V. PROSE.

How riches are neither precious, nor our owne.

BVt since my resons beginto sinke into thy mind, I will vse those, which are somewhat more forcible. Goe to then, if the gifts of fortune were not brittle and momentanie, what is there

n them, which can either euer bee made your owne, or well weighed and considered seemeth not vile and of no accompt? Are riches either yours, or precious in themselues? What part of them can bee so esteemed of, Gold, or [a] heapes of mony? But these make a fairer shew, when they are spent, then when they are kept. For couetousnesse alway maketh men odious, as liberalitie famous. And if a man cannot haue that, which is giuen to another, then money is precious, when bestowed vpon others, it is not possessed any longer. But if all the money in the whole world were in one mans custodie, all other men should bee poore. The voice at the same time wholly filleth the eares of many, but your riches cannot passe to many, except

[a] Money.

cept they bee diminished. Which being done, they must needes make them poore, whome they leaue. O skant and poore riches, which neither can bee wholly possessed of many, and come to none without the impouerishment of others. Doeth the glittering of [b] Iewels drawe thy eyes after them? But, if there bee any great matter in this shewe, not men but the Iewels shine, which I exceedingly maruaile, that men admire. For what is there wanting life and members, that may iustly seeme beautifull to a nature not onely endewed with life, but also with reason? Which, though by their makers workemanshippe, and their owne varietie they haue some part of baseſt beautie, yet it is so farre inferiour to your excellencie, that it did in

[b] Iewels.

in no ſort deſerue your admiration. Doeth the pleaſant proſpect of the [c] fields delight you? Why not? For it is a faire portion of the faireſt worke. So wee are delighted with a calme Sea, ſo wee admire the skie, the Starres, the Sunne, and the Moone. Doth any of theſe belong to thee? Dareſt thou boaſt of the beautie, which any of them haue? Art thou adorned with May-flowers? Or doeth thy fertilitie bring forth the fruits of Summer? VVhy reioyceſt thou vainely? VVhy embraceſt thou outward goods, as if they were thine owne? Fortune wil neuer make thoſe things thine, which by the appointment of nature belong not to thee. The fruits of the earth are appointed for the ſuſtenance of liuing creatures. But if thou wilt onely ſatisfie want, which

[c] Pleaſant fields.

which suffiseth nature, there is no cause to require the superfluities of fortune. For nature is contented with little, and if being satisfied, thou wilt ouerlay it with more then needes, that which thou addest, will either become vnpleasant, or hurtfull. But perhaps thou thinkest it a fine thing, to goe decked in gay [d] apparell, which if they make a faire shew, I will admire either the goodnesse of the stuffe, or the inuention of the workman. Or doth the multitude of [e] seruants make thee happie? VVho if they bee vicious, they are a pernicious burthen to thy house, and exceeding troublesome to their Master: and if they bee honest, what shalt thou bee the better for other mens honestie? By all which it is manifestly proued, that none of these goods, which thou accoun-

[d] Apparell.

[e] Seruants.

accounteſt thine are thine indeede. And if there be nothing in thē worthy to be deſired, why art thou either glad, when thou haſt them, or ſorie, when thou looſeſt them? Or what is it to thee, if they bee precious by nature? For in this reſpect, they would haue pleaſed thee, though they had belonged to others. For they are not precious, becauſe they are come to bee thine, but becauſe they ſeemed precious, thou wert deſirous to haue them. Now, what deſire you with ſo much adoe? Perhaps you ſeeke to driue away penurie with plentie. But this falleth out quite contrarie, for you ſtand in neede of many ſupplies, to furniſh your ſelues with varietie of precious ornaments. And it is true, that they which haue[f] much neede much, ānd contrariwiſe, that they

[f] They which haue much, need much.

they neede litle, which measure not their wealth by the superfluitie of ambition, but by the necessitie of nature. Haue you no proper & inward good, that you seeke so much after those things which are outward and separated from you? Is the condition of things so changed, that man, who is deseruedly accounted diuine for the gift of reson, seemeth to haue no other excellency then the possession of a litle houshold stuffe? All other creatures are content with that they haue of their owne, and you, who in your minds carie the likenesse of God, are content to take the ornamentes of your excellent nature from most base and vile things, neither vnderstand you, what iniurie you doe to your creatour. Hee woulde haue mankinde to excell all earthly things, you

you debase your dignitie vnder euery meaneſt creature. For if it be manifeſt, that the good of euery thing is more precious then that, whoſe good it is, ſince you iudge the vileſt things that can be, to bee your goods, you g deiect your ſelues vnder them in your owne eſtimation, which queſtion leſſe commeth not vndeſeruedly to paſſe; for this is the condition of mans nature, that then only it ſurpaſſeth other things, when it knoweth it ſelfe; and it is h worſe then beaſts, when it is without that knowledge. For in other liuing creatures the ignorance of themſelues is nature, but in men it is vice. And how farre doeth this errour of yours extend, who thinke, that i any can bee adorned with the ornaments of another? Which can in no wiſe be. For if any adioyned thing

g Man deiecteth himſelfe by louing worldly things.

h Hee is worſe then beaſts, when hee knoweth not himſelfe.

i Nothing can be adorned with the ornaments of another.

seeme precious, it is that, which is praised, but that which is couered and enwrapped in it, remaineth notwithstanding with the foule baseneſſe, which it hath of it selfe. Moreouer, I denie that to be good, which hurteth the poſſeſſour. Am I deceiued in this? I am ſure thou wilt ſay, no. But [k] riches haue often hurt their poſſeſſours, ſince euery lewdeſt companion, who are conſequently moſt deſirous of that, which is not their owne, thinke themſelues moſt worthy to poſſeſſe alone all the Gold, and Iewels in the world. Wherefore thou, who with much perturbation feareſt now to be aſſayled and ſlaine, if thou hadſt entred the path of this life, like a poore paſſenger, neededſt not be afraid, but mighteſt reioyce and ſing euen in the ſight of moſt rauenous

[k] Riches do often hurt their poſſeſſours.

rauenous thieues. O excellent happineſſe of mortall riches, which when thou haſt gotten, thou haſt loſt thy ſafetie.

THE V. VERSE.

Philoſophy commendeth the former age, which was free from couetouſneſſe.

TOo much the former age was bleſt,
When fields their pleaſed owners failed not,
Who with no ſlouthfull laſt oppreſt
Brake their long faſts with akornes eas'ly got.
No wine with honie mixed was,
Nor did they ſilke in purple colours ſteepe,
They ſlept vpon the wholeſome graſſe,
And their coole drink did ſetch from riuers deepe.
The Pines did hide them with their ſhade,
No Merchants through the dang'rous billowes went,
Nor with deſire of gainefull trade
Their traffick into forraine Countreyes ſent.
Then no ſhrill Trumpets did amate
The minds of Souldiers with their daunting ſounds,
Nor weapons were through deadly hate
Dy'd with the dreadful bloud of gaping wounds.
For how could any furie draw
The mind of man to ſtirre vp warres in vaine,

When

When nothing, but fierce wounds he saw,
And for his blood no recompence should gaine.
O that the ancient maners would
In these our latter happelesse times returne.
Now the desire of hauing gold
Doth like the flaming fires of [a] *Aetna burne.*
Ah who was he, that first did shew
The heapes of treasure, which the earth did hide,
And iewels which lay close below.
By which he costly dangers did prouide.

[a] A hill in Scicily.

THE VI. PROSE.

Of dignitie and power.

NOw why should I discourse of dignities & power, which you not knowing, what true dignitie and power meaneth, extoll to the skies? And if they light vpon wicked men, what fire, though the very flames of *Aetna* should breake foorth, or what diluge can cause so great harmes? I suppose thou remembrest, how your ancestours by reason of the Consuls ar-

rogancie, desired to abolish that gouernement, which had beene the beginning of their freedome, who before for the same cause had remooued the gouernment of Kings from their citie. And if sometime, which is very seldome, good men bee preferred to Honours, what other thing can giue contentment in them, but the honesty of those, which haue them? So that vertues are not honoured by dignities, but dignities by vertue. But what is this your so esteemed and excellent power? Consider you not O earthly wights, whom you seeme to excell? For if among Mise thou shouldest see one claime iurisdiction and power to himselfe ouer the rest, to what a laughter would it moue thee? And what, if thou respectest the body, canst thou find more weake then

man

man, whom euen the biting of little Flies, or the entring of creeping wormes doth often kill? Now, how can any man exercise iurisdiction vpon any other, except onely vpon their bodies, and that, which is inferiour to their bodies, I meane their fortunes? Canst thou euer imperiously impose any thing vpon a free [a] mind? Canst thou remoue a soule setled in firme reason from the quiet state, which it possesseth? When a [b] tyrant thought to compell a certaine free man by torments, to bewray his confederates of a conspiracie attempted against him, hee bit off his tongue and spit it out vpon the tyrants face, by that meanes wisely making those tortures, which the tyrant thought matter of crueltie, to bee to him occasion of vertue. Now, [c] what is there

[a] The mind free.

[b] *Nearchus or Diomedon. Zeno Eleata. See Euseb. lib. 10 de prapar. Euang. & Suidas.*

[c] Whatsoeuer one can doe to another, another may doe to him.

there, that any can enforce vpon another, which he may not bee enforced to sustaine by another? We read, that [d] *Busirides* wont to kill his guestes, was himselfe slaine by his guest *Hercules*. [e] *Regulus* had layed fetters vpon many *Affricanes* taken in warre, but ere long hee found his owne hands inuironed with his Conquerours chaines. Wherefore thinkest thou the power of that man to bee any thing worth, who cannot hinder another from doing that to him, which hee can doe to another? Moreouer, if [f] dignities and power had any naturall and proper good in them, they would neuer bee bestowed vpon the worst men, for one opposite vseth not to accompanie another. Nature refuseth to haue contraries ioyned. So that, since there is no doubt, but that

[d] King of Egypt.

[e] *Marcus Atilius Regulus* a Consul of Rome.

[f] Dignities and power often bestowed on the worst men.

that men of the worſt ſort often enioy dignities, it is alſo manifeſt, that they are not naturally good, which follow moſt naughtie men. Which may worthily bee thought of all fortunes gifts, which are more plentifully beſtowed vpon euery lewde companion. Concerning which, I take that alſo to bee worthy conſideration, that no man doubteth him to bee a valiaunt man, in whome hee ſeeth valour; and it is manifeſt, that hee, which hath ſwiftneſſe is ſwift. So likewiſe, Muſicke maketh Muſitians, Phiſicke Phiſitians, and Rethoricke Rhetoricians. For the nature of euery thing doth that, which is proper vnto it, and is not mixed with contrary effectes, but repelleth all oppoſites. But neither can riches extinguiſh vnſatiable auarice, nor

power make him maſter of himſelfe, whome vicious luſtes keepe chained in ſtrongeſt fetters. And dignitie beſtowed vppon wicked men, doeth not onely not make them worthy, but rather bewrayeth and diſcouereth their vnworthineſſe. How commeth this to paſſe? Becauſe you take a pleaſure in miſcalling things, which is eaſily refuted by the effecte of the things themſelues. Wherefore by right, theſe things are not to bee called riches, power or dignitie. Laſtly, we may conclude the ſame of all fortunes, in which it is manifeſt, there is nothing to bee deſired, nothing naturally good, which neither are alway beſtowed vpon good men, nor doe make them good, whome they are beſtowed vpon.

THE

The VI. Verse.

Philosophy declareth by the example of Nero, that dignities or power, doe not make men better.

We know what stirres he made,
Who did the [a] *Senate slay, and* [b] *Rome with fire inuade,*
Who did his [c] *brother kill.*
And with his [d] *mothers blood his moistned hād did fill,*
Who could without a teare
Behold her nak't and dead, whose body him did beare.
Yet his dread power controll'd
Those people whom the Sun doth in the East behold,
And those, who doe remaine
In Westerne lands, or dwell vnder [e] *Bootes waine,*
And those, whose skinnes are tann'd
With Southerne winds, which rost and burne the parched sand.
What? could this glorious might
Restraine the furious rage of wicked Neroes spight?
But oh mishappe most badde,
Which doth the wicked sword to cruel poyson adde!

[a] *Nero* killed many of the Senatours without any cause.

[b] He caused Rome to burne for a weeke, that he might conceiue the ouerthrow of Troy.

[c] Britannicus, to reign alone.

[d] Agrippina.

[e] The seuen Starres in Vrsa maior, which represent a waine, with seuen Oxen, which in old time were called Triones, for which cause these Stars are by *Boetius* called, *Septem gelidi triones*, from whence commeth *Septentrio*, to signifie the North.

The

The VII. Prose.

Of glory.

THEN I sayde: thou thy selfe knowest, that the ambition of mortall things hath borne as little sway with me as with any, but I desired matter of action, least old age should come vpon me ere I had done any thing. To which shee answered: This is the only thing, which is able to entice such a minds as being excellently quallified by nature, are not yet fully brought to the perfection of vertues, I meane desire of glorie, and fame of best deserts towards their common wealth, which how slender it is, and voide of all weight, consider this, Thou hast learned by astronomicall demonstrations, that the

a The danger of the most excellent minds.

the compasse of the whole earth compared to the scope of heauen is no bigger then a pinnes point, which is as much to say, as that it hath no bignesse at all. And of this so small a region onely the fourth part is knowne to be inhabited, as *Ptolomæus* proueth. From which fourth part, if thou takest away the seas, and marish grounds, and all other desert places, there will skarcely be left any roome at all for men to inhabit. Wherefore encioſed and shutte vp in this [b] smallest point of that other point, doe you thinke of extending your fame, and enlarging your name? But what great or heroical matter can that glory haue, which is pend vp in so small and narrow bounds? Besides that the little compasse of this small habitation is inhabited by many nations, diffe-

[b] The smallnesse of glory.

different in language, fashions, and conuersation, to which by reason of the difficulties in trauelling, the diuersitie of speach, and the scarcitie of trafficke, not onely the fame of particular men, but euen of cities can hardly come. Finally in the age of *Marcus Tullius*, as he [c] himselfe writeth, the fame of the *Romane* commonwealth had not passed the mountaine [d] *Caucasus*, and yet it was then in the most flourishing estate, fearful euen to the [e] *Parthyans*, and to the rest of the nations about. Seest thou, how streight and narrow that glorie is, which you labour to enlarge & encrease? where the fame of the *Romane* name could not passe, can the glory of a *Romane* man penetrate? Moreouer, the customes and lawes of diuers nations, doe so much differ the one from the other, that

[c] *In somnio Scipionis.*

[d] A mountaine betwixt Scythia and India.

[e] People of Asia maior.

that the same thing, which some commend as laudable, others condemne as deseruing punishment. So that, if a man be delighted with the praise of fame, it is no way conuenient for him to be named in many countreys. Wherefore euery man must be content with that glorie, which he may haue at home, & that noble immortalitie of fame must be comprehended within the compasse of one nation. Now, how many most famous while they liued, are altogether forgotten, for want of writers! Though what doe writings auaile, which perish as well as their authors by continuance and obscuritie of time? But you imagine, that you make your selues immortall, when you cast your eyes vpon future fame. Whereas, if thou weighest attentiuely the infinite

f Glory lasteth not long.

infinite ſpaces of eternitie, what cauſe haſt thou to reioyce at the prolonging of thy name? For if we compare the ſtay of one moment with ten thouſand yeres, ſince both be limited, they haue ſome proportion, though it be but very ſmall. But this number of yeares, how oft ſoeuer it bee multiplied, is no way comparable to endleſſe æternitie. For limited things may in ſome ſort bee compared among themſelues, but that, which is infinite, admitteth no compariſon at all. So that the fame of neuer ſo long time, if it be compared with euerlaſting æternitie ſeemeth not little, but none at all. But without popular blaſts, and vaine rumours you know not how to doe well, and reiecting the excellencie of a good conſcience and of vertue, you chuſe

to be rewarded with others tatling. Heare how pleasantly one iested at this vaine & contemptible arrogancie. For hauing assaulted with reprochfull speeches a certaine fellow, who had falsely taken vpon him the name of a Philosopher, not for the vse of vertue, but for vaine glorie, and hauing added, that now he would know whether hee were a Philosopher or no, by his gentle & patient bearing of iniuries. The other tooke al patiently for a while, and hauing borne his contumely as it were triumphing sayed: Doest thou now at length thinke mee a Philosopher? To which he bitingly replied, I would haue thought thee one, if thou haddest holden thy peace. But what haue excellent men (for of these I speak) who seeke for glorie by vertue, what haue wee (I say)

(I say) to expect by fame after death. For if contrarie to our beleefe, men g wholy perish, there is no glorie at all, since he, to whom it is sayed to belong, is no where extant. But if a guiltlesse minde freed from earthly imprisonment, goeth forthwith to heauen, will shee not despise all earthly traffike who enioying heauen, reioiceth to see her selfe exempted from earthly affayres.

g The vanitie of glory, euen in the opinion of Atheists, and much more of Christians.

THE VII. VERSE.

Of the smalnesse and shortnesse of fame.

HE that to honour only seekes to mount,
And that his chiefest end doth count,
Let him behold the largenesse of the skyes,
And on the streight earth cast his eyes,
He will despise the glorie of his name,
Which cannot fill so small a frame.
Why do proud mẽ scorne, that their necks should beare
That yoke, which euery man must weare?
Though fame through many nations flie along,
And should be blaz'd by eu'ry tongue,

And

And houses shine with our forefathers stories,
Yet death contemnes these stately glories,
And summoning both rich and poore to die,
Makes the low equall with the high.
Who knows, where [a] *faithfull* Fabrice *ones are prest,*
Where [b] Brutus *and* [c] *strict* Cato *rest?*
A slender fame now cause their titles vaine
In some few letters to remaine,
Because their famous names in bookes we reade,
Come wee by them to know the dead:
You dying then remembred are by none,
Nor any fame can make you knowne.
But if you thinke you liue euen after death,
Your names borne vp with mortall breath:
When length of time takes this away likewise,
A second death shall you surprize.

[a] A Consull of Rome, who made warre with *Pirrhus* King of the Epirotes, by whom hee could not be corrupted by bribes, and to whome he sent one that offered to kill him.

[b] The first Consull of Rome, who reuenged *Lucrecias* rape.

[c] A noble Romane, whome nothing could corrupt, *Lucan. Victrix causa diis placuit, sed victa Catoni*, meaning of *Cæsar*, and *Pompey*.

The VIII. Prose.

Aduersitie more profitable then prosperitie.

BVT least thou shouldest thinke, that I am at vnplacable warre with fortune, there

there is a time, when this thy deceitfull Goddeſſe deſerueth ſomewhat well of men, to wit, when ſhe declareth her ſelfe, when ſhee diſcouereth her face, and ſheweth her ſelfe in her owne colours. Perhaps thou vnderſtandeſt not yet, what I ſay. I would vtter a wonderfull thing, inſomuch as I can skarcely explicate my minde in words. For I thinke, that [a] fortune when ſhee is oppoſite is more profitable to men, then when ſhee is fauourable. For in proſperitie ſhee falſely counterfeiteth a ſhew of happineſſe, but in aduerſitie [b] ſhee ſheweth her ſelfe truely vnconſtant by changing. In that ſhee deceiueth, in this ſhe inſtructeth, in that ſhee impriſoneth the mindes of men with falſely ſeeming goods, which they enioy: In this ſhee ſetteth

[a] The vtilitie of aduerſitie.

[b] Fortune is truely knowne.

reth them at libertie by diſcoue-
ing the [c] vncertaintie of them.
Wherfore in that, thou ſhalt alway
ſee men puffed vp, and wauering,
and blinded with a ſelfe conceit of
themſelues: in this thou ſhalt find
them [d] ſober, ſetled, and with the
very exerciſe of aduerſitie, wiſe. Fi-
nally, proſperitie with her flatte-
rings withdraweth men from true
goodneſſe, aduerſitie [e] recalleth and
reclaymeth them many times by
force, to true happineſſe. Doeſt
thou eſteeme it a ſmall benefite,
that this rough and harſh fortune
hath made knowne vnto thee the
minds of thy faithfull [f] friends?
Shee hath ſeuered thy aſſured from
thy doubtfull friends; proſperitie at
her departure tooke away with
her thoſe, which were hers, and
left thee thine. How dearely woul-

[c] The vncertainetie of worldly things is diſcouered

[d] Men become ſober, ſetled, wiſe.

[e] They are drawen by force to true happineſſe.

[f] Faithfull friends are diſcerned.

deſt thou haue bought this before thy fal, and when thou ſeemedſt to thy ſelfe fortunate? Deſiſt from ſeeking to recouer thy loſt riches, ſince thou haſt found friends, the moſt precious treaſure in the world.

THE VIII. VERSE.

Philoſophy praiſeth true loue and friendſhip.

THat this faire world in ſetled courſe her ſeuerall formes ſhould vary,
That a perpetuall Law ſhould tame the fighting ſeedes of things,
That Phœbus *ſhould the roſie day in his bright chariot cary,*
That Phœbe *ſhould gouerne the nights, which* Heſperus *forth brings,*
That to the flouds of greedy ſeas are certaine bounds aſſign'd,
Which them, leaſt they vſurpe too much vpon the earth, debarre,
Loue ruling heau'n, and earth, and ſeas, them in this courſe doeth bind:
And if it once let looſe their raines, their friendſhippe turnes to warre,
Tearing the world, whoſe ordred forme their quiet motions beare.
By it all holy Lawes are made, and marriage rites are ti'd,
By it is faithfull friendſhippe ſeru'd. How happy mortalls were,
If that pure loue did guid their minds, which heau'nly Spheares doth guid!

THE

THE THIRD BOOKE OF BOETIVS.

In which Philosophy begin-neth to apply more forcible re-medies, and treateth of true felicitie.

THE I. PROSE.

Philosophy promiseth to explicate true felicitie.

THough shee had ended her verse, yet the sweetnesse of it made mee remaine astoni-

shed, attentiue, and desirous to heare her longer. Wherefore after a while, I saide. O most effectuall refreshment of wearied minds, how much haue I beene comforted with thy weightie sentences, and pleasing Musicke! Insomuch that I begin to thinke my selfe not vnable to encounter the assaults of fortune. Wherefore I am not now afraid, but rather earnestly desire to know those remedies, which before thou toldest mee were too sharpe. To which shee answered, I perceiued as much, as thou sayest, when I sawe thee hearken to my speeches with so great silence and attention, and I expected this disposition of thy mind, or rather more truely caused it my selfe. For the remedies which remaine are of that sort, that they are bitter to the taste, but being inwardly

wardly receiued waxe ſweete. And whereas thou ſayeſt that thou art deſirous to heare; how much would this deſire encreaſe, if thou kneweſt, whether we goe about to bring thee! Whether (quoth I.) To true felicitie (quoth ſhe) which thy mind alſo dreameth of, but thy ſight is ſo dimmed with phantaſies, that thou canſt not behold it as it is. Then I beſeeched her to explicate without delay, wherein true happineſſe conſiſteth. To which ſhe anſwered, I will willingly doe So for thy ſake, but firſt I will endeuour to declare that, which is better knowne vnto thee, that hauing throughly vnderſtood it, by reflecting of the contrary thou maieſt diſcouer a glimpſe of perfect bleſſedneſſe.

True happineſſe the better diſcerned, if the contrarie be firſt explicated.

THE I. VERSE.

False felicitie must bee forsaken, that true happinesse may be embraced.

HE that a fruitfull field will sow,
Doth first the ground from bushes free,
All Fearne and Bryers likewise mow,
That he his Harvest great may see.
Honie seemes sweeter to our tast,
If cloy'd with noysome foode it bee.
Starres clearer shine, when Notus blast
Hath ceast the rainie stormes to breede.
When Lucifer hath night defact,
The dayes bright horses then succeede.
So thou, whom seeming goods doe feede,
First shake off yokes, which so thee presse.
That trueth may then thy mind possesse.

THE II. PROSE.

How all men desire happinesse, but many mistake it.

THEN for a while looking stedfastly vpon the ground, and as it were retiring her selfe to the most secret seate of her soule,

soule, shee beganne in this maner: [a] All mens thoughts, which are turmoyled with manifold cares, take indeede diuers courses, but yet endeuour to attaine the same end of happinesse, which is that good, which being once obtained, nothing can be further desired. Which is the chiefest of al goods, & containeth in it self, whatsoeuer is good, & if it wanted any thing, it could not be the chiefest, because there would something remaine besides it, which might be wished for. Wherfore it is manifest, that [b] blessednesse is an estate repleniished with all that is good. This (as we said) all men endeuour to obteine by diuers wayes. For there is naturally ingrafted in mens minds an earnest desire of that, which is truely good; but deceitfull errour withdraweth

[a] All men seeke for happinesse.

[b] What it is.

it to that, which falsly seemeth such. So that some esteeming it their greatest good to want nothing, labour by all meanes to abound with [c] riches: others making more account of [d] honours, hunt after preferments, to be respected by their inferiours. Others think it the greatest felicitie, to [e] haue great power and authoritie, and these will either raigne themselues, or at least procure to be great with Princes. But they who thinke [f] fame better then all these, make all speed possible to spread their names farre and neere, by atchieuing some worthy enterprise either in warre or peace. Many measure happinesse by [g] ioy and mirth, and their chiefest care is, how they may abound with pleasure. Some subordinate one of these to the other, as riches to power

[c] Riches.
[d] Honours.
[e] Power.
[f] Fame.
[g] Pleasure.

power and pleasure, or power to wealth & fame. At these and such other doe mens affections and desires aime, as nobilitie and popularity, which make men esteemed, wife and children, which bring pleasure and delight. For holy friendship is rather to be attributed to vertue, then to fortune. Other things for the most part are desired either for power or pleasure. And it is an easie matter to reduce all corporall goods to the former heades. For strength and greatnesse giue ability, beautie and swiftnesse, fame, and health yeeldeth pleasure. By all which wee manifestly seeke for nothing else but happinesse. For that, which euery man seeketh most after, is by him esteemed his greatest good. Which is all one with happinesse. Wherfore he esteemeth

that

that eſtate happy, which hee preferreth before al other. And thus thou haſt in a maner ſeene the forme of humane felicitie, riches, honour, power, glorie, pleaſure. Which the Epicure onely conſidering; conſequently tooke pleaſure for his chiefeſt good, becauſe all the reſt ſeeme to delight the mind. But I returne to the carefull thoughts of men, whoſe minds though obſcured, yet [h] ſeeke after the greateſt good, but like a drunken man, know not the way home. For, ſeeme they to erre, who endeuour to want nothing? But nothing can cauſe happineſſe ſo much, as the plentifull poſſeſſion of all that is good, needing the helpe of none, but is ſufficient of it ſelfe. Or doe they erre, who take that which is beſt to bee likewiſe moſt worthy of reſpect?

[h] All agree in chuſing that which is good.

No.

No. For it is no vile or contemptible thing, which almost all men labour to obtaine. Or is not power to bee esteemed good? Why then, is that to be accounted feeble and of no force, which manifestly surpasseth all other things? Or is fame to be contemned? But these two cannot be seperated, that the most excellent seeme also most famous. For to what purpose should I say, that happinesse is not sadde or melancholy, or subiect to griefe and trouble, when euen in smallest matters we desire that, which wee delight to haue and enioy? And these be the things, which men dedesire to obtaine, and to this end procure riches, dignities, kingdomes, glory and pleasures, because by them they thinke to haue sufficiencie, respect, power, fame, delight and

and ioy. Wherefore that is good, which men ſeeke after by diuers deſires, in which the force of nature is eaſily deſcried, ſince though there be many and different opinions, yet they agree in chuſing for their end that which is good.

THE II. VERSE.

How nature cannot bee wholly changed.

HOw the ſtrict raines of al things guided are
By powerfull nature, as the chiefeſt cauſe,
And how ſhee keepes with a foreſeeing care
The ſpacious world in order by her lawes,
And to ſure knots, which nothing can vntie,
By her ſtrong hand all earthly motions drawes:
To ſhew all this we purpoſe now to trie
Our pleaſing Verſes, and our Muſicke ſound.
Although the Lybian Lyons often lie
Gentle and tame in willing fetters bound,
And fearing their incenſed maſters wrath
With patient lookes endure each blow and wound:
Yet if their iawes they once in blood doe bathe,
They gaining courage with fierce noyſe awake

The

The force, which nature in them seated hath,
And from their neckes the broken chaines doe shake;
Then he, that tam'd them first doeth feele their rage,
And torne in pieces doth their furie slake.
The bird shut vp in an vnpleasing cage,
Which on the loftie trees did lately sing,
Though men her want of freedome to asswage,
Should vnto her with carefull labour bring
The sweetest meates, which they can best deuise:
Yet when on toppes of houses fluttering
The pleasing shadowes of the groues shee spies,
Her hated foode shee scatters with her feete,
And discontented to the woods shee flies,
And their delights to tune her accents sweete.
When some streng hand doth tender plant constraine
With his debased top the ground to meete,
If it let goe, the crooked twigge againe
Vp toward heauen it selfe it streight doth raise.
Phœbus doeth fall into the Westerne maine,
Yet doeth he backe returne by secret wayes,
And to the East doeth guide his chariots race.
Each thing a certaine course and lawes obeyes,
Striuing to turne backe to his proper place;
Nor any setled order can be found,
But that, which doth within it selfe embrace
The birthes and ends of all things in a round.

THE

The III. Prose.

That true happineſſe conſiſteth not in riches.

YOu alſo (O earthly creatures) thogh ſlightly & as it were in a dreame acknowledge your beginning, and though not perſpicuouſly yet in ſome ſort behold that true end of happineſſe, ſo that the intention of nature leadeth you to the true good, and manifold errour withdraweth you from it. For conſider, whether thoſe things, by which men thinke to obtaine happineſſe, can bring them to their deſired end. For if either money, or honour, or any of the reſt be of that qualitie, that they want nothing which is good, we will alſo confeſſe, that they are able to make men happy. But if they neither

ther be able to performe that they promise, and want many things which are good, are they not manifestly discouered to haue a false appearance of happinesse? First then, I aske thee thy selfe, who not long since diddest abound with wealth; In that plenty of riches, was thy minde neuer troubled with any iniuries? I cannot remember (quoth I.) that euer my mind was so free from trouble, but that something or other still vexed me. Was it not because thou either wantedst something, which thou wouldedst haue had, or else haddest something which thou wouldest haue wanted? It is true (quoth I.) Then thou desiredst the presence of that, and the absence of this, I confesse I did (quoth I.) And doth not a man want that (quoth shee) which hee desi-

desireth. He doth (quoth I.) But he that wanteth any thing, is not altogether sufficient of himselfe. He is not (quoth I.) So that thou felt'st this insufficiencie, euen in the height of thy wealth. Why not (quoth I.) Then [a] riches cannot make a man wanting nothing nor sufficient of himselfe, and this was that they seemed to promise. But this is most of all to be considered, [b] that mony hath nothing of it self, which can keepe it from being taken from them, which possesse it, against their will. I graut (quoth I.) why shouldest thou not grant it, since that euery day those, which are more potent, take it from others perforce? For from whence proceede so many complaints in Law, but that mony gotten either by violence, or deceit is sought to be

[a] Riches taketh not away want.

[b] Money cannot defend it selfe, and therefore needeth something to defend it.

be recouered by that meanes? It is so indeed (quoth I.) So that euery man needeth some other helpe to defend his mony. Who denies that? (quoth I.) But hee should not neede that helpe, vnlesse he had mony, which he might loose. There is no doubt of that (quoth I.) Now then the matter is fallen out quite contrary, for riches which are thought to suffise of themselues, rather make men stand in need of other helpes. And after what maner doe riches expell penury? For are not rich men hungry? are they not thirsty? Or doeth much money make the owners senseles of cold in winter? But thou wilt say, wealthy men haue wherewithal to satisfie their hunger, slake their thirst, and defend themselues from cold. But in this sort, though wants may be somewhat relieued

by wealth, yet it cannot altogether be taken away. For if euer gaping and crauing, it bee ſatiated by riches, there muſt needes alway remaine ſomething to be ſatiated. I omitte, that to nature very little, to couetouſneſſe nothing is ſufficient. Wherefore if riches can neither remoue wants, and cauſe ſome themſelues, why imagine you, that they can cauſe ſufficiency.

The III. Verse.

How riches afflict their poſſeſſours in life, and forſake them in death.

Although the rich man from his mines of gold,
Digge treaſure, which his mind can neuer fill,
And lo ſe necke with precious Pearles enfold
And his fatte fields with many Oxen till:
Yet biting cares will neuer leaue his head,
Nor will his wealth attend him being dead.

The

THE IIII. PROSE.

That true happinesse consisteth not in dignities.

BVt dignities make him honourable and Reuerend, on whome they light. Haue offices that force to plant vertues and expell vices in the minds of those who haue them? But they are not wont to banish, but rather [a] to vphold wickednesse. So that we many times complaine, because most wicked men obtaine them. Whereupon [b] *Catullus* called [c] *Nonius* a scabbe or impostume though he sate in his chaire of estate. Seest thou, what great ignominie dignities heape vpon euill men! For their vnworthinesse would lesse appeare, if they were neuer aduaunced to any honours. Could so ma-

[a] Dignities vphold wickednesse.

[b] A famous Poet of Verona.

[c] A wicked Romane full of vices, whose firname was *Struma*, as appeareth in Plin. lib. 37. nat. Hist.

ny dangers euer make thee beare office with [d] *Decoratus* hauing discouered him to be a very varlet and spie? For [e] wee cannot for their honours account them worthy of respect, whome wee iudge vnworthy of the honours themselues. But if thou seest any man endewed with wisedome, canst thou esteeme him vnworthy of that respect or wisedome, which he hath? No truely. For vertue hath a proper dignitie of her owne, which she presently endeweth her possessours withall. Which since popular preferments cannot doe, it is manifest that they haue not the beauty, which is proper to true dignitie. In which wee are farther to consider, that if to be contemned of many, make men abiect, whom dignities cannot make respected, they rather

[d] Boetius refused him

[e] Dignities make not men respected.

rather make wicked, by laying their defects and ignominy open to the view of the world. But the dignities goe not scot-free, for[f] wicked men do as much for them, defiling them with their infectious diseases. And that thou maist plainely see, that true respect cannot be gotten by these painted dignities, inferre it thus, let[g] one, that hath beene often Consul goe among barbarous nations, will that honour make those barbarous people respect him? And yet, if this were naturall to dignities, they would neuer forsake their function in any nation whatsoeuer; as fire, wheresoeuer it bee, alway remaineth hoate. But because not their owne nature, but the deceitfull opinion of men attributeth that to them, they forthwith come to nothing, being brought to

[f] Wicked men defile dignities.

[g] Diuersitie of nations make Dignities contemptible.

h Their worth decayes by change of times.

them, who esteeme them not to be dignities. And this for forraine nations. But doe they[h] alway last among them, where they had their beginning? The Præfect-shippe a great dignitie in time past, is now an idle name, and an heauy burthen of the Senates Censure. If heretofore one had care of the peoples prouision, he was accounted a great man; Now what is more abiect then that office? For as wee saied before, that which hath no proper dignitie belonging vnto it, sometime receiueth, and sometime looseth his value at the vses discretion. VVherefore if dignities cannot make vs respected, if they be easily defiled with the infection of the wicked, if their worth decaies by change of times, if diuersitie of nations make them con-

contemptible, what beautie haue they in themselues, or can they afford to others worth the desiring?

The IIII. Verse.

How Nero being most wicked, was in greatest dignitie.

THough fierce and lustfull Nero did adorne
Himself with purple robes, which gems did grace
He did but gaine a generall hate and scorne:
Yet by his power he Officers most base,
Ouer the Reu'rend Senators did place.
Who would esteeme of fading honours then,
Which may begin with thus by the wickedst men?

The V. Prose.

Of Kings and their fauorites.

BVt can kingdomes and the familiaritie of kings make a man mighty? VVhy not, when their felicity lasteth alwaies? a Kingdomes fall.

But both former and preſent times are full of examples, that many kings haue changed their happineſſe with miſery. O excellent power, which is not ſufficient to vphold it ſelfe. And if this ſtrength of kingdomes bee the author of bleſſedneſſe, doeth it not diminiſh happineſſe and bring miſery, when it is any way defectiue? But though [b] ſome Empires extend themſelues farre, there will ſtill remaine many nations out of their dominions. Now, where their power endeth, which maketh them happy, there entereth the contrary, which maketh them miſerable, ſo that all kings muſt needes haue leſſe happineſſe then miſery. That [c] tyrant knowing by experience the dangers of his eſtate, ſignified the [d] feares incident to a kingdome,

[b] Kingdomes are limited.

[c] *Dyoniſius* king of Sicily.

[d] Kingdomes full of feares.

dome, by the hanging of a drawne sword ouer a mans head. VVhat power is this then, which cannot expell nor avoid biting cares and pricking feares? They would willingly haue lined securely, but could not, and yet they brag of their power. Thinkest thou him mighty, whom thou seest desire that, which he cannot doe? Thinkest thou him mighty who dareth not goe without his guard, who feareth others more then they feare him, who cannot seeme mighty, except his seruaunts please? For what should I speake of kings followers, since I shew, that kingdomes themselues are so full of weakenesse? Whome the power of kings often standing, and many times falling, doth ouerthrow. *Nero* compelled *Seneca* his familiar friend and Master, to make

choice of his owne death. [e] *Antonius* cauſed *Papinianus*, who had beene long a gallant courtier, to be cutte in pieces with his ſouldiers ſword. And they would both haue renounced their power, yea *Seneca* endeuoured to deliuer vp his riches alſo to *Nero*, and to giue himſelfe to a contemplatiue life. But their very greatneſſe drawing them to their diſtruction, neither of them could compaſſe that, which they deſired. Wherefore what power is this, that the poſſeſſors feare, which when thou wilt haue, thou art not ſecure, and when thou [f] wilt leaue, thou canſt not auoid. Are wee the better for thoſe friends, which loue vs not for our vertue, but for our proſperity? But whome proſperitie maketh our friend, aduerſitie will make our enemy. And what plague is

[e] *Aurelius Antonius Baſſianus, Caracalla* ſlew *Papinianus* a famous Lawyer, and the chiefe man in his Court to whome *Seuerus* chiefly commended his two ſonnes. the cauſe of his death, was for that he would not excuſe the murther of *Geta* the Emperours brother, and o other Noble men.

[f] Kings fauourites cannot with draw themſelues, when they would.

is able to hurt vs more, then a familiar enemie?

THE V. VERSE.

True power consisteth in conquering our owne passions.

WHo would be powerfull, must
His owne affections checke,
Nor let foule raynes of lust
Subdue his conquer'd nicke.
For though the Indian land
Should tremble at thy becke,
And though thy dread command
The farthest parts obey,
Unlesse thou canst withstand.
And boldly driue away
Blacke care and wretched moane
Thy might is small or none.

THE VI. PROSE.

That true happinesse consisteth not in glorie.

AS for [a] glory, how deceitfull is it oftentimes, and dishoneſt? For which cauſe

[a] glory often false.

cause the Tragicall Poet deseruedly exclameth: ὦ δόξα δόξα μυρίοισι δὴ βροτῶν ὕβλε, γεγῶσι βίοτον ὤγκωσάς μεγάν for many haue bin much spoken of by the false opinions of the common people. Then which what can bee imagined more vile? For those who are falsely commended must needes blush at their owne praises. Which though they be gotten [b] by deserts, yet what adde they to a wise mans conscience; who measureth his owne good, not by popular rumours, but by his owne certaine knowledge. And if it seemeth a faire thing to haue dilated our fame, consequently wee must iudge it a foule thing not to haue it extended. But since as I shewed a litle before, there must needes be many [c] nations, to which the fame of one man cannot arriue, it commeth to passe, that he, whom thou

O gloria, gloria, insignitissam mortalibus nullius pretii vitam tuam fecisti magnam.

[b] The vanitie of true glorie.

[c] The smalnesse of it.

thou esteemest glorious, in the next Countrey seemeth to haue no glory at all. And here now I thinke [d] popular glory not worth the speaking of, which neither proceedeth from iudgment, nor euer hath any firmenesse. Likewise, who seeth not, what a vaine and idle thing it is to be called noble? Which, for as much as belongeth to fame, is not our owne For [e] Nobilitie seemeth to be a certaine praise proceeding from our parents deserts. And if praising causeth fame, they must necessarily be famous, who are praised. Wherfore the fame of others, if thou hast none of thine own, maketh not thee renowmed. And if there bee any thing good in nobility, I iudge it only to be this, that it imposeth a necessitie vpon those, which are Noble, not to degenerate from the vertue of their ancestors. THE

[d] Popular glorie.

[e] Nobilitie.

THE VI. VERSE.

How all, but wicked men, are noble.

THe gen'rall race of men from alike birth is borne,
All things one father haue, who doth them all adorne,
Who gaue the Sunne his rayes and the pale Moone her horne
The loftie heauen for Starres, low earth for mortals chose;
He soules [a] *fetch't downe from high in bodies did enclose;*
And thus from noble birth all men did first compose.
Why bragge you of your stocke? since none is counted base,
If you consider God the authour of your race,
But he that with foule vice doeth his owne birth deface.

[a] Here Boetius speaketh according to the opinion of Platonists, who thought, that the soules were created in heauen, but the trueth is that they are created in the bodies, so soone as they are ready for life.

THE VII. PROSE.

That true happinesse consisteth not in pleasure.

NOW what should I speake of bodily pleasure, the desire of which is full of anxietie, & the enioying of them breeds repentance? How many diseases, how intollerable griefes bring they forth in the bodies of their possessors,

ſors, as it were the fruites of their wickedneſſe? I know not what ſweetneſſe their motions haue, but whoſoeuer will remember his luſts, ſhall vnderſtand, that the end of pleaſure is ſadneſſe. Which if it be able to cauſe happineſſe, there is no reaſon, why beaſts ſhould not be thought bleſſed, whoſe whole intention is bent to ſupply their corporall wants. That pleaſure, which proceedeth from wife and children is moſt honeſt; but it was too naturally ſpoken, that (I knowe not whome) found his children his tormentors, whoſe condicion, whatſoeuer it be, how biting it is, I neede not tell thee, who haſt had experience heeretofore, and art not now free from care. In which I approue the opinion of *Euripides*, who ſaid that they, which haue no children

children, are happy by being vnfortunate.

THE VII. VERSE.

That there is no pleasure without paine.

ALl pleasure hath this property,
Shee woundeth those, who haue her most.
And like vnto the angrie Bee,
Who hath her pleasant home lost.
Shee flies away with nimble wing,
And in our hearts doeth leaue her sting.

THE VIII. PROSE.

How all temporal goods are mixed with euill, and are small in themselues.

WHerefore there is no doubt, but that these waies to happinesse, are onely certaine by-pathes, which can neuer bring any man thether, whether they promise to leade him. And with

how great euills they are besette, I will briefely shew. For what? wilt thou endeuour to gather [a] money? but thou shalt take it away from him, who hath it. Wilt thou excell in [b] dignities? Thou shalt crouche to the giuer, and thou, who desirest to surpasse others in honour, shalt become vile by thy baseneſſe in begging. Wisheſt thou for [c] power? Thou shalt be in danger of thy subiects treacheries. Seekeſt thou for [d] glory? But drawne into many difficulties, thou shalt looſe thy safety. Wilt thou liue a [e] voluptuous life? But who would not dispise and neglect the seruice of so vile and base a thing, as his body? Now they, who boast of the [f] habilities of their body, vpon how vnstedfast a possession doe they ground themselues? For can

[a] Money.

[b] Dignities.

[c] Power.

[d] Glory.

[e] Pleasure.

[f] Habilities of the body.

you bee bigger then Elephants, or ſtronger then Buls? Or ſwifter then Tygers? looke vpon the ſpace, firmneſſe and ſpeedy motion of the heauens, and ceaſe at length to haue in admiration theſe baſe things. Which heauens are not more to be admired for theſe quallities, then for the maner of their gouernement. As for the glittering of [g] beautie, how ſoone and ſwiftly doeth it vaniſh away? As ſuddenly decaying and changing as the fraile flowers in the ſpring. And if, as *Ariſtotle* ſayeth, men had [h] *Lynces* eyes, that they could ſee through ſtone walles, would they not iudge that body of [i] *Alcibiades* ſeeming outwardly moſt faire, to be moſt foule and vgly by diſcouering his entrailes? VVherefore not thy nature, but the weakneſſe of the beholders eyes

g Beautie.

h The beaſt Lynx hath the quickeſt ſight of any beaſt. Plin. lib 32. Hiſt. nat. cap. 8. There was alſo a man caled Lynceus, who did ſee through wals &c. *Apollonius in Argonauticis, &c.*

i A noble Captaine of Athens.

eyes maketh thee seeme faire. But esteeme the goods of the body as much as you will, so that you acknowledge this, that whatsoeuer you admire, may be dissolued with the burning of an Ague of three dayes. Out of all which, wee may briefely collect this summe; that these goods, which can neither performe that they promise, nor are perfect by hauing all that is good, doe neyther, as so many pathes, leade men to happinesse, nor make men happy of themselues.

The VIII. Verse.

How men are wise in seeking for things of little value, and foolish in finding out their soueraigne good.

Alas, how ignorance makes wretches stray out of the way!

You from greene trees expect no golden mines,
nor pearles from vines.
Nor vse you on mountaines to lay your net,
fishes to get.
Nor, if the pleasant sport of hunting please,
runne you to seas.
Men will be skilfull in the hidden caues
of th'Ocean waues.
And in what coasts the orient pearles are bred,
or purple red.
Also, what diff'rent sorts of fishes store
ech seuerall shore.
But when they come their chiefest good to find,
then are they blind.
And search for that vnder the earth, which lies
aboue the skies.
How should I curse these fooles? Let thirst them hold
of fame and gold,
That hauing got false goods with payne, they learne
True to discerne.

THE IX. PROSE.

Why true felicitie cannot consist in temporall things.

LEt it suffice, that wee haue hetherto discouered the forme of false felicitie, which

which if thou haſt plainely ſeene, order now requireth, that we ſhew thee, in what true happineſſe conſiſteth. I ſee (quoth I) that neither ſufficiencie by riches, nor power by kingdomes, nor reſpect by dignities, nor renowme by glory, nor ioy can be gotten by pleſures. Haſt thou alſo vnderſtood the cauſes, why it is ſo? Me thinke I haue a little glimpſe of them, but I had rather thou wouldeſt declare them more plainely. The reaſon is manifeſt, for that, which is ſimple and vndeuided of it ſelfe, is deuided by mens errour, and is tranſlated from true and perfect to falſe and vnperfect. Thinkeſt thou, that, which needeth nothing, to ſtand in need of power. No (quoth I.) Thou ſayeſt well, for if any power in any reſpect bee weake, in this it muſt neceſſarily

ſtand in need of the helpe of others. It is true (quoth I.) Wherefore ſufficiencie and power haue one and the ſame nature. So it ſeemeth. Now thinkeſt thou, that, which is of this ſort ought to bee deſpiſed, or rather that it is worthy to be reſpected aboue all other things? There can bee no doubt of this (quoth I.) Let vs adde reſpect then to ſufficiencie and power, ſo that wee iudge theſe three to bee one. We muſt adde it, if we will confeſſe the truth. What now (quoth ſhe) thinkeſt thou this to be obſcure and baſe, or rather moſt excellent and famous? Conſider whether, that, which thou haſt granted to want nothing, to bee moſt potent, and moſt worthy of Honour, may ſeeme to want fame, which it cannot yeeld it ſelfe, and for that cauſe be

be in some respect more abiect. I must needes confesse (quoth I.) That it is also most famons. Consequently then wee must acknowledge, that fame differeth nothing from the former three. VVe must so (quoth I.) VVherefore that which wanteth nothing, which can performe al things by his owne power, which is famous and respected, is it not manifest that it is also most pleasant? To which I answered, how such a man should fall into any griefe, I can by no meanes imagine. Wherefore it that, which wee haue said hitherto be true, wee must needs confesse, that he is most ioyfull and content. And by the same reason it followeth that [a] sufficiencie, power, fame, respect, pleasure haue indeede diuers names, but differ not in substance. It follow-

[a] Sufficiencie, power, fame, respect and pleasure are all but one and the same thing

eth indeed (quoth I.) This then, which is one and ſimple by nature, mans wickednesse deuideth, and while he endeuoureth to obtaine part of that, which hath no partes, he neither [b] getteth a part, which is none, nor the whole, which he ſeeketh not after. How is this? (quoth I.) Hee who ſeeketh after riches (quoth ſhe) to avoid want, taketh no thought for power, hee had rather be baſe and obſcure, he depriueth himſelfe euen of many naturall pleaſures, that he may not looſe the money, which he hath gotten. But by this meanes he attaineth not to ſufficiencie, whom power forſaketh, whom trouble moleſteth, whom baſeneſſe maketh abiect, whom obſcuritie ouerwhelmeth. Againe, he that onely deſireth power, conſumeth wealth, deſ-

[b] He that diuideth them, hath none of them.

piseth pleasures, and setteth light by honour or glory, which is not potent. But thou seest how many things are wanting to this man also. For sometimes he wanteth necessaries, and is perplexed with anxieties, and being not able to ridde himselfe, ceaseth to be powerfull, which was the thing he onely aymed at. The like discourse may be made of honours, glory, pleasures. For since euery one of these things is the same with the rest, whosoeuer seeketh for any of them without the rest, obtaineth not that, which hee desireth. VVhat then? (quoth I) If one should desire to haue them altogether, he should wish for the summe of happinesse, but shall hee find it in these things, which wee haue shewed cannot performe what they promise? No (quoth I) where-

wherefore we muſt by no meanes ſeeke for happineſſe in theſe things, which are thought to afford the ſeuerall portions of that, which is to be deſired. I confeſſe it (quoth I) and nothing can be more true then this. Now then (quoth ſhe) thou haſt both the forme and cauſes of falſe felicitie, caſt but the eyes of thy minde on the contrary, and thou ſhalt preſently eſpie the true happineſſe, which we promiſed to ſhew thee. This (quoth I) is euident, euen to him that is blind, and thou ſhewedſt it a little before, while thou endeuouredſt to lay open the cauſes of the falſe. For, if I bee not deceiued, [c] that is true and perfect happineſſe, which maketh a man ſufficient, potent, reſpected, famous, ioyfull. And that thou maiſt know that I vnderſtood thee aright, that which

[c] Wherein true happineſſe conſiſteth.

which can truely performe any one of these because they are all one, I acknowledge without all doubt to be full and perfect happinesse. O my scholler, I think thee happy by hauing this opinion, if thou addest this also. What? (quoth I.) Doest thou imagine that there is any mortall or fraile thing, which can cause this happy estate? I doe not (quoth I) and that hath beene so proued by thee, that more cannot be desired. Wherefore these things seeme to afford men the images of the true good, or certaine vnperfect goods, but they cannot giue them the true and perfect good it selfe. I am of the same mind (quoth I.) Now then since thou knowest, wherein true happinesse consisteth, and what haue onely a false shew of it, it remaineth

d No mortall thing can cause true happinesse.

neth that thou ſhouldeſt learne, where thou maieſt ſeeke for this which is true. This is that (quoth I) which I haue long earneſtly exſpected. But ſince as *Plato* teacheth (in Timæo) we muſt implore Gods aſsiſtance euen in our leaſt affaires, what thinkeſt thou, muſt wee doe now, that we may deſerue to find the ſeat of that Soueraigne good? we muſt (quoth I) inuocate the father of all things, without whoſe remembrance no beginning hath a good foundation. Thou ſayeſt rightly (quoth ſhee) and withall ſung in this ſort.

THE IX. VERSE.

Philoſophy craueth Gods aſsiſtance for the diſcouery of true happineſſe.

O Thou, that doeſt the world in laſting order guide,
Father of heau'n & earth, who mak'ſt time ſwiftly
And ſtading ſtil thy ſelfe yet fram'ſt all mouing laws,
Whom to thy worke nere mou'd by no externall cauſe:

But

But by a sweete desire, where enuie hath no place,
Thy goodnesse mouing thee to giue each thing his grace.
Thou doest all creatures formes from highest patterne take,
From thy faire mind, the world faire like thy selfe doest make.
Thus thou perfect the whole, perfect ech part dost frame.
Thou temp'rest elements, making cold mixe with flame,
And drie thing ioyne with moyst, least fire away should flie,
Or earth oppresst with weight, buried too low should lie.
Thou in [a] *consenting parts fitly disposed hast*
Th'all mouing [b] *soule in* [c] *midst of threefold naiure plac't,*
Which [d] *cut in seuer all parts, that runne a diff'rent race,*
Iustest [e] *selfe returnes, and circling doth embrace*
The [f] *highest mind, &* [g] *heau'n with* [g] *like proportion driues.*
Thou also with like cause [h] *doest make the soules, &* [i] *lesser*
And [k] *those in* [l] *charyots beare, and fitly them inspire (liues*
Into the heauen and earth, which with returning [m] *fire*
Goe backe againe to thee their authour and their end.
Deare Father let my mind thy glorious seat ascend,
Let me behold the spring of grace and find thy light,
That I on thee may fixe my soules well cleared sight
Cast off the earthly weight, wherewith I am oppresst,
Shine as thou art most bright, thou onely calme and rest
To pious men, whose end is to behold thy ray,
Who their beginning art, their guide, their bound, and way.

[a] The different orbes of heauen. [b] The Angell, which moueth the heauens. [c] Betwixt God, and men. [d] Diuided into different motions of diuers heauens. [e] Knowing himselfe. [f] And likewise God. [g] Mouing the heauens according to Gods appointment. [h] Of men. [i] Of beasts, &c. [k] The soules of men. [l] In starres according to the Platonists. [m] Of loue and charity.

THE X. PROSE.

That there is some true happinesse, and where it is to be found.

Wherefore since thou hast seene what is the forme of perfect & vnperfect good, now

now I think we muſt ſhew in what this perfection of happineſſe is placed. And enquire firſt, whether there can bee any ſuch good, extant in the world, as thou haſt defined, leaſt contrary to the truth, wee bee deceiued with an empty ſhew of knowledge. But it cannot bee denied, that there is ſome ſuch thing, which is as it were the fountaine of all goodneſſe. For all, that is ſaid to be imperfect, is ſo tearmed for the want, it hath of perfection. Whence it followeth, that if in any kind we find ſomething vnperfect, there muſt needs be ſomething perfect alſo in the ſame kind. For if we take away perfection we cannot deuiſe, how there ſhould be any imperfection. For the nature of things began not from that which is defectiue and not compleate, but pro-

proceeding from entire & absolute, falleth into that which is extreame and consumed. And if, as wee shewed before, there bee a certaine imperfect felicitei, of fraile goods, it cannot bee doubted, but that there is some solide and perfect happinesse also. Thou hast (quoth I) concluded most firmely and most truely. Now where this good dwelleth (quoth shee) consider this. The common conceit of mens minds proueth, that God the Prince of all things is good. For since nothing can be imagined better then God, who doubteth but that is good, then which is nothing better? And reason doeth in such sort demonstrate God to bee good, that it conuinceth him to bee [a] perfectly good. For vnlesse hee were so, hee could not bee the chiefe of

[a] God is perfectly good.

of all things. For there would bee ſomething better then hee, hauing perfect goodneſſe, which could ſeeme to be more auncient and of longer continuance then he. For it is already manifeſt, that perfect things were before the imperfect. Wherefore, leaſt our reaſon ſhould haue no end, we muſt confeſſe, that the Soueraigne God is moſt full of Soueraigne and perfect goodneſſe. But we haue concluded, that perfect goodneſſe is true happineſſe, wherefore [b] true happineſſe muſt neceſſarily be placed in the moſt high god.

[b] True happineſſe placed in God.

I agree (quoth I) neither can this be any way contradicted.

But I pray thee (quoth ſhee) ſee how holily and inuiolably thou approueſt that, which we ſaid, that the ſoueraigne God is moſt full of ſoueraigne goodneſſe. How? (quoth

(quoth I.) That thou presumest not, that this Father of all things, hath eyther [c] receyued from others, that soueraigne good, with which he is said to be replenished, or hath it naturally in such sort, that thou shouldest thinke, that the substance of the blessednesse, which is had, and of God who hath it, Were diuers. For if thou thinkest, that hee had it from others, thou mayest also inferre, that hee who gaue it, was better then the receiuer. But wee most worthily confesse, that hee is the most excellent of all things. And if he hath it by nature, but as a diuerse [d] thing, since wee speake of God the Prince of all things, let him that can, inuent, who vnited these diuerse things. Finally, that which is different from any thing, is not that, from which it is

[c] God hath not receiued his goodnesse from any other.

[d] Gods goodnesse is himself.

vnderſtood to differ. VVherefore that, which is naturally different from the Soueraigne good, is not the Soueraigne good it ſelfe. VVhich it were impious to thinke of God, then whom, we know certainely, nothing is better. For doubtleſſe, the nature of nothing can be better, then the beginning of it. VVherefore I may moſt truely conclude, that, which is the beginning of all things, to bee alſo in his owne ſubſtance, the chiefeſt good. Moſt rightly: (quoth I.) But it is granted, that the chiefeſt good is happineſſe. It is, (quoth I.) VVherfore (quoth ſhe) we muſt needs confeſſe, that our happineſſe it ſelfe is God. I can neither contradict, (quoth I) thy former propoſitions, and I ſee this illation followeth from them. Conſider (ſayeth ſhe)

if

if the same be not more firmely proued hence, because there [e] cannot be two chiefe goods the one different from the other. For it is manifest that of those goods, which differ, the one is not the other, wherefore neither of them can bee perfect, wanting the other. But manifestly that which is not perfect, is not the chiefest, wherefore the chiefe goodes cannot bee diuers. Now wee haue proued that both blessednesse and God are the chiefest good, wherfore that must needes be the highest happinesse, which is the highest Diuinitie. There can be nothing (quoth I) concluded, more truely in the thing it selfe, nor more firmely in arguing, nor more worthy God himselfe. Vpon this then (quoth she) as the *Geometricians* are wont, out of their propositions, which

[e] There cannot bee two soueraigne goods.

they haue demonſtrated to inferre ſomething, which they call πορισματα ſo will I giue thee as it were a *Corollarium*. For ſince that men are made bleſſed by the obtaining of bleſſedneſſe, and bleſſedneſſe is nothing elſe but Diuinitie, it is manifeſt that men are made happy by the obtaining of Diuinity. And as men are made iuſt by the obtaining of iuſtice, and wiſe by the obtaining of wiſedome, ſo they who obtaine Diuinitie, muſt needs in like maner become Gods. Wherefore euery one that is happy is a God, but by nature there is onely one God, but there may bee many by [f] participation. This is (quoth I) an excellent and pretious πορισμα or *Corollarium*. But there is nothing more excellent then that, which reaſon perſwaded vs to adde. What (quoth I) ſince (quoth

[f] Men become Gods by participation.

(quoth ſhee) bleſſedneſſe ſeemeth to containe many things, whether they all concurre as diuers partes to the compoſition of one entire body of happineſſe, or ſome one of them doeth accompliſh the ſubſtance of bleſſedneſſe, to which the reſt are to be referred. I deſire (quoth I) that thou wouldeſt declare this point, by the enumeration of the particulars. Doe we not thinke (quoth ſhe) that happineſſe is good? yea the chiefeſt good, (quoth I.) Thou maieſt (quoth ſhee) adde this to them all. For happineſſe is accounted the chiefeſt ſufficiencie, the chiefeſt power, reſpect, fame, and pleaſure. What then? are all theſe, ſufficiencie, power and the reſt as it were certaine members of bleſſedneſſe, or rather are they referred to good as to the head? I vnderſtand (quoth I)

what thou propoſeſt, but I deſire to heare what thou concludeſt. This is the deciſion of this matter. If all theſe were members of bleſſedneſſe, they ſhould differ one from another. For this is the nature of parts, that being diuers they compoſe one body. But wee haue proued, that all theſe are one, and the ſame thing. Wherefore they are no members, otherwiſe happineſſe ſhould be compacted of one member, which cannot bee. There is no doubt of this (quoth I) but I expect that which is behind. It is manifeſt that the reſt are referred to goodneſſe; for ſufficiency is deſired, becauſe it is eſteemed good, and likewiſe power, becauſe that likewiſe is thought to be good; And we may coniecture the ſame of reſpect, fame and pleaſure. Wherefore g goodneſſe is the ſumme and cauſe

g Goodneſſe is the ſum and cauſe of all that is deſired.

cauſe of all that is deſired. For that which is neither good indeed, nor beareth any ſhew of goodneſſe, can by no meanes be ſought after. And contrariwiſe thoſe things, which are not good of their owne nature, yet if they ſeeme ſuch, are deſired as if they were truely good. So that the ſumme, origen, and cauſe of all that is ſought after, is rightly thoght to be goodneſſe. And that ſeemeth chiefely to be wiſhed for, which is the cauſe, that other things are deſired. As if one would ride for his health, he doth not ſo much deſire the motion of riding, as the effect of health. Wherefore ſince all things are deſired in reſpect of goodneſſe, they are not ſo much wiſhed for, as goodneſſe it ſelfe. But we graunted that to be happineſſe, for which other things are deſired, wherefore in

like manner onely bleſſednesse is fought after. by which it plainly appeareth, that [h] goodnesse and happinesse haue one and the selfe same substance. I see not how any man can dissent. But wee haue shewed that God and true bleſſednesse are one and the selfe-same thing. It is so (quoth I) we may then securely conclude, that the [i] substance of God consisteth in nothing else, but in goodnesse.

[h] goodnesse and happinesse al one

[i] The substance of God consisteth in goodnesse.

THE X. VERSE.

Phylosophy exhorteth men to embrace true happinesse.

COme hither all you, that are bound,
Whose base and earthly minds are drown'd
By lust, which doeth them tye in cruell chaynes:
Here is a seat for men oppreſt,
Here is a port of pleasant reſt;
Here may a wretch haue refuge from his paynes.
No gold, which [a] Tagus *sands bestow,*

[a] A riuer in Portugal or Spaine.

Nor

Nor which on [b] Hermus *bankes doth flow,*
Nor precious stones, which skorched Indians *get,*
Can cleare the sharpenesse of the mind,
But rather make it farre more blind
And it in farther depth of darkenesse set.
For this that sets our soules on worke
Buried in caues of earth doth lurke.
But heauenly guided by another light,
Which causeth vs to shunne the darke,
And who this light doth truely marke,
Must needs deny, that Phœbus *beames are bright.*

[b] A riuer in Lydia.

THE XI. PROSE.

That goodnesse is the end of all things.

I Consent (quoth I) for all is grounded vpon most firme reasons. But what account wilt thou make (quoth she) to know what goodnesse it selfe is. I will esteeme it infinitely, (quoth I) because by this meanes I shall come to know God also, who is nothing else but goodnesse. I will conclude this (quoth shee)

ſhee) moſt certainely, if thoſe things be not denied, which I haue already proued. They ſhall not (quoth I.) Haue wee not proued (quoth ſhee) that thoſe things, which are deſired of many, are not true and perfect goods, becauſe they differ one from another, and being ſeparated, cannot cauſe complete, and abſolute goodneſſe, which is only found, when they are vnited as it were into one forme and cauſality, that the ſame may be ſufficiencie, power, reſpect, fame, and pleaſure? And except they be all one and the ſame thing, that they haue nothing worth the deſiring? It hath bin proued (quoth I) neyther can it be any way doubted of. Thoſe things then, which when they differ, are not good, and when they are one, become good, are they not

not made good by obtayning vnitie? so me thinke (quoth I.) But doest thou grant that all, that is good, is good by pertaking goodnesse? It is so. Thou mayest graunt then likewise, that [a] vnitie and goodnesse are the same. For those things haue the same substance, which naturally haue not diuers effects. I cannot denie it, (quoth I.) Knowest thou then (quoth shee) that [b] euery thing that is, doth so long remaine and subsist, as it is one, and perisheth and is dissolued, so soone as it ceaseth to bee one. How? As in liuing creatures, (quoth she) so long as the body and the soule remaine vnited, the liuing creature remaineth. But when this vnity is disolued by their seperation, it is manifest that it perisheth, and is no longer a liuing creature. The body

[a] Vnity and goodnesse the same.

[b] Euery thing continueth onely so long, as it is one.

body also it selfe, so long as it remaineth in one forme by the coniunction of the parts there appeareth the likenesse of a man. But if the members of the body being seperated and sundred, haue lost their vnitie, it is no longer the same. And in like maner it will bee manifest to him that will descend to other particulars, that euery thing continueth so long as it is one, and perisheth when it looseth vnitie. Considering more particulars, I find it to bee no otherwise. Is there[c] any thing (quoth she) that in the course of nature, leauing the desire of being, seeketh to come to destruction & corruption? If (quoth I) I consider liuing creatures, which haue any nature to will and to nill, I find nothing, that without externe compulsion, forsake the intention to remain, and

[c] All things desire to be.

and of their owne accord haſten to diſtruction. For euery liuing creature laboureth to preſerue his health, and eſcheweth death and detriment. But what I ſhould thinke of hearbs, and trees, and of all things without life, I am altogether doubtfull. But there is no cauſe why thou ſhouldeſt doubt of this, if thou conſidereſt firſt, that hearbs and trees grow in places agreeable to their nature, where ſo much as their conſtitution permitteth, they cannot ſoone wither and periſh. For ſome grow in fields, other vppon hils, ſome in fennie, other in ſtonie places, and the barren ſands are fertile for ſome, which if thou wouldeſt tranſplant into other places, they dye. But nature giueth euery one that which is fitting, and ſtriueth to keepe them from

from decaying ſo long as they can remaine. What ſhould I tell thee, if all of them, as it were thruſting their head into the ground, draw nouriſhment by their rootes, and conuey ſubſtance and barke by the inward pith? VVhat, that alway the ſofteſt, as the pith is placed within, and is couered with more firme wood, and laſt of all the bark is expoſed to the weather, as being beſt able to beare it off: And how great is the diligence of nature, that all things may continue by the multiplication of ſeede; all which who knoweth not to bee, as it were certaine engines, not onely to remaine for a time, but ſucceſſiuely in a maner to endure for euer. Thoſe things alſo which are without all life, doth not euery one in like maner deſire that, which appertaineth to their owne

owne good? For why doth leuitie lift vp flames, or heauineſſe weigh downe the earth, but becauſe theſe places and motions are conuenient for them? And that which is agreeable to euery thing, conſerueth it, as that which is oppoſite, cauſeth corruption. Likewiſe thoſe things which are hard, as ſtones, ſticke moſt firmely to their parts, & make great reſiſtance to any diſſolution. And liquid things, as ayer and water, are indeed eaſily deuided, but doe eaſily alſo ioyne againe. And fire flyeth all deuiſion. Neither doe we now treate of the voluntary motions of the vnderſtanding ſoule, but onely of naturall operations. Of which ſort is, to digeſt that, which wee haue eaten, without thinking of it, to breath in our ſleepe not thinking what wee doe.

For

For euen in liuing creatures the loue of life proceedeth not from the wil of the ſoule, but from the principles of nature. For the will many times embraceth death vpon vrgent occaſions, which nature abhorreth; and contrariwiſe the act of generation, by which alone the continuance of mortal things is maintained, is ſom times bridled by the will, though nature doth alway deſire it. So true it is, that this ſelfe-loue proceedeth not from any voluntary motion, but from naturall intention. For prouidence gaue to her creatures this as the greateſt cauſe of continuance, that they naturally deſire to continue ſo long as they may; wherefore there is no cauſe, why thou ſhouldeſt any way doubt, that al things, which are, deſire naturally ſtabilitie of remaining, and eſchue

eschue corruption. I confesse (quoth I) that I now see vndoubtedly that, which before seemed very doubtfull. Now that (quoth she) which desireth to continue and remaine, seeketh to haue vnity. For if this be taken away, being it selfe cannot remaine. It is [d] true (quoth I.) All things then (quoth she) desire vnitie. I granted it to be so. But wee haue shewed that vnity is the same that goodnesse. You haue indeede. All [e] things then desire goodnesse, which thou mayest define thus: That goodnesse is that, which is desired of all things. There can be nothing imagined more true. For either all things haue reference to nothing, and being destitute as it were of one head, shall be in confusiō without any ruler: or if there be any thing, to which al things hastē,

[d] All things desire vnity.

[e] All things desire goodnesse.

that must bee the chiefest of all goods. I reioyce too much O scholler (quoth shee) for thou hast fixed in thy mind the very marke of veritie. But in this thou hast discouered that, which a little before thou saidest, thou wert ignorant of. What is that? (quoth I.) What the end of all things is (quoth she.) For certainly it is that, which is desired of all things, which since we haue concluded to bee goodnesse, wee must also confesse that [f] goodnesse is the end of all things.

[f] Goodnes is the end of al things

The XI. Verse.

How we may attaine to the knowledge of truth.

He that would seeke the truth with thoughts profound,
And would not stray in waies which are not right,
He to himselfe must turne his inward sight,
And guid his motions in a circled round,
Teaching his mind, what euer she disigne,

Her

Her selfe in her owne treasures to possesse:
So that, which late lay hidde in cloudinesse,
More bright and cleere then Phœbus beames shall shine.
Flesh hath not quenched all the spirits light,
Though this oblivious lumpe holds her oppreſt,
Some seede of truth remaineth in our breſt,
Which skilfull learning easily doth excite.
For being askt, how can we answere true
Vnlesse that grace within our hearts did dwell?
If Platoes beauthymise the truth be tell,
We learning things, [a] remember them anew.

[a] This was Platoes opinion, but the truth is that knowledge is gotten by inuention, & instruction supposing that one hath the light of vnderstanding which is capable of the

THE XII. PROSE.

How the world is gouerned by God.

THen I said, that I did verie wel like of *Platoes* doctrin, for she had brought these things to my remembrance now the second time. First, because I lost their memorie by the contagion of my bodie, and after when I was oppressed with the burthen of griefe. If (quoth she) thou reflectest vpon that, which heretofore hath beene granted, thou wilt not be farre of from remembring that, which in

the beginning thou confeſſedſt thy ſelfe to bee ignorant of. VVhat? (quoth I.) By what gouernment (quoth ſhe) the world is ruled. I remember (quoth I) that I did confeſſe my ignorance, but though I foreſee what thou wilt ſay, yet I deſire to heare it more plainly from thy ſelfe. Thou thoughteſt a little before, that it was not to be doubted, that the [a] world is gouerned by God; neither doe I thinke now (quoth I) neither wil I euer thinke, that is to be doubted of, and I will briefely explicate the reaſons, which moue me to thinke ſo. This world could neuer haue beene compacted of ſo many diuers and contrarie parts, vnleſſe there were one, that doth vnite theſe ſo differēt things, and this diſagreeing diuerſity of natures being vnited, would ſeparate and

[a] The world is gouerned by God.

and diuide this concord, vnlesse there were one that holdeth together that, which he vnited. Neither would the course of nature continue so certaine, nor hold so well ordered motions in due places, times, causalitie, spaces and qualities, vnlesse there were one, who himselfe remaining quiet, disposeth and ordereth this varietie of motions. This, whatsoeuer it bee, by which things created continue and are moued, I cal God, a name which all men vse. Since (quoth shee) thou art of this mind, I thinke with little labour, thou mayest be capable of felicity, and returne to thy countrey in safetie. But let vs consider, what we proposed. Haue we not placed sufficiency in happines, and granted, that God is blessednes it selfe? Yes truely. VVherefore

(quoth shee) hee needeth no outward helps to gouerne the world, otherwise, if he needeth any thing, he hath not full sufficiency. That (quoth I) must necessarily bee so. VVherefore [b] he disposeth al things by himselfe. No doubt hee doeth (quoth I.) But it hath beene proued that God is goodnesse it selfe. I remember it very well (quoth I.) Then hee disposeth all things by goodnesse: since he gouerneth all things by himselfe, whom we haue granted to be goodnesse.

[b] God disposeth all things by himselfe, that is by goodnesse.

And this is as it were the stearne and gouernement, by which the frame of the world is kept stedfast and vncorrupted. I most willingly agree (quoth I) and I foresaw a little before, though onely with a slender gueſſe, that thou wouldest conclude this. I beleeue thee (quoth shee) for now

now I suppose thou lookest more watchfully about thee to discerne the truth, but that which I wil say is no lesse manifest. What? (quoth I.) Since that God is deseruedly thoght to gouerne al things with the stearne of goodnesse, and all these things likewise, as I haue shewed, hasten to goodnesse with their naturall intention, can there be any doubt made, but that they are gouerned [c] willingly, and that they frame themselues of their owne accord to their disposers becke, as agreeable and conformable to their ruler? It must needes bee so (quoth I) neither would it seeme an happy gouernement, if it were an imposed yoake, not a desired health. There is [d] nothing then which following nature, endeuoureth to resist God. Nothing (quoth I.) What if any thing

[c] All things are willingly gouerned by God.

[d] Nothing either will or can resist God.

doeth endeuour (quoth she) can any thing preuaile against him, whom we haue granted to be most powerfull by reason of his blessednesse? No doubt (quoth I) nothing could preuaile. Wherefore there is nothing, which either will or can resist this soueraigne goodnesse. I thinke not (quoth I.) It is then the soueraigne goodnesse, which gouerneth all things strongly, and disposeth them sweetly. When (quoth I) how much (quoth I) doeth not onely the reason, which thou alleadgest, but much more the very words, which thou vsest, delight mee, that folly which bauleth forth great things, may at length bee ashamed of her selfe. Thou hast heard in the [c] Poets Fables how the Gyants prouoked heauen, but this benigne fortitude put thē also down, as they de-

[c] *Ouid Lib 2. Metamor. & Macrob. Lib. 1. Saturnal.*

deserued. But wilt thou haue me vrge farther by way of disputation? perhaps by this arguing there will flie out some beautifull sparke of truth. As it pleaseth thee (quoth I.) No man can doubt (quoth she) but that God is Almighty. No man (quoth I) that is well in his wittes. But (quoth shee) there is nothing, that he, who is Almightie, cannot doe. Nothing (quoth I.) Can God do euil? No (quoth I.) Wherfore (quoth shee) [f] Euill is nothing, since hee cannot doe it, who can doe any thing. Doest thou mocke mee (quoth I) making with thy reasons an inextricable labyrinth, that now thou maist go in where thou meanest to goe out againe, and after goe out, where thou camest in, or doest thou frame a wonderful circle of the simplicity

[f] Euil is nothing.

plicity of God ? For a little before taking thy beginning from bleſſednesse, thou affirmedſt that to be the chiefeſt good, which thou ſaydeſt was placed in God, and likewiſe thou prouedſt, that God himſelfe is the chiefeſt good, and ful happines, out of which thou madeſt mee a preſent of that inference, that no man ſhall be happy, vnleſſe hee bee alſo a God. Againe thou toldeſt me, that the forme of goodnes is the ſubſtance of God and of bleſſednes, and that vnity is the ſame with goodnes, becauſe it is deſired by the nature of all things, thou didſt alſo diſpute, that God gouerneth the whole world with the reynes of goodnes, and that all things obey willingly, and that there is no nature of euill, and thou didſt explicate all theſe things with no forreine

reine or farre fetched proofes, but with those which were proper and drawen from inward principles, the one confirming the other; We neither play nor mock (quoth she) and wee haue finished the greatest matter, that can be by the assistance of God, whose aide we implored in the beginning. For such is the forme of the diuine substance, that it neither is diuided into outward things, nor receiueth any such into it self, but as *Parmenides* saith of it:

πάντοθεν ἐν κύκλοισι φέρειν εναλίγκιον ὄγκον

Vndique in circulus ducis similem acervum.

And if wee haue vsed no farre fetched reasons, but such as were placed within the compasse of the matter we handled, thou hast no cause to marueile, since thou hast learned in *Platoes* schoole, that our speeches must be like, and as it were a kinne to the things we speake of.

¶ Our speeches must be like the things we speake of.

THE

THE XII. VERSE.

Philosophy exhorteth to perseuerance in contemplation and vertue.

HAppy is he that can behold
The wel-spring, whence all good doth rise,
Happy is he, that can vnfold
The bands, with which the earth him tyes.
The [a] Thracian Poet, whose sweete song
Perform'd his wiues sad obsequyes,
And forc't the woods to runne along,
When he his mournfull tunes did play,
Whose powerfull musicke was so strong,
That it could make the riuers stay;
The fearefull Hynds not daunted were,
But with the Lions tooke their way,
Nor did the Hare behold with feare
The Dogge, whom these sweete notes appease.
When force of griefe drew yet more neare,
And on his heart did strongly seaze,
Nor tunes, which all in quiet bound
Could any iotte their master ease,
Complayning of his greeuous wound,
And Plutoes Pallace visiting,
He mixt sweet verses with the sound
Of his loud harpes delightfull string,
All that he dranke with thirsty draught
From his high mothers chiefest spring,

[a] Orpheus.

All

All that his restlesse griefe him taught,
And loue, which giues griefe double aide,
With this euen hell it selfe was caught
Whether he went, and pardon pray'd
For his deare spouse, (vnheard request)
The vgly porter was dismayd,
Rauisht with this vnwonted guest,
The furies, which in tortures keepe
The guilty soules with paines oppresst,
Mou'd with his song began to weepe.
Ixions [b] wheele now standing still
Turnes not his head with motions steepe.
Though [c] Tantalus might drinke at will,
To quench his thirst he would forbeare.
The Vulture full with musicke shrill
Doth not poore [d] Titius liuer teare,
We by his verses conquered are,
Saith the great King whom spirits feare.
Let vs not then from him debarre
His wife, whom he with songs doth gaine,
Yet lest our gift should stretch too farre,
We will it with this law restraine,
That when from hell he takes his flight,
He shall from looking backe refraine.
Who can for louers lawes endite?
Loue hath no law, but her owne will.
Orpheus seeing in th'end of night
Euridice, doth loose and kill
Her and himselfe with foolish loue.
But you this fained tale fulfill,

[b] With which he is tormented in hell for attempting to commit adultery with Iuno.
[c] Who killed his own sonne to entertaine the Gods, and therefore is tormented with hunger & thirst.
[d] Who would haue committed adultery with Latona Apolloes mother, or with Diana.

Who

Who thinke vnto the day aboue
To bring with speede your darke some mind.
For if your eyes (conquerd) you moue
Backward to Pluto *left behind,*
All the rich pray, which thence you tooke,
You loose, while backe to hell you looke.

THE

THE FOVRTH BOOKE OF BOETIVS.

Conteining the reasons, why God permitteth euill.

THE I. PROSE.

Boetius merueileth at the impunitie and prosperitie of euill men.

WHen Philosophy had sung these verses with a soft & sweete voice, obseruing due dignitie and grauitie in her coun-

countenance and geſture, I not hauing altogether forgotten my inward griefe, interrupted her ſpeach, which ſhee was about to continue, and ſayed, O thou, who bringeſt vs to ſee true light, thoſe things, which hetherto thou haſt treated of, haue manifeſtly appeared to bee Diuine in their owne knowledge, and inuincible by thy reaſons, and thou haſt ſaid, that though the force of griefe had made me forget them of late, yet heretofore I was not altogether ignorant of them. But this is the chiefeſt cauſe of my ſorrow, that, ſince the gouernour of all things is ſo good, there can either be any euill at all, or paſſe vnpuniſhed. Which alone I beſeech thee conſider, how much admiration it deſerueth. But there is another greater then this, for wickedneſſe bearing

ring rule and sway, vertue is not onely without reward, but lieth also troden vnder the wickeds feet, and is punished in stead of vice. That which things should be done in the kingdome of God, who knoweth all things, can doe all things, but will doe onely that, which is good, no man can sufficiently admire nor complaine. To which she answered, It were indeede infinitly strange, and surpassing all monsters, if, as thou conceiuest, in the best ordered house of so great an housholder, the vilest vessels were made account of, and the pretious neglected, but it is not so For if those things which were a little before concluded, be kept vnuiolated, thou shalt by his helpe, of whose kingdome we speake, know, that the good are alway powerfull,

and the euill alway abiect and weake, & that vices are neuer without punishment, nor vertue without reward, and that the good are alway prosperous, and the euil vnfortunate, and many things of that sort, which will take away all cause of complaint, and giue thee firme and sollide strength. And since by my meanes thou hast already seene the forme of true blessednesse, and knowen where it is placed, running ouer all those things, which I thinke necessary to let passe, I will shew thee the way, which will carry thee home. And I will also fasten wings vpon thy mind, with which shee may rouse her selfe, that al perturbation being driuen away, thou mayest returne safely into thy countrey by my direction, by my path, and with my wings. THE

THE I. VERSE.

How Phylosophy bringeth men to the contemplation of God.

FOr I haue swift and nimble wings, which will ascend the lofty skies,
VVith which when thy quick mind is clad, it wil the loathed earth dispise
And goe beyond the airy globe, and watry cloudes behind it leaue
Passing the fire, which skorching heat doth from the heau'ns swift course re
Vntill it reach the starry house, and get to treade bright Phabus waies (coiue,
Ioyning it selfe in company with aged Saturnes lightsome raies,
And trace the circles of the starres, which in the night to vs appeare,
And hauing stai'd there long enough goe on beyond the farthest sphere.
Sitting vpon the highest orbe partaker of the glorious light,
VVhere highest King his Scepter holds, and the worlds raines doth guide a-
And in his Chariot standing firme, doth euery thing in order set. (right,
Vnto this seat when thou art brought, thy countrey, which thou didst forget,
Thou then wilt challenge to thy selfe, saying this is the glorious land
VVhere I was borne and in this soile my feet for euermore shall stand.
VVhence if thou pleasest to behold the earthly might, which thou hast left,
Those Tyraunts, which the people feare, will seeme of their true home bereft.

THE II. PROSE.

That good men are powerfull, and euill men weake.

OH (quoth I.) How great things doest thou promise? And I doubt not but thou

canſt performe them, wherefore ſtay me not now, that thou haſt ſtirred vp my deſire. Firſt then (quoth ſhe) that[a] good men are alway powerfull, and euill men of no ſtrength, thou mayeſt eaſily knowe, and the one is proued by the other. For ſince that good and euill are contraries, if it be conuinced, that goodneſſe is potent, the weakeneſſe of euil will be alſo manifeſt; and contrariwiſe if we diſcerne the frailty of euill, wee muſt needes acknowledge the firmenes of goodneſſe. But that our opinion may be more certainely embraced, I will take both waies, confirming my propoſitions, ſometime from one part, ſometime from another. There bee two things, by which all humane actions are effected, will and power, of which if

[a] Good men are powerfull, and euill men weake

if either be wanting, there can nothing be performed. For if there want will, no man taketh any thing in hand against his will, and if there be not power, the will is in vaine. So that, if thou seest anie willing to obtaine that, which he doth not obtaine, thou canst not doubt, but that he wanted power to obtaine, what he would. It is manifest (quoth I) and can by no meanes be denied. And wilt thou doubt, that he could, whō thou seest bring to passe, what he desired? No. But euery man is mighty in that which he can doe, & weake in that, which he cannot doe. I confesse it (quoth I.) Doest thou remember then (quoth she) that it was inferred by our former discourses, that all the intention of mans will doth hasten to happinesse, though their courses

be diuers? I remember (quoth I) that that also was proued. Remembrest thou also that blessednesse is goodnesse it selfe, and consequently when blessednesse is sought after, goodnesse must of force be desired? I haue that also fixt in my memory. Wherefore all men both good and bad, without difference of intentions endeuour to obtaine goodnesse. It followeth (quoth I.) But it is certaine, that men are made good by the obtayning of goodnesse. It is so, Wherefore good men obtaine what they desire. So it seemeth. And if euill men did obtaine the goodnes they desire, they could not be euill. It is true. VVherefore since they both desire goodnesse, but the one obteineth it, and the other not, there is no doubt but that good men are

power-

powerfull, and the euill weake. Whosoeuer doubteth of this (quoth I) hee neither considereth the nature of things, nor the consequence of thy reasons. Againe (quoth shee) if there bee two, to whom the same thing is proposed according to nature, and the one of them, bringeth it perfectly to passe with his naturall function; but the other cannot exercise that naturall function, but after another maner, then is agreeable to nature, & doth not perform that, which he had proposed, but imitateth the other who performeth it: Which of these two wilt thou iudge to bee more powerfull? Though I coniecture (quoth I) at thy meaning, yet I desire to heare it more plainely. VVilt thou denie (quoth shee) that the motion of walking is a-

greeable to the nature of men? No (quoth I.) And makeſt thou any doubt, that the function of it doth naturally belong to the feet? There is no doubt of this neither (quoth I.) Wherfore if one, that can go vpon his feete, doeth walke, and another, who hath not this naturall function of his feete, endeuoureth to walke by creeping vpon his hands: which of theſe two is deſeruedly to bee eſteemed the ſtronger. Inferre the reſt (quoth I) for no man doubteth, but that hee which can vſe that naturall function is ſtronger then he which cannot. But (quoth ſhe) the good ſeeke to obtaine the chiefeſt good, which is equally propoſed to badde and good, by the naturall function of vertues, but the euill endeuour to obtaine the ſame by diuers concupiſcenſes,

piscenſces, which are not the naturall function of obtaining goodneſſe. Thinkeſt thou otherwiſe? No (quoth I) for it is manifeſt, what followeth. For by force of that which I haue already granted, it is neceſſary, that good men are powerfull, and euil men weake. Thou runneſt rightly (quoth ſhe) and it is (as Phyſitions are wont to hope) a token of an erected and reſiſting nature. VVherefore, ſince I ſee thee moſt apt and willing to comprehend, I will therefore heape vp manie reaſons together. For conſider the great weakeneſſe of vicious men, who cannot come ſo farre, as their naturall intention leadeth, and almoſt compelleth thē. And what? If they were deſtitute of this ſo great and almoſt inuincible helpe of the direction of

of nature? Ponder likewise the immense impotency of wicked men. For they are no light or trifling rewards, which they desire, and cannot obtaine: but they faile in the very summe and toppe of things: neither can the poore wretches compasse that, which they onely labour for nights and daies: in which thing the forces of the good eminently appeare. For as thou wouldest iudge him to be most able to walke, who going on foote could come as farre, as there were any place to goe in: so must thou of force iudge him most powerful, who obtaineth the end of all, that can be desired, beyond which there is nothing. Hence that which is opposite also followeth, that the same men are wicked, and destitute of all forces. For why doe they follow

low vices, forsaking vertues? By ignorance of that which is good? But what is more deuoide of strength then blind ignorance? Or do they know what they should embrace, but passion driueth them headlong the contrary way? So also intemperance make them fraile, since they cannot striue against vice. Or doe they wittingly and willingly forsake goodnesse, and decline to vices? But in this sort they leaue not onely to be powerfull, but euen to be at all. For they which leaue the common end of all things which are, leaue also being. Which may perhaps seeme strange to some, that we should say, that euill men are not at all, who are the greatest part of men: but yet it is so. For I denie not, that euill men are euill, but withall I say that [b] purely and simply

[b] Euill men simply haue no being at all.

plie they are not.

For as thou mayeſt call a carcaſſe a dead man, but not ſimply a man, ſo I confeſſe, that the vitious are euill, but I cannot grant that abſolutely they are. For that is, which retaineth order, and keepeth nature, but that, which faileth from this, leaueth alſo to be that, which it is in his owne nature. But thou wilt ſay, that euill men can do many things, neither will I deny it, but this their power proceedeth not from forces, but from weakneſſe. For they can doe euill, which they could not doe, if they could haue remained in the performance of that, which is good. Which poſſibilitie declareth more euidently that they can do nothing. For if, as wee concluded a little before, euill is nothing, ſince they can onely doe euill, it is manifeſt, that

c Euill men can doe nothing.

that they can doe nothing. It is plaine. And that thou maiſt vnderſtand, what the force of this power is; we determined a little before, that there is nothing more powerful then the Soueraigne goodneſſe. It is true (quoth I.) But he cannot doe euill. No. Is there any then (quoth ſhe) that thinke that men can doe all things? No man, except he be mad, thinketh ſo But yet men can doe euill. I would to God, they could not (quoth I.) Since therefore hee that can onely doe good, can doe all things, and they who can doe euill, cannot doe all things, it is manifeſt, that they which can doe euill, are the leſſe potent. Moreouer, wee haue proued that all power is to bee accounted among thoſe things, which are to be wiſhed for, and that all ſuch things haue refe-

reference to goodneſſe, as to the very heighth of their nature. But the poſſibilitie of committing wickedneſſe cannot haue reference to goodneſſe. Wherfore it is not to be wiſhed for, & conſequently it is manifeſt, poſſibility of euil is no power. By all which the power of the good and the vndoubted infirmitie of the euill appeareth. And it is manifeſt, that that ſentence of[d] *Plato* is true; that onely wiſe men can doe that, which they deſire, and that wicked men practiſe indeed what they liſt, but cannot performe what they would. For they doe what they liſt thinking to obtaine the good which they deſire, by thoſe things which cauſe them delight, but they obtain it not, becauſe ſhamefull actions cannot arriue to happineſſe.

[d] In Gorgia

THE

THE II. VERSE.

Kings are not potent, if they be passionate.

THe Kings, whom we behold
In highest glory plac't
And with rich purple grac't
Compast with souldiers bold.
Whose count'nance shewes fierce threats,
Who with rash fury chide,
If any curbe the pride
Of their vaine glorious seates.
Yet inwardly oppreſt
They are with captiues chaines,
For filthy lust there raignes
And poysoneth their breſt,
Wrath often them perplex,
Raising their minds like waues
Oft sorrow makes them slaues
And sliding hopes them vex.
So many Tyrants still
Dwelling in one poore heart
Except they first depart
Shee cannot haue her will.

THE

The III. Prose.

That good men are not without reward, nor euill without punishments.

SEest thou then, in what myre wickednesse wallows, and how clearely honesty shineth? By which it is manifest, that the good are neuer without rewards, nor the euill without punishments. For that, for which any thing is done, may deseruedly seeme the reward of that action, as to him that runneth a race, the crowne for which hee runneth, is proposed as a reward. But we haue shewed, that blessednesse is the selfe same goodnes, for which all things are done. Wherefore this [a] goodnesse is proposed as a common reward for all humane actions, and this

[a] Goodnes the reward of all humane actions.

this cannot be separated from those, who are good. For hee shall not rightly be any longer called good, who wanteth goodnesse: wherefore vertuous actions are not left without their due rewards. And how much soeuer the euill doe rage, yet the wise mans crowne wil not fade nor wither. For others wickednesse depriueth not vertuous minds of their proper glory. But if hee should reioyce at any thing which hee hath from others, either he, who giue it, or any other might take it away. But because euery mans vertue is the cause of it, then only he shall want his reward, when he leaueth to be vertuous. Lastly, since euery reward is therfore desired, because it is thought to be good, who can iudge him to bee deuoyd of reward, which hath goodnesse for his

possession? But what reward hath hee? The most beautifull and the greatest that can be. For remember that *Corollarium*, which I presented thee with a little before, as with a rare and pretious iewell, and inferre thus: since that goodnesse it selfe is happinesse, it is manifest that all good men euen by being good, are made happy. But we agreed, that blessed men are Gods. Wherefore the reward of [b] good men, which no time can wast, no mans power diminish, no mans wickednesse obscure, is to become Gods. Which things being so, no wise man can any way doubt of the inseparable punishment of the euill. For since goodnesse and euill, punishment and reward are opposite the one to the other: those things, which wee see fall out in the reward of goodnesse,

[d] Good men are Gods.

nesse, must needes be answerable in a contrary maner, in the punishment of euill. Wherfore as to honest men, honesty it selfe is a reward, so to the wicked their very wickednesse is a punishment. And hee that is punished, doubteth not, but that he is afflicted with euill. Wherefore if they would truely consider their owne estate, can they thinke themselues free from punishment, whom wickednesse the worst of all euils, doth not onely touch, but strongly infect? But weigh the punishment, which accompanieth the wicked, by comparing it to the reward of the vertuous. For thou learnedst not long before, that whatsoeuer is at all, is one, and that vnity is goodnesse, by which it followeth, that whatsoeuer is, must also bee good. And in this manner, whatsoeuer falleth

a Wickednesse the punishment of euil men

from goodneſſe, ceaſeth to be, by which it followeth, that [d] euil men leaue to be that, which they were. But the ſhape of men, which they they ſtill retaine, ſheweth them to haue beene men, wherefore by embracing wickeneſſe, they haue loſt the nature of men. But ſince vertue alone can exalt vs aboue men, wickedneſſe muſt needes caſt thoſe vnder the deſert of men, which it hath bereaued of that condition. Wherefore thou canſt not account him a man, whom thou ſeeſt transformed by vices. Is the violent extortour of other mens goods carried away with his couetous deſire? Thou mayeſt liken him to a wolfe. Is the angrie and vnquiet man alway contending and brauling? Thou mayeſt compare him to a dogge. Doeth the trecherous fellow reioyce that

[d] Euill men ceale to be that which they were.

that hee hath deceiued others with his hidden fraudes? Let him be accounted no better then a fox. Doth the outragious fret and fume? Let him bee thought to haue a Lions mind. Is the feareful & timorous affraid without cause? Let him be esteemed like to Hares and Deares. Is the slow and stupide alway idle? He liueth an asses life. Doeth the light and vnconstant change his courses? Hee is nothing different from the birds. Is he drowned in filthy and vncleane lusts? He is entangled in the pleasure of stinking sinne. So that hee, [c] who leauing vertue, ceaseth to be a man, since he cannot be partaker of the Diuine condition, is turned into a beast.

[c] Wicked men are beasts.

THE III. VERSE.

That vices are of greater force, then enchauntments.

THe sailes, which wise Vlisses bore,
And ships, which in the seas long time did stray,
The Easterne wind draue to that [a] shore,
[a] The Ile
Where the faire Goddesse Lady Circe lay
Daughter by birth to Phebus bright,
Who with inchanted cups and charmes did stay
Her guests, deceiu'd with their delight,
And into sundry figures them did change,
Being most skilfull in the might,
And secret force of herbes and simples strange,
Some like to sauage beres and some
Like Lyons fierce, which daile vse to raunge
Vpon the Libyan plaines, become.
Others are chang'd to the shape and guise
Of rau'nous Wolues, and waxing dumbe
Vse howling in the stead of manly cries.
Others like to the Tigre roue,
Which in the scorched Indian desert lies.
[b] Mercurius.
And though the [b] winged sonne of Ioue
From these bewitched cups delightfull tast
To keepe the famous Captaine strone,
Yet them the greedy mariners imbrac'd

With

With much desire, till turn'd to swine
In steed of bread they fed on oken mast.
Now in their outward shape no signe,
Nor shew remaines of any humane grace,
Onely their minds vnchaung'd repine
To see their bodies in such vgly case.
O feebie hand, and idle art,
Which though it could the outward lims deface:
Yet had no force to change the heart.
For all the force of men giu'n by Gods arme
Lyes hidden in their inmost part.
The poysons therefore, which within them swarme
More deeply pierce, and with more might,
For to the body though they doe no harme:
Yet on the soule they worke their spight.

THE IIII. PROSE.

Of the misery of wicked men.

THen said I, I confesse, and perceiue that thou affirmest not without cause, that the vicious, though they keepe the outward shape of men are in their

their inward ſtate of mind changed into bruite beaſts. But I would haue had them, whoſe cruell and wicked heart rageth to the harme of the good, reſtrained from executing this their malice. They are reſtrained (quoth ſhee) as ſhall bee proued in conuenient place. But yet if this [a] liberty, which they ſeeme to haue, be taken away, their puniſhment alſo is in great part releaſed. For, (which perhaps to ſome may ſeeme incredible) euill men muſt neceſſarily be more vnhappy, when they haue brought to paſſe their purpoſes, then if they could not obtaine what they deſire. For if it bee a miſerable thing to deſire that, which is euill, it is more miſerable to be able to performe it, without which the miſerable will could not haue any effect. Wherfore ſince euery one

[a] The miſery of the wicked encreaſeth with their power.

one of theſe hath their peculiar miſery, they muſt of force bee oppreſſed with a threefold wretchedneſſe, whom thou ſeeſt deſire, be able, and performe wickedneſſe. I grant it (quoth I) but I earneſtly wiſh, that they may ſoone be deliuered from this miſerie hauing loſt the power to performe their malice. They will looſe it (quoth ſhee) ſooner then perhaps either thou wouldeſt, or they themſelues ſuppoſe. For in the ſhort compaſſe of this life there is nothing ſo late, which the immortall ſoule thinketh to expect long, ſo that the great hope and higheſt attempts of the wicked are many times made fruſtrate with a ſuddaine and vnexpected ende, which in trueth maketh their miſerie to bee in ſome meaſure.

For

For if wickednes make men miſerable, the b longer one is wicked, the more miſerable he muſt needes be; And I ſhould iudge him the moſt vnhappy man, that may be, if death at leaſt did not end their malice. For if wee haue concluded truely of the miſery of wickedneſſe, it is is manifeſt, that the wretchedneſſe, which is euerlaſting, muſt of force bee infinite. A ſtrange illation (quoth I) and hard to bee granted: but I ſee, that thoſe things, which were granted before, agree very well with theſe. Thou thinkeſt aright (quoth ſhe) but he that findeth difficultie to yeeld to the concluſion, muſt either ſhew, that ſomthing which is preſuppoſed is falſe, or that the combination of the propoſitions make not a neceſſary concluſion, otherwiſe granting that, which went before, hee hath no reaſon to doubt of the inference. For this alſo, which I will conclude now, will ſeeme no leſſe ſtrange, and yet followeth as neceſſarily out of thoſe things, which are already aſſumed. What? (quoth I.) c That wicked men (quoth ſhe) are more happy being puniſhed, then if they eſcaped the hands of iuſtice. Neither doe I now goe about to ſhew that, which may come into euery mans minde, that euill cuſtomes are corrected

b The longer a man is wicked, the more miſerable he is.

c Wicked men more happy, when they are puniſhed, then when they eſcape.

corrected by chastisement, and are reduced to vertue by the terrour of punishment, and that others may take example to auoid euill, but in another manner also I thinke vitious men, that goe vnpunished to be more miserable, although we haue no relation, nor respect to correction or example. And what other manner shall this be (quoth I) besides these? Haue we not graunted (quoth shee) that the good are happy, and the euil miserable? We haue (quoth I.) If then (quoth she) some thing that is good be added to ones misery, is not hee happier then another, whose misery is desolate and solitary, without any participation of goodnesse? So it seemeth (quoth I.) What if there be some other euill annexed to this miserable man, who is depriued of all goodnesse, besides, those,

thoſe, which make him miſerable, is hee not to bee accounted much more vnhappy then he, whoſe miſerie is lightned by pertaking of goodneſſe? Why not? (quoth I.) Then the wicked haue ſome good annexed when they are puniſhed, to witte, the puniſhment it ſelfe, which by reaſon of iuſtice is good, and when they are not puniſhed, they haue a farther euill, the very impunitie, which thou haſt deſeruedly graunted to bee an euill to wickedneſſe. I cannot deny it. Wherefore the vicious are farre more vnhappy, by eſcaping puniſhment vniuſtly, then by being iuſtly puniſhed. But it is manifeſt, that it is iuſt, that the wicked be puniſhed, and vniuſt that they ſhould goe vnpuniſhed. VVho can deny that? But neither will any man deny this

this (quoth shee) that whatsoeuer is iust, is good, and contrariwise, that whatsoeuer is vniust, is euill. This followeth (quoth I) out of that, which hath beene concluded before. But I pray thee, leaueſt thou no punishments for the soules after the death of the body? And those great too (quoth shee.) Some of which I thinke to bee executed as sharpe punishments, and other as mercifull purgations. But I purpose not now to treate of those. But wee haue hetherto laboured, that thou shouldest perceiue the power of the wicked, which to thee seemed intollerable, to bee none at all, and that thou shouldest see, that those, whome thou complainedst went vnpunished, doe neuer escape without punishment for their wic-

wickednesse. And that thou shouldest learne, that the licence, which thou wishedst might soone end, is neither long, and the longer, the more miserable, and most vnhappy if it were euerlasting. Besides, that the wicked are more wretched being permitted to escape with iniust impunity, then being punished with iust seuerity. Out of which it followeth, that they are then more greeuously punished, when they are thought to goe scot-free. When I consider thy reasons (quoth I) I thinke nothing can bee said more truely. But if I returne to [d] the iudgements of men, who is there, that will thinke them worthy to be beleeued, or so much as heard? It is true (quoth shee) for they cannot lift vp their eyes accustomed to darkenesse, to behold the light of mani-

[d] The blind iudgments of men.

manifest truth, and they are like those birds; whose sight is quickned by the night, and dimmed by the day. For while they looke vpon, not the order of things, but their owne affections, they thinke that licence and impunity to sinne, is happie. But see, what the eternall law establisheth. If thou applyest thy mind to the better, thou needest no iudge to reward thee: thou hast ioyned thy selfe to the more excellent things. If thou declinest to that which is worse, neuer expect any other to punish thee, thou hast put thy selfe in a miserable estate; as if by turnes thou lookest downe to the myerie ground; and vp to heauen, all outward things ceasing, by thy very sight thou seemest sometime to be in the durt, and somtime present to the starres. But the common

men ſort conſidereth not theſe things. VVhat then? Shall wee ioyne our ſelues to them, whom we haue proued to be like beaſts? VVhat if one hauing altogether loſt his ſight, ſhould likewiſe forget, that hee euer had any, and ſhould thinke, that hee wanted nothing which belongeth to humane perfection; ſhould we therefore thinke them blind, that ſee his folly? For they will not graunt that neither, which may be proued by as forcible reaſons, [e] that they are more vnhappy, that doe iniury, then they which ſuffer it. I would (quoth I) heare theſe reaſons. Denieſt thou (quoth ſhe) that euery wicked man deſerueth puniſhment? No. And it is many wayes cleare, that the vitious are miſerable. It is true (quoth I.) If then (quoth ſhee) thou

e They which doe iniury are more vnhappy, then they which ſuffer it.

thou wert to examine this cause, whom wouldest thou appoint to be punished, him that did, or that suffred wrong? I doubt not (quoth I) but that I would satisfie him that suffered, with the sorrow of him that did it. The offerer of the iniury then would seeme to thee more miserable, then the receiuer. It followeth (quoth I.) Hence therefore, and for other causes groundedvpon that principle, that dishonesty of it selfe maketh men miserable, it appeareth, that the iniury which is offered any man, is not the receiuers, but the doers misery. But now a dayes (quoth she) orators take the contrary course. For they endeuour to draw the Iudges to commiseration of them, who haue suffred any greeuous afflictions, wherein pitty is more iustly due to the causers there-

of,who ſhould be brought not by angry, but rather by fauourable a nd compaſsionate accuſers to iudgement, as it were ſicke men to a Phyſition, that their diſeaſes and faults might bee taken away by puniſhments,by which meanes the defenders labour, would either wholy ceaſe,or if they had rather profite in ſome ſort, they would change their defence into accuſations. And the wicked themſelues, if they could behold the leaſt part of vertue at ſome little rift, and perceiue that they might be deliuered from the filth of ſinne by the affliction of puniſhments, in reſpect of obtaining vertue, they would not eſteeme of torments,and would refuſe the aſſiſtance of their defenders, and wholy reſigne themſelues to their accuſers and Iudges. By which

meanes it commeth to passe, that [f] in wise men there is no place at all for hatred. For, who but a verie foole would hate the good? And to hate the wicked were against reason. For as faintnesse is a disease of the bodie, so is vice a sickenesse of the mind. VVherefore, since wee iudge those, that haue corporall infirmities, to bee rather worthy of compassion, then of hatred, much more are they to be pitied, and not abhorred, whose minds are oppressed with wickednesse the greatest malady that may be.

[f] A wise man hateth none.

The IIII. Verse.

No man is to be hated, the good are to be loued, and the euill to be pitied.

VVHy should we striue to die so many waies,
And slay our selues with our own hands,

If we seeke death, shee ready stands,
She willing comes, her passage neuer stayes.
Those against whome the wild beasts armed be,
Are arm'd against themselues with rage.
Doe they such warres vniustly wage,
Because their liues, and manners disagree,
And so themselues with mutual weapons kill.
Alas, but this reuenge is small.
Wouldst thou giue due desert to all?
Loue then the good, and pitty thou the ill.

THE V. PROSE.

Boetius complaineth, that prosperity and aduersity are common both to good and badde.

I See (quoth I) what felicity, or misery is placed in the deserts of honest, and dishonest men. But I consider that there is somewhat good, or euill euen in this popular fortune. For no wise man had rather liue in banishment, pouerty and ignominie, then prosper in his owne countrey, being rich, respected, and powerfull. For in this manner is the office of wisedome performed with more credite and renowne, when the gouernours happinesse is participated by their people; so

so chiefely because prisons, chaines, and other torments of legall punishments are rather due to pernitious subiects, for whom they were also ordained. Wherefore I much marueile, why these things are thus turned vpside downe, and the punishments of wickednesse oppresse the good, while euill men obtaine the rewards of the good. And I desire to know of thee, what may seeme to be the reason of so vniust confusion. For I would marueile lesse, if I thought that all things were disordered by casuall euents. Now God being the gouernour, my astonishment is encreased, because since that hee distributeth oftentimes that which is pleasant to the good, and that which is distastfull to the badd, and contrariwise aduersity to the good, and prosperity to the euill, vnlesse we find out the cause hereof; what difference may there seeme to bee betwixt this, and accidentall chances? It is no marueile (quoth she) if any thing be thought temerarious and confused, when wee knowe not the order it hath. But although thou beest ignorant of the causes why things be so disposed, yet because [a] the world hath a good gouernour, doubt not, but all things are well done.

[a] We must thinke that God doth all things wel, though we vnderstand not the reason of his doings.

THE V. VERSE.

Admiration ceaseth, when the causes of things are knowne.

WHo knows not how the starres neare to the poles doe slide
And how Bootes his slow waine doth guide,
And why he sets so late, and doth so early rise,
May wonder at the course of the skies.
If when the moone is full, her hornes seeme pale to sight,
Infested with the darkenesse of the night
And Starres from which all grace she with her brightnes tooke,
Now shew themselues, while she doth dimly looke.
A publike errour straight through vulgar minds doth passe,
And they with many streates beate vpon brasse.
None wonders, why the winds vpon the waters blow,
Nor why loate Phœbus beames dissolue the snow.
These easie are to know, the other hidden lye,
And therefore more our hearts they terrifie.
All strange events, which time to light more seldome brings,
And the same people count as sudden things,
If we our clouded minds from ignorance could free,
No longer would by vs admired be.

a Stesichorus and Pindarus thought that the moone was eclipsed by songs, and therefore to hinder it, they caused the belles to be rung out of order. see Iun. nall. Satyr. 6.

THE VI. PROSE.

Of prouidence and Fate, and why prosperitie and aduersitie are common both to good and bad.

IT is true (quoth I) but since it is thy profession to explicate the causes of hidden

den things, & to vnfold the reasons, which are couered with darkenesse, I beseech thee vouchsafe to declare this miracle, which troubleth me aboue all others. Then she smiling a little saide: thou inuitest me to a matter, which is most [a] hardly found out, and can scarcely be sufficiently declared, for it is such, that one doubt being taken away, innumerable other, like the heads of [b] Hydra, succeed, neither will they haue any end, vnlesse a man represse them with the most liuely fire of his minde: for in this matter are wont to be handled these questions. Of the simplicitie of prouidence, of the course of fate, of sudden chaunces, of Gods knowledge and prædestination, and of free will, which, how weighty they are, thou thy selfe discernest.

[a] How hard it is to find out the reason of Gods prouidence

[b] Which had 70. or 90. heads. and if one were cut of 2. arose in the place.

But becauſe it is a part of thy cure, to know theſe things alſo, though the time be ſhort, yet wee will endeuour to touch them briefely. But if the ſweetneſſe of verſe delight thee, thou muſt forbeare this pleaſure for a while, vntill I propoſe vnto thee ſome fewe arguments. As it pleaſeth thee (quoth I.) Then taking as it were a new beginning, ſhe diſcourſed in this maner. The generation of all things, and all the proceedings of mutable natures, and whatſoeuer is moued in any ſort, take their cauſes, order, and formes from the ſtabilitie of the Diuine mind. This placed in the Caſtle of his owne ſimplicitie, prefixeth manifolde wayes for all that is to bee wrought or done; which wayes being conſidered in the puritie of Gods vnderſtanding, are

are named prouidence, but beeing referred to those things, which hee moueth and disposeth, they were by the ancients called Fate The diuersitie of which will easily appeare, if we weigh the force of both. For [c] prouidence is the very Diuine reason it selfe, seated in the highest Prince, which disposeth all things; But [d] Fate is a disposition inhærent in changeable things, by which prouidence connecteth all things in their due order. For prouidence embraceth all things together, though diuers, though infinite; but Fate putteth euery particular thing into motion, beeing distributed by places, formes, & times: so that this vnfolding of temporall order being vnited in the foresight of Gods mind, is prouidence & the same vniting, being digested & vnfolded by times,

[c] Prouidence

[d] Fate.

times, is called fate. Which although they be diuers, yet the one dependeth on the other. For fatall order proceedeth from the ſimplicitie of prouidence. For as a workeman conceiuing the forme of any thing in his mind, taketh his worke in hand, and executeth by order of time, that which he had ſimply and preſently foreſeene: So God by his prouidence diſpoſeth whatſoeuer is to be done with ſimplicitie and ſtabilitie: And by fate effecteth by manifold and temporal waies thoſe very things which he diſpoſeth. Wherfore, [e] whether fate bee exerciſed by the ſubordination of certaine Diuine ſpirits to prouidence, or this fatall webbe be wouen by the ſeruice of the ſoule, of all nature, or of the heauenly motions of the Starres, of [f] angelicall vertue, or of diaboli-

call

[e] Diuers opinions of ancient philoſophers.

[f] This is diſtinguiſhed from diuine ſpirits mentioned in the firſt place, by their miſſion or outward adminiſtration, from which the former are free.

cal industry; or of some or al of these; that certainly is manifest, that prouidence is an vnmoueable and simple forme of those things, which are to be done; & fate a moueable connexion and temporall order of those things, which the diuine simplicity hath disposed to be done. So that all, that is vnder fate, is also subiect to prouidence, to which also fate it self obeieth. §But some things which are placed vnder prouidence, are aboue the course of fate. And they are those things, which nigh to the first diuinity being stable & fixe, exceede the order of fatal mobility. For as of Orbes which turne about the same Centre, the inmost draweth nigh to the simplicity of the middest, and is as it were the hinge of the rest, which are placed without it, about which they are turned: and

§ Some things aboue the course of Fate.

and the outmoſt wheeled with a greater compaſſe, by how much it departeth from the middle indiuiſibility of the Centre, is ſo much the more extended into larger ſpaces: but that which is ioyned & coupled to that middle, approcheth to ſimplicity, and ceaſeth to ſpread & flow abroad. In like maner that, which departeth fartheſt from the firſt mind, is perplexed with greater connexions of fate, and euery thing is ſo much the freer from fate, by how much it draweth nigh to that hinge of all things. And if it ſticketh to the ſtability of the ſoueraign mind, free from motion, it ſurpaſſeth alſo the neceſsity of fate. VVherefore in what ſort diſcourſe is compared to vnderſtanding; that, which is produced to that which is, time to eternity, a circle to the Centre. Such is the

the course of moueable fate, to the stable simplicity of prouidence. That course mooueth the heauen and starres, temper eth the elements one with another, and transformeth them by mutuall changing. The same reneweth all rising and dying things by like proceeding of fruites and seedes. This comprehendeth also the actions and fortunes of men by an vnloosable connection of causes, which since they proceede from the principles of vnmooueable prouidence, must needes also be [h] immutable. For in this manner things are best gouerned, if the simplicity which remayneth in the Diuine minde, produceth an inflexible order of causes, and this order restrayneth with his owne immutabilitie, things

[h] Fate and those thing which are vnder it, are immutable as they are referred to prouidence

things otherwise mutable & which would haue a confused course. VVhereof it ensueth, that though all things seeme confused and disordered to you, who are not able to consider this order: notwitstanding all things are disposed by their owne measure directing them to good. For there is [i] nothing, which is done for the loue of euill, euen by the wicked themselues, whom, as hath beene abundantly prooued, lewd errour carrieth away, while they are seeking after that, which is good, so farre is it, that order proceeding from the hing of the soueraign goodnesse, should auert any from his first beginning. But thou wilt say, what more vniust confusion can there be, then that both aduersity and prospetity should happen to the good, and in like maner both

[i] Nothing is done for the loue of euill.

desired

desired and hatefull things to the wicked. But are men so completely wise, that whosoeuer they [k] iudge wicked or honest, must needes be so? How then are their censures contrary one to another, so that to diuers the same men seeme worthy of reward and punishment. But let vs graunt, that some are able to discerne the good from the euill. Can they therefore behold that inward complexion as it were of soules? For he that knoweth not the cause, may marueile in like maner, why some sound bodies agree better with sweete things, and other with tart. And why some sick men are healed with gentle and some with sharper physicke. But to a Physitian who knoweth the manner and temper both of health and sickenesse, this is nothing strange. Now,

[k] The iudgments of men vncertaine.

Now, what is the health of ſoules, but vertue? What ſickeneſſe haue they, but vices? And who either conſerueth goodneſſe, or expelleth euils, but God the ruler and gouernour of mens minds? Who[l] beholding from his high turret of prouidence, ſeeth what is fitting for euery one, and applieth that, which hee knoweth to bee moſt conuenient. Hence proceedeth that ſtrange wonder of fatal order, when he that knoweth what is beſt, doth that, which the ignorant admire. For to touch briefely ſome few things of the diuine depth, which humane reaſon is able to attaine, whome thou thinkeſt moſt iuſt, and moſt obſeruant of equity, ſeemeth otherwiſe in the eies of prouidence which knoweth all. And our friend [m] *Lucan* noteth, that the cauſe of the conquerours

[l] God ſeeth what is moſt fitting for euery man, and diſpoſeth accordingly

[m] A Poet of Cordona.

querours pleased the Gods, and that of the conquered, *Cato.* Wherefore whatsoeuer thou seest done heere against thy expectation, is right order in the things themselues, but a peruerse confusion in thy opinion. But let there be one so wel conditioned, that God and men approue and praise him, yet perhaps he is so weake a minded man, that if he falleth into aduersity, he wil forsake his innocency, which was not able to keepe him in prosperity. Wherefore Gods wise dispensation spareth him that aduersity might make worse, least he should suffer, to whome difficulties are dangerous. There is another complete in al vertues, a Saint and nigh to God, prouidence iudgeth it a sacriledge to lay any afflictions on him, insomuch, that she permitteth him not to be troubled so much

as with corporall sickenesse. For as one,[n] that excelleth me, saith: Ἀνδρὸς ἱερῦ σῶμα δυνάμεις τὸ ἱκοδομῦσι. It hapneth oftē also, that the chiefe cōmand is giuen to good mē, that wickednes, which otherwise would ouerflow all, may be kept downe. She mixeth for others sower with sweete according to the disposition of their soules, she checketh some, lest they should fall to dissolution by long prosperity, others she suffereth to be tossed with many stormes, that they may confirme the forces of their minde with the vse and exercise of patience. Some are too much afrayde of that, which they are able to beare. Other make lesse account then there is cause of that, which they cannot endure, these shee assayeth with afflictions that they may make triall of themselues. Many haue bought the

[n] This is a saying of a Christian diuine, whō Philosophy acknowledgeth to excell her. *Viri sacri corpus virtutes ædificauere.*

the renowne of this world with a glorious death. Some ouercomming all torments, haue shewed by their example, that vertues cannot be conquered by miseries, which things how well and orderly they are done, and how much to their good, to whom they happen, there can bee no doubt. For that sometimes greeuous, sometime pleasant things befall in like maner the wicked, proceedeth from the same causes. And as for aduersitie, no man merueileth, because all thinke that they deserue ill, whose punishments doe both terrifie others from the like courses, and moue them to amend themselues: And their prosperitie is a great argument to the good, what they ought to iudge of this happinesse, which they see oftentimes bestowed vpon the wicked.

ked. In which this alſo is to bee conſidered, that peraduenture ſome haue ſo headlong and vntowyard a diſpoſition, that pouertie would rather make him worſe, whoſe diſeaſe is cured by prouidence, with giuing him ſtore of money; Another knowing his owne guilty conſcience, and reflecting vpon his owne eſtate, is afraid leaſt the loſſe of that ſhould be greeuous vnto him, the vſe of which is pleaſant. Wherefore he reſolueth to chang his cuſtomes, and whiles he feareth to looſe his proſperitie, he forſaketh wickednes. The increaſe of honor vndeſeruedly obteined, hath throwne ſome headlong into their deſerued deſtruction. Others are permitted to haue authoritie to puniſh others, that they may exerciſe the good, and puniſh the bad. For as there is

no league betweene vertuous & wicked men, ſo neither can the wicked agree among themſelues. Why not? Since they diſagree within themſelues, by reaſon of their vices which teare their conſcience, ſo that they many times doe that, which afterward they wiſh vndon. Frō whence that higheſt prouidence, often worketh that wonderfull miracle, that euill men make thoſe, which are euill, good. For ſome conſidering the iniuſtice done thē by moſt wicked men, out of their hatred to their enemies, haue embraced vertue, procuring to be contrary to them, whom they hate. For it is onely a Diuine ſtrength, to which euen euill things are good, when by vſing them in due ſort, it draweth ſome good effect out of them. For a certaine order embraceth al things, ſo that euen

that, which departeth from the order appointed to it, though it falseth into another, yet that is order also, least cōfused rashnes shold beare any sway in the kingdome of prouidēce Ἀργαλέον δ' ἐμὲ ταῦτα θεῶν ὡς πάντ' ἀγορεύειν For it is impossible for any man either to cōprehend by his witt, or to explicate in spech al the frames of Gods work. It is sufficient, that we haue seene thus much, that God the authour of all natures, directeth and disposeth also all things to goodnesse, and while hee endeuoureth to reduce those things which he hath produced to his owne likenesse, hee banisheth all euill from the boundes of his common wealth, by the course of fatall necessitie. So that, if thou considerest the disposition of prouidence, thou wilt perceiue that euill, which is thought so to abound

Difficile autem est me sermone explicare quem ad modum Deus omniare gat et prouidentia disponat.

bound vpon earth, hath no place left for it at all. But I see that long since burthened with so weighty a question, and wearied with my long discourse, thou expectest the delight of verses; wherfore take a draught, that being refreshed, thou maiest be able to goe forward.

The VI. Verse.

Phylosophy praiseth Gods prouidence.

If thou wouldest see
Gods lawes with purest mind,
Thy sight on heau'n must fixed be,
Whose settled course the Starres in peace doth bind.
The Sunnes bright fire
Stops not his sisters teame
Nor doth the Northerne beare desire
Within the Oceans waue to hide her beame.
Though she beh ld
Th'other Starres their couching:
Yet shee vncessantly is rowl'd
About the heau'n the Ocean neuer touching.
The Eu'ning light
With certaine course doth show
The comming of the shady night,
And Lucifer before the day doth goe.

This mutuall loue
Courses eternall makes,
And from the starry Spheres aboue
All cause of warre, and dang'rous discord takes.
This sweet consent
In equall bands doth tye
The nature of each Element,
So that the moist things yeeld vnto the dry.
The piercing cold
With flames doth friendship keepe
The fire the highest place doth hold,
And the grosse earth sinkes downe into the deepe.
The flowry yeare
Breathes odours in the spring
The scorching summer corne doth beare
The Autumne fruit from loaden trees doth bring.
The falling raine
Doth winters moisture giue
These rules thus nourish and maintaine
All creatures, which we see on earth to liue.
And when they dye,
These bring them to their end,
While their Creatour sittes on high,
Whose hand the raines of the whole world doth bend.
He as their King
Rules them with Lordly might,
From him they rise, flourish and spring,
He as their law and iudge deuides their right.
Those things, whose course
Most swiftly slides away,
His might doth often backward force,

And

And suddenly their wandring motion stay.
Vnlesse his strength
Their violence should bound,
And them which else would runne at length,
Should bring within sbe compasse of a round:
That firme decree
Which now doth all adorne
Would soone destroi'd and broken bee,
Things being farre from their beginning borne.
This powerfull loue
Is common vnto all
Which for desire of good doe moue
Backe to the springs from whence they first did fall.
No wordly thing
Can a continuance haue
Vnlesse loue backe againe it bring,
Vnto the cause, which first the essence gaue.

The VII. Prose.

All fortune is good.

PErceiuest thou now, what followeth of al, that we hau hetherto said? what? (quoth I.) That (quoth she) all maner of fortune is good: How can that bee? (quoth I.) Be attentiue (quoth she) since that al fortune, be it pleasing or vnplea-

vnpleasing, is directed to the reward or exercise of the good, and to the punishment and direction of the wicked, it is manifest, it is all good, since it is all iust, or profitable. Thy reason is very true (quoth I) and if I consider prouidence & fate, which thou diddest explicate a little before, thy opinion is well grounded. But if thou pleasest let vs account it among those, which thou not long since supposedst incredible. What? (quoth she) Because men commonly vse to say, and repeat, that some haue ill fortune: Shall wee (quoth shee) frame our speech to the vulgar phrase, least we seeme to haue as it were forsaken the vse of humane conuersation? As it pleaseth thee (quoth I.) Doest thou not thinke then, that that is good, which is profitable? Yes (quoth I.) But that, which

which either exerciseth, or correcteth, is profitable. It is true (quoth I.) It is good then. VVhy not? But this is the estate of them, who being either vertuous striue with aduersity, or forsaking vices, betake themselues to the way of vertue. I cannot denie it (quorh I.) Now, what sayest thou to that pleasing fortune, which is giuen in reward to the good, doth the common people account it badde? No, but iudgeth it exceeding good, as it is indeed. And what of the other, which being vnpleasing, restraineth the euil with iust punishment, doeth not the people thinke it good? Yea (quoth I) they thinke it the most miserable that can be. Looke then (quoth shee) how following the peoples opinion, we haue concluded a very incredible matter. What? (quoth I.) For it follow-

followeth (quoth shee) out of that, which is granted, that all their fortune, whatsoeuer it be, who are either in the possession, or encrease or entrance of vertue, is good: and theirs, which remaine in vices, the worst that may be. This (quoth I) is true, though none dare say so. VVherefore (quoth she) a wise man must be no more troubled, when he is assaulted with aduersitie: then a valiant Captaine dismayd at the sound of an alarum. For difficulties are the matter, by which the one must encrease his glory, and the other confirme his wisedome. For which cause vertue is so called, because it hath sufficient strength to ouercome aduersitie. For you, that are proficients in vertue, are not come to bee dissolute with dainties, or to languish in pleasures,

sures, but you skirmish fiercely with any fortune, least either affliction oppresse you, or prosperitie corrupt you, and so procure to stay your selues strongly in the meane. For whatsoeuer commeth either short, or goeth beyond, may well contemne felicity, but will neuer obtaine any reward of labour. For it is placed in your power, to frame to your selues, what fortune you please. For all that seemeth vnsauory, either exerciseth, or correcteth, or punisheth.

THE VII. VERSE.

Phylosophy exhorteth to labours.

Reuengfull [a] *Atreus sonne did ten whole yeares employ*
In wars, till he his [b] *brothers losse repai'd with ransacke*
He setting forth the Fleete of Greece vpon the seas (Troy.
And knowing well, that onely bloud the angry winds would
Forgot a fathers part and with his cruel knife (please.
Vnto the Gods did sacrifice his dearest [c] *daughters life.*
Vlisses wail'd the losse of his most faithfull men
VVhom [d] *Polipkemus did deuoure inclosed in his den*

[a] Agamemnon.
[b] Menelaus whose wife Helena, Paris tooke away.
[c] Iphigenia.
[d] A Gyant in Sicily, hauing but one eye in his fore-head, which Vlisses did put out.

But

But when his hand by sleight had made the Cyclops blind,
Most pleasant ioy in stead of former teares possest his mind
Hercules famous is for his laborious toyle, (spoyle
Who tam'd the c *Centaurs, and did take the dreadful Lions*
He the f *Stymphalian birds with piercing arrowes strooke,*
And from the watchful Dragons care the golden apples took
He in a threefold chaine the g *Hellish porter ledde,*
And with their cruell h *masters flesh the savage horses fedde*
He did th'encreasing heads of poysonous Hydra burne,
And breaking i *Achelous hornes did make him back returne*
He on the Libyans sands did proud k *Antæus kill,*
And with the mighty l *Cacus blood* m *slanders wrath fulfil,*
He with the dreadfull Bore, encountred, and him slew,
Remayning prest, if he were 8*rg'd his labours to renew.*
To beare n *Heav'n of his toyles the last was, and most hard,*
And for this last & *greatest toile the heav'ns was his reward.*
You Valiant men pursue this way of high renowne, (crown.
Why yeeld you? ouercome the earth, and you the starres shall

c Half men and halfe horses.
f Huge birds in the e called Stymphalus in Arcadia.
g The dog Cerberus who had 3. heads.
h Diomedes King of Thracia, who fedde his horses with mans flesh.
i Who had turned himselfe into the forme of a bull. k The sonne of Neptune, who by touching the earth recouered strength, and therefore Hercules held him vp, and so slew him. l Vulcans son, who did cast out of his mouth fire and smoke. m King of Arcadia. n In stead of Atlas.

THE

THE FIFT BOOKE OF BOETIVS.

Of chance and freewill, and how they ſtand with Prouidence

THE I. PROSE.

Of chance.

HAuing ſayd thus, ſhe began to turne her ſpeech to certaine other queſtions; when I interruptedher, ſaying: Thy

Thy exhortation is very good, and well beſeeming thy authority. But I find it true by experience, as thou affirmedſt, that the queſtion of prouidence, is entangled with many other. For I deſire to know, whether thou thinkeſt chance to be any thing at al, & what it is. I make haſt (quoth ſhee) to performe my promiſe, and to ſhew thee the way, by which thou mayeſt returne to thy countrey. And theſe other queſtions, though they be very profitable, yet they are ſomewhat from our purpoſe, and it is to be feared, leaſt being wearied with digreſsions, thou beeſt not able to finiſh thy direct iourney. There is no feare of that (quoth I) for it will be a great eaſe to me, to vnderſtand thoſe things, in which I take great delight, & withall when thy diſputation is fenced

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in on euery side, there can bee no doubt made of any thing thou shalt inferre. I will (quoth shee) doe, as thou wouldest haue me, and withall begannе in this maner: If any shall define chance to be, an euent produced by a confused motion, & without connexion of causes, I affirme that there is no such thing, and that chance is only an empty voyce without any reall signification. For what place can confusion haue, since God disposeth all things in due order. For it is a true sentence, that of nothing commeth nothing, which none of the ancients denied, though they held not that principle of the efficient cause, but of the materiall subiect, that is of the nature of all formes. But if any thing proceedeth from no causes, that will seeme to haue come from nothing,

which if it cannot bee, neither is it posſible there ſhould be any ſuch chance, as is defined a little before. What then (quoth I,) is there nothing that can rightly bee called chance, or fortune? Or is there ſomthing, though vnknowen to the common ſort, to which theſe names agree? My *Ariſtotle* (quoth ſhee) in his bookes of nature declared this point briefely and truely. How? (quoth I.) When (quoth ſhee) any thing is done for ſome certain cauſe, and ſome other thing hapneth, for ſome reaſons, then that, which was intended, this is called chance: as if one digging his ground with intention to till it, findeth an hidden treaſure. This is thought to haue fallen thus out by fortune, but it is not of nothing, for it hath peculiar cauſes, whoſe vnexpected & not foreſeene concourſe

concourse seemeth to haue brought foorth a chance. For vnlesse the Husbandman had digged vp his grounds, and vnlesse the other had hidden his money in that place, the treasure had not beene found. These are therefore the causes of this fortunate accident, which proceedeth from the meeting and concourse of causes, and not from the intention of the doer. For neither he that hid the golde, nor hee that tilled his ground, had any intention that the money should be found, but, as I said, it followed and concurred, that this man should dig vp that, which the other hidde. VVherefore wee may define [a] chance thus: that it is an vnexpected euent of concurring causes, in those things, which are done to some end and purpose. Now the cause, why causes concurre and

[a] What Chance is.

meete so together, is that order proceeding with inuitable connexion, which descending from the fountaine of providence, disposeth all things in their places and times.

THE. I. VERSE.

How casuall events are guided by prouidence.

IN th' Achæmenion rockes, where Parthians with their darts
In their dissembled flight doe wound their enemies,
Tigris from the same head doth with Enphrates rise
And forthwith they themselues deuide in seu'rall parts:
But if they ioyne againe, and them one channell bound,
Bringing together all that both their waues doe beare,
The ships and trees, whose rootes they from the bankes doe teare,
Will meete, and they their flouds will mingle and confound
Yet runnes this wandring course in places which are low.
And in these sliding streames a settled law remaines.
So fortune though it seemes to runne with careles raines,
Yet hath it certaine rule, and doth in order flow.

THE

THE III. PROSE.

Of free will.

OBserue it (quoth I) and I acknowledge it to bee as thou sayest. But in this ranke of coherent causes, haue wee any free will, or doth the fatall chaine fasten also the motions of mens minds? We haue (quoth she) for there can be no resonable nature, vnlesse it be endewed with freewill. For that which naturally hath the vse of reason, hath also iudgement, by which he can discerne of euery thing by it selfe, wherfore he putteth a difference betwixt those things, which are to bee auoided, and those which are to bee desired. Now euery one seeketh for that, which he thinketh is to be desired, and eschueth that which in his iudgement

is

is to be auoyded. Wherefore they which haue reason, haue freedome to will and nill. But yet I make not this equal in al. For the supreme and diuine substances haue both a perspicuous iudgment, & an incorrupted wil, & an effectual power to obtaine their desires. But [a] the minds of men must needes be more free, when they conserue themselues in the contemplation of God, & lesse, when they come [b] to their bodies, and yet lesse when they are bound with earthly setters. But their greatest bondage is, when giuing themselues to vices, they loose the possession of their owne reason. For hauing cast their eyes from the light of the soueraigne truth to inferiour obscurities, forthwith they are blinded with the cloud of ignorance, molested with hurtfull affections, by yeelding and consen-

a This is spoken according to the opinion of the Platonists.
b Before they enforme them

consenting to which, they increase the bondage, which they layd vppon themselues, and are after a certaine manner captiues by their own freedome. Which notwithstanding that foresight of prouidence, which beholdeth all things from eternity, foreseeth, and by predestination disposeth of euery thing by their merrits. πάντ' ἐφορᾷ καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούει

Omnia videt & omnia audit.

The II. Verse.

How God knoweth all things.

Sweete Homer sings the praise
Of Phabus cleare and bright,
And yet his strongest rayes
Cannot with feeble light
Cast through the secret maine
Of earth and seas his sight:
But he, that did the world deuise,
Looketh from high with clearer eyes.
The earths vast depths vnseene
From his sight are not free,
No clouds can stand betweene.
He at one time doth see

What are, and what haue beene,
And what shal after bee.
Whom (since he onely vieweth all)
You rightly the true Suu ne may call.

THE III. PROSE.

Boetius *proposeth the difficulty of concording Gods prouidence with mens free-will.*

THen I conmplayned, that I was now in a greater confusion, & more doubtful difficultie then before. What is that? (quoth she) for I already coniecture what it is that troubleth thee. It seemeth (quoth I) to bee altogether impossible and repugnant, that God foreseeth all things, and that there should be any free-will. For if God beholdeth all things, and cannot be deceiued, that must of necessity follow, which his prouidence foreseeth to be to come. VVherefore if from eternity he doth not only, foreknow

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the deeds of men, but also their counsels & wils, there can be no freewill; for there is not any other deede or wil, but those, which the diuine prouidence that cannot bee deceiued, hath forseene. For if things can be drawn to any other course, then was foreknowne, there will not be any firm knowledg of that, which is to come, but rather an vncertaine opinion, which in my opinion were impious to beleeue of God. Neither do I allow of that reaſō, with which ſome ſuppoſe that they can diſſolue the difficulty of this queſtion. For they ſay, that nothing is therfore to come to paſſe, becauſe prouidence did foreſee it, but rather contrary wiſe, becauſe it ſhall bee, it could not be vnknown to prouidence, and in like maner it is neceſſary, that the other ſhould be true.

For it is not necessarie that those things should happen, which are foreseene, but it is necessarie that those things shoul be foreseene, that are to come. As though our question were, which of them is the others cause, the foreknowledge of the necessitie of things to come, or the necessitie of things to come of the foreknowledge. But let vs endeuour to proue, that howsoeuer these causes be ordered, the event of the things, which are foreknowne, is necessary, although the foreknowledge seemeth not to inferre necessitie of being vpon the things themselues. For if any man sitteth, the opinion which thinketh so, must needes be true, and againe on the other side, if the opinion that one sitteth be true, hee must needes sitte. Wherefore there is necessitie in both

in

in the one of sitting, and in the other of truth. But one sitteth not, because the opinion is true, but rather this is true, because one sitteth. So that though the cause of truth proceedeth from one part, yet there is a common necessity in both. And the like is to be inferred of prouidence, & future things. For althogh they be foreseene, because they shall be, and they doe not come to passe, because they are foreseene: notwithstanding it is necessary, that things to come be foreseene, or that things foreseen doe fall out; which alone is sufficient to ouerthrow freewill. Besides how preposterous is it, that the euent of temporall things should be said to be the cause of the euerlasting foreknowledge: And what els is it to thinke, that God doth therefore foresee future things, because they

they are to happen, then to affirme that those things which happened long since, are the cause of that soueraigne prouidence? Furthermore, as whē I know any thing to be, it must needs be: so when I know, that any thing shall be, it must needes be to come. And so it followeth, that the euent of a thing foreknowen cannot bee auoyded. Finally if any man thinketh otherwise, then the thing is, that is not onely no knowledge, but it is a deceitfull opinion, farre from the truth of knowledge; wherefore if any thing is to bee in such sort, that the euent of it is not certaine or necessary, how can that be foreknowen that it shal happen? for as the knowledge is without mixture of falsity, so that, which is conceiued by it, cannot be otherwise then it is conceiued. For this is the cause

cause, why knowledg is without deceit, because euery thing must needs be so, as the knowledge apprehendeth it to be. What then? How doth God foreknow, that these vncertaine things shall bee? For if hee iudgeth that those things shall happen inevitably, which it is possible shall not happen, hee is deceiued, which is not ondly impious to thinke, but also to speake. But if he supposeth, that they shall happen in such sort as they are, so that hee knoweth, that they may equally be done, and not be done, what foreknowledge is this, which comprehendeth no certaine or stable thing? Or in what is this better then that ridiculous prophecy of *Tiresia*? Whatsoeuer I say, shal either be, or not be, or in what shall the diuine prouidence exceede humane opinion,

if,

if, as men, God iudgeth thoſe things to be vncertaine, the euent of which is doubtfull? But if nothing can bee vncertaine to that moſt certaine fountaine of all things, the euent of thoſe things is certaine, which he doth certainely know ſhall be. Wherefore there is no freedome in humane counſels & actions, which the diuine mind foreſeeing al things without errour or falſhood, tyeth and bindeth to one euent. Which once admitted, it is euident, what ruine of humane affayres wil enſue. For in vain are rewards and puniſhments propoſed to good and euill, which no free and voluntary motion of their minds hath deſerued. And that will ſeeme moſt vniuſt, which is now iudged moſt iuſt, that either the wicked ſhould be puniſhed, or the good rewarded, ſince their owne

owne will leadeth them to neither, but they are compelled by the certaine necessity of that, which is to come. By which meanes vertues and vices shall be nothing, but rather there will follow a mixt confusion of all deserts. And, then which there can be nothing inuented more impious, since that al order of things proceedeth from prouidence, and humane counsels can do nothing, it followeth, that our vices also shal be referred to the author of goodnesse. Wherfore there is no meanes left to hope or pray for any thing. For what can any man either hope or pray for, since an vnflexible course connecteth all things that can bee desired? VVherefore that onely traffick betwixt God and men of hope and prayer shall bee taken away. For by the price of iust humili-

humility, we deserue the vnestimable benefite of Gods grace, which is the onely manner, by which it seemeth that men may talke with God, and by the very manner of supplication be ioyned to that inaccessible light, before they obtain any thing: which if by the admitting the necessity of future things, they bee thought to haue no force; by what shall we be vnited and cleaue to that soueraigne Prince of all things? Wherefore mankind must needes, (as thou saydest in thy verse a little before) being separated and seuered from his fountain, faile & fall away.

THE III. VERSE.

How we come to know the truth.

VVhat cause of discord breakes the bandes of loue?
What God betweene two truths such wars doth moue?
That things which seuerally well settled be,

Yet

Yet iarr'd in one will neuer friendly proue?
Or in true things can we no discord see,
Because all certainties doe still agree?
But our dull soule, couer'd with members blind,
Knowes not the secret lawes, whuh things doe bind,
By the drown'd light of her oppressed fire.
Why then, the hidden notes of things to find,
Doth shee with such a loue of truth desire?
If shee knowes that, which she doth so require.
Why wisheth shee knowne things to know againe?
If she knowes not why striues she with blind paine?
Who after things vnknowne will striue to goe?
Or will such ignorant pursuite maintaine?
How shall she find them out? or hauing so,
How shall she then their formes and natures know?
Because this soule the highest mind did view,
Must we? needes say, that it all natures knew?
Now she, though cloudes of flesh doe her debarre,
Forgets not all, that was her ancient due.
But in her mind some gen'rall motions are,
Though not the skill of things particular.
He that seekes truth, in neither course doth fall,
Not knowing all nor ignorant of all.
He marketh gen'rall things which he retaines,
And matters seene on high doth backe recall.
And things forgotten to his mind regaines,
And ioynes them to that part, which there remaines.

The IIII. Prose.

Phyloſophy beginneth to ſolue the difficulties, which Boetius propoſed.

THis (quoth ſhee) isan ancient complaint of prouidence, vehemently purſued by *Marcus Tullius*, in his diſtribution of diuination, and a thing which thou thy ſelfe haſt made great and long ſearch after; But hetherto none of you haue vſed ſufficient diligence and vigour in the explication thereof. The cauſe of which obſcurity is, for that the motion of humane diſcourſe cannot attaine to the ſimplicity of the diuine knowledge, which if by any meanes wee could conceiue there would not remain any doubt at all, which I will endeuour

our to make manifest and plaine, when I haue first explicated that, which moueth thee. For I demand, why thou thinkest their solution vnsufficient, who thinke that free will is not hindered by foreknowledge, because they suppose that foreknowledge is not the cause of any necessity in things to come. For fetchest thou any proofe for the necessity of future things from any other principle, but onely from this, that those things which are foreknowne, cannot chuse but happen? wherefore if foreknowledge imposeth no necessitie vpon future euents, which thou diddest grant no long before, why should voluntary actions be tyed to any certaine successe? For examples sake, that thou maiest see what will follow, let vs suppose that there were no proui-

dence or foreſight at all. Would thoſe things which proceede from freewill, be compelled to any neceſſity by this meanes? No. Againe let vs grant it to be, but that it impoſeth no neceſsity vpon any thing, no doubt the ſame freedome of will, will remaine whole and abſolute. But thou wilt ſay, though foreknowledge be not a neceſsity for things to happen, yet it is a ſigne, that they ſhal neceſſarily come to paſſe. Wherefore now, though there had bin no foreknowledge, the euents of future things would haue beene neceſſary. For all ſignes only ſhew ſomthing, that is, but cauſe not that which they deſigne. And conſequently it muſt firſt be proued, that all things fal out by neceſsity, that it may appeare that foreknowledge is a ſigne of this neceſsity. For otherwiſe if there be no neceſsity,

neceſsitie, neither can foreknowledge be the ſigne of that, which is not. Beſides it is manifeſt that euery firme proofe muſt bee drawne from intrinſecall and neceſſary cauſes, and not from ſignes and other farrefetched arguments. But how is it poſsible, thoſe things ſhould not happen, which are foreſeene to be to come? As though we did beleeue that thoſe things will not be, which prouidence hath foreknowne, and doe not rather iudge, that although they happen, yet by their owne nature they had no neceſsity of being, which thou maieſt eaſily gather hence. For we ſee many things with our eyes, while they are in doing, as thoſe things which the Coach-men do while they driue and turne their Coaches, and in like manner other things.

Now doth neceſsity compell any of theſe things to be done in this ſort? No. For in vain ſhould Art labour, if all things were moued by compulſion. VVherefore as theſe things are without neceſsity, when they are in doing, ſo likewiſe they are to come without neceſsity, before they bee done. And conſequently there are ſome things to come, whoſe euent is free from all neceſsity. For I ſuppoſe no man will ſay, that thoſe things, which are done now, were not to come, before they were done. VVherefore theſe things being foreſeene, come freely to effect. For as the knowledge of things preſent cauſeth no neceſsity in things which are in doing, ſo neither the foreknowledg in things to come. But thou wilt ſay, This is the queſtion, whether there can bee

any foreknowledg of those things, whose euents are not necessary. For these things seeme opposite, and thou thinkest, that if future things be foreseene, there followeth necessity, if there bee no necessity, that they are not foreknowen, and that nothing can be perfectly knowne, vnlesse it be certaine. And if vncertaine euents be foreseene as certain, it is manifest that this is the obscurity of opinion and not the truth of knowledge. For thou thinkest it to be farre from the integrity of knowledge, to iudge otherwise then the thing is. The cause of which errour is, because thou thinkest that all that is knowen, is knowen onely by the force and nature of the things themselues, which is altogether otherwise. For all that is knowne, is not comprehended according to

the force which it hath in it selfe, but rather according to the facultie of them which know it. For to explicate it with a briefe example: the sight, and the feeling doe diuersly discerne the roundnesse of a dye. The sight standing aloofe, beholdeth it altogether by his beames; but the feeling vnited and ioyned to the orbe, being moued about the compasse of it, comprehendeth the roundnes by parts. Likewise sense, imagination, reason and vnderstanding doe diuersly behold a man. For sense looketh vpon his forme as it is placed in matter or subiect, the imagnation discerneth it alone without matter. Reason passeth beyond this also, and considereth vniuersally the species or kind, which is in particulars. The eye of the vnder-

derstanding is higher yet. For surpassing the compasse of the whole world, it beholdeth with the cleare sight of the mind, that simple forme in it selfe.

In which that is chiefely to bee considered, that the superiour force of comprehending embraceth the inferiour; but the inferiour can by no meanes attaine to the superiour: for the sense hath no force out of matter, neither doth the imagination conceiue vniuersall Species, nor reason is capable of the simple forme, but the vnderstanding, as it were, looking downeward, hauing conceyued that forme, discerneth of all thinges which are vnder it, but in that sorte, in which it apprehendeth that forme, which can bee knowne by none

of

of the other. For it knoweth the vniuerſality of reaſon, and the figure of imagination, and the materia lity of ſenſe, neither vſing reaſon, nor imagination, nor ſenſes, but as it were formally beholding all things, with that one twinckling of the mind. Likewiſe reaſon, when it conſidereth any vniuerſallity, comprehendeth both imaginable and ſenſible things without the vſe of either imagination or ſenſes. For ſhe defineth the vniuerſallity of her conceit thus: man is a reaſonable two-footed liuing creature, which being an vniuerſall knowledge, no man is ignorant that it is an imaginable and ſenſible thing, which ſhe conſidereth by a reaſonable conceiuing, and not by imagination or ſenſe. Imagination alſo, although it began by the ſenſes of ſeeing and

forming

forming figures, yet when sense is absent, it beholdeth sensible things, not after a sensible, but after an imaginary manner of knowledge. Seest thou now how al these in knowing, doe rather vse their owne force and faculty, then the force of those things, which are knowen? Nor vndeseruedly, for since all iudgement is the act of him, who iudgeth, it is necessary that euery one should perfect his operation by his owne power, and not by the force of any other.

The IIII. Verse.

That our knowledge is not wholy taken from the outward obiect.

Ancients in schooles once too obscurely taught,
That sense and shape presented to the thought,
From outward obiects their impression take.

As

As when vpon a paper ſmooth and plaine,
On which as yet no markes of inke haue Layne,
We with a nimble pen doe letters make.
But if our minds to nothing can apply
Their proper motions, but doe patient, lie
Subiect to formes, which doe from bodies flow,
Like to a glaſſe, rendring the ſhapes of things,
Who then can ſhew, from whence that motion ſprings,
By force of which the mind all things doth know?
Or by what skill are ſeu'rall things eſpide?
And being knowne, what power doth them deuide?
And thus deuided, doth againe vnite?
And with a various iourney, oft aſpires
To higheſt things, and oft againe retires
To baſeſt, nothing being out of ſight?
And when ſhe back- vnto her ſelfe doth moue,
Doth all the falſhoods by the truth reproue,
This vigour needes muſt be an actiue cauſe,
And with more powerfull forces muſt be deckt,
Then that, which from thoſe formes, that do reflect
From outward matter, all her vertue drawes.
And yet in liuing bodies paſſions might
Doth goe before, whoſe office is t'incite,
And the firſt motions in the mind to make.
As when the light vnto our eyes appeares,
Or ſome loud voyce is ſounded in our eares.
Then doth the ſtrength of the dull mind awake
Thoſe phantaſies, which ſhe retaynes within,
She ſtirreth vp ſuch motions to begin,
Whoſe obiects with their natures beſt agree.
And thus applying them to outward things,

Sh

She ioynes th'externall shapes, which thence she brings
With formes, which in her selfe included bee.

The V. Prose.

That reason must yeeld to the simplicity of Gods knowledge.

AND if in the discerning of bodies by sense, although the qualities which are obiected do moue the organs of sense, and the passion of the body goeth before the vigor of the actiue mind, prouoking her action to it selfe, and exciting the inward formes, which before lay quiet; if (I say) in perceiuing these corporal obiects, the mind taketh not her impression from passion, but by her own force iudgeth of the passiō it self, which is obiected to the body; how much more do those powers exercise the action of their mind,

minde, and not onely follow the outward obiects in their iudgement, which are free from all affections of the body? Wherefore in this sort haue diuers and different substances, knowledges of many kinds. For onely sense destitute of all other, is in those liuing creatures, which are vnmoueable, as some shell-fish, and other which sticke to stones and so are nourished. And imagination in moueable beasts, who seeme to haue some power to couet, and flie. Reason belongeth onely to mankinde, as vnderstanding to things Diuine. So that, that knowledge is most excellent, which of it selfe doth not onely know her owne obiect, but also those which belong to others. What then, if sense and imagination repugne to discourse and reason, affirming that vniuer-

sallity

sallity to be nothing, which reason thinketh her selfe to see? For that cannot be vniuersal, which is either sensible or imaginable. Wherefore either the iudgment of reason must be true, and nothing at all sensible, or because they know that many things are subiect to the senses and imagination, the conceit of reason is vaine, which considereth that which is sensible and singular, as if it were vniuersall. And if reason should answere, that she beholdeth in her vniuersallity, al that which is sensible or imaginable, but they cannot aspire to the knowledge of vniuersallity, because their knowledge cannot surpasse corporall figures and shapes. And that wee must giue more credite to the firmer and more perfect iudgement, about the knowledge of things. In this contention,

tention, ſhould not wee, who haue the power of diſcourſing, as well as of imagination and ſenſe, rather take reaſons part? The very like happeneth, when humane reaſon doth not thinke, that the diuine vnderſtanding doeth beholde future things, otherwiſe then ſhe her ſelfe doth. For thus thou argueſt, if any things ſeeme not to haue certaine and neceſſary euents, they cannot be certainely foreknowne to bee to come. Wherefore there is no foreknowledge of theſe things, and if we thinke that there is any, there ſhall be nothing, which happeneth not of neceſsity. If therefore, as we are endewed with reaſon, wee could likewiſe haue the iudgement proper to the diuine mind, as we haue iudged that imagination and ſenſe muſt yeeld to reaſon, ſo likewiſe we would

would thinke it most reasonable and iust, that humane reason should submitte her selfe to the Diuine mind. Wherefore let vs bee lifted vp, as much as wee can to that height of the highest mind; for there reason shall see that which she cannot behold in her selfe. And that is how a certaine and definite foreknowledge seeth those things, which haue no certaine issue, and that this is no opinion, but rather the simplicitie of the highest knowledge, inclosed with no bounds.

THE V. VERSE.

Mans body declareth, that his mind was made to contemplate heauenly things.

WHat seest all figures things that liue vpon the earth, do keepe?
Some haue their bodies stretcht in length, by which the dust they sweepe

And do continuall furrowes make, while on their brests they creepe.
Some lightly soaring vp on high, with wings the wind doth smite,
And through the longest ayery space, passe with an easie flight.
Some by their paces to imprint the ground with steps delight;
Which through the pleasant fieldes doe passe, or to the woods do goe,
Whose seuerall formes though to our eyes they do a difference shew,
Yet by their lookes cast downe on earth their senses heauy grow.
Men onely with more stately shape to higher obiects rise,
Who with erected bodies stand, and doe the earth dispise.
These figures warne (if baser thoughts blind not thine earthly eies)
That thou, who with an vpright face dost looke vpon the skie,
Shouldest also raise thy mind aloft, least while thou beareſt high
Thy earthly head thy soule oppreſt beneath thy body lye.

THE VI. PROSE.

The concord of Gods prouidence with freewill is fully explicated.

Seeing therefore, as hath been shewed, all that is knowne, is not comprehended by his owne nature, but by the power of him, which comprehendeth it, let vs see now, as much as we may, what is the state of the diuine substance that

that wee may also know, what his knowledge is. Wherfore it is the common iudgement of all that liue by reason, that God is eterlasting, and therefore let vs consider what [a] eternity is. For this will declare vnto vs both the Diuine nature and knowledge. Eternitie is a perfect possession all together of an endlesse life, which is more manifest by the comparison of temporall things, for whatsoeuer liueth in time, that being present proceedeth from times past, to times to come, and there is nothing placed in time, which can embrace all the space of his life at once. But he hath not yet attained to morrow, and hath lost yesterday. And you liue no more in this daies life, then in that moueable and transitory moment. wherefore whatsoeuer suffereth the

[a] Eternity what it is.

dition of time, although as *Aristotle* thought of the world) it neuer began, nor were euer to end, and his life did endure with infinite time, yet it is not such, that it ought to be called euerlasting. For it doth not comprehend and embrace all the space of his life together, though it be infinite, but it hath not the future time which is yet to come. That then which comprehendeth and possesseth the whole fullnesse of an endlesse life together, to which neither any part to come is absent, nor of that which is past, hath escaped, is worthely to bee accounted euerlasting, and this is necessary, that being no possession in it selfe, it may alway be present to it selfe, and haue an infinity of moueable time present to it. Wherefore they are deceiued, who hearing that *Plato* thoght, that

that this world had neither beginning of time, nor ſhould euer haue any end, thinke that by this meanes the created world ſhonld be coeternall with the creator. For it is one thing, to bee carried through an endleſſe life, which *Plato* attributed to the world, another thing to embrace the whole preſence of an endleſſe life together, which is manifeſtly proper to the Diuine mind. Neither ought God to ſeeme more ancient then things created by the quantity of time, but rather by the ſimplicity of his Diuine nature. For that infinite motiõ of tẽporal things imitateth the preſent ſtate of the vnmoueable life, and ſince it cannot attaine nor equal it, it falleth from immobillitie to motion, & frõ the ſimplicity of preſence, it decreaſeth to an infinite quãtity of future & paſt

and since it cannot possesse together all the fulnesse of his life, by neuer leauing to be in some sort, it seemeth to æmulate in part that, which it cannot fully obtaine & expresse, tying it selfe to this small presence of this short & swift moment, which because it carrieth a certaine image of that abiding presence, whosoeuer hath it, seemeth to be. But because it could not stay, it vndertooke an infinite iourney of time, and so it came to passe, that it continued that life by going, whose plenitude it could not comprehend by staying. Wherefore if wee will giue things their right names, following *Plato*, let vs say that God is euerlasting, and the world perpetuall. Wherefore since euery iudgement comprehendeth those things which are subiect vnto it, according to his owne nature,

and

and God hath alway an euerlaſting and preſent ſtate, his knowledge alſo ſurpaſsing all motion of time, remayneth in the ſimplicity of his preſence, and comprehending the infinite ſpaces of that, which is paſt and to come, conſidereth al things in his ſimple knowledge, as though they were now in doing. So that, if thou wilt weigh his foreknowledge, with which he diſcerneth all things, thou wilt more rightly eſteeme it to bee the knowledge of a neuer fading inſtant, then a foreknowledge as of a thing to come. For which cauſe it is not called præuidence or foreſight, but rather prouidence, becauſe placed farre from inferiour things, it beholdeth all things as it were from the higheſt toppe of things. Why therefore wilt thou haue thoſe things neceſſary, which are illuſtra-

ted by the Diuine light, since that men make not those things necessary, which they see. For doth thy sight impose any necessity vpon those things, which thou seest present? No. But the present instant of men may well bee compared to that of God in this; that as you see some things in your temporall instant, so he beholdeth all things in his eternall presence. VVherefore this diuine foreknowledge doeth not change the nature and propriety of things, and it beholdeth them such in his presence, as they will after come to bee, neyther doth hee confound the iudgement of things, and with one sight of his mind he discerneth as well those things which shal happen necessarily, as otherwise. As you when at one time you see a man walking vpon earth, and the Sun ri-

sing

ſing in heauen, although they be both ſeene at once, yet you diſcerne, and iudge that the one is voluntary, and the other neceſſary. So likewiſe the Diuine ſight beholding all things, diſturbeth not the quality of things, which to him are preſent, but in reſpect of time are yet to come. And ſo this is not an opinion, but rather a knowledge grounded vpon truth, whē he knoweth that ſuch a thing ſhalbe, which likewiſe he is not ignorāt, that it hath no neceſsity of being. Here if thou ſayeſt, that cannot chuſe but happē, which God ſeeth ſhal happen, & that, which can not chuſe but happen, muſt be of neceſsity, and ſo tyeſt me to this name of neceſsity: I will graunt, that it is a moſt ſolide trueth, but whereof ſcarce any but a contemplator of Diuinity is capable.

For

For I will answere, that the same thing is necessary, when it is referred to the diuine knowledge; but when it is weighed in his owne nature, that it seemeth altogether free and absolute. For there be two necessities; the one simple, as that it is necessary for all men to be mortall. The other conditionall, as if thou knowest, that any man walketh, he must needes walke. For what a man knoweth, cannot bee otherwise, then it is knowne. But this conditionall draweth not with it that simple or absolute necessity. For this is not caused by the nature of the thing, but by the adding a condition. For no necessity maketh him to goe, that goeth of his owne accord, although it bee necessary that he goeth, while he goeth. In like manner if prouidence seeth any

ny thing present, that must needes be, although it hath no necessity of nature. But God beholdeth those future things, which proceed from freewill, present. These things therfore beeing referred to the Diuine sight are necessary by the condition of the diuine knowledg, and considered by themselues, they loose not the absolute freedome of their own nature. Wherefore doubtlesse all those things come to passe, which God foreknoweth shall come, but some of them proceede from freewill, which though they come to passe by being, yet they loose not their owne nature, because before they came to passe, they might also not haue happened. But what importeth it, that they are not necessary, since that by reason of the condition of the diuine knowledge, they come

come to passe in all respects, as if they were necessary. It importeth this, that those things, which I proposed a litle before, the Sunne rising, and the man going, while they are in doing, cannot chuse but bee in doing; yet one of them was necessarily to bee, before it was, and the other not. Likewise those things, which God hath present, haue doubtlesse a beeing, but some of them proceede from the necessity of things, other from the power of the doers. And therefore wee said not without cause, that these, if they bee referred to Gods knowledge, are necessary; and if they bee considered by themselues, they are free from the bonds of necessity. As whatsoeuer is manifest to senses, if thou referrest it to reason, is vniuersall, if thou considerest

it in it self, singular or particular. But thou wilt say, it is in my power to change my purpose, shall I frustrate prouidéce, if I chance to alter those things, which she foreknoweth? I answere, that thou mayest indeede chaunge thy purpose, but beecause the trueth of prouidence beeing present seeth, that thou canst doe so, and whether thou wilt doe so or no, and what thou purposest anew, thou canst not auoyde the Diuine foreknowledge; euen as thou canst not avoyde the sight of an eye, which is present, although thou turnest thy selfe to diuers actions by thy freewill.

But yet thou wilt enquire, whether GODS knowledge shall bee chaunged by thy disposition, so that when thou wilt now one thing, and now another, it should

also

alſo ſeeme to haue diuers knowledges. No. For Gods ſight preuenteth all that is to come, and recalleth and draweth it to the preſence of his owne knowledge; neither doth he vary, as thou imagineſt, now knowing one thing and now another, but in one inſtant without moueing preuenteth and comprehendeth thy mutations. Which preſence of comprehending, and ſeeing all things God hath not by the euent of future things, but by his owne ſimplicity. By which that doubt is alſo reſolued, which thou diddeſt put a litle before, that it is an vnworthy thing, that our future actions ſhould be ſaid to cauſe the knowledge of God. For this force of the diuine knowledge, comprehending all things with a preſent notion, appointeth to euery thing his meaſure,

sure, and receiueth nothing from ensuing accidents. All which being so, the freewill of mortall men remayneth vnuiolated, neither are the lawes vniust, which propose ptiniſhments and rewards to our wils, which are free from all necesity. There remayneth also a beholder of all things, which is God, who foreseeth all things, and the eternity of his vision, which is alway present, concurreth with the future quality of our actions, distributing rewards to the good, and punishments to the euill. Neyther doe we in vaine put our hope in God, or pray to him, for if wee doe this well and as we ought, wee shall not loose our labour, or bee without effect. Wherefore flye vices, embrace vertues, possesse your mindes with worthy hopes, offer vp humble prayers

prayers to your highest Prince. There is, if you will not dissemble, a great necessity of doing well imposed vpon you, since you liue in the sight of your Iudge, who beholdeth all things.

FINIS.

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